Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core by Thompson, Michael
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
3-9-2009
Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant:
Imagination at the Core
Michael Thompson
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Thompson, Michael, "Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core" (2009). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/50
  
 
Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: 
 
Imagination at the Core 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Michael Thompson 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Major Professor:  Martin Schönfeld Ph.D. 
Roger Ariew, Ph.D. 
Sidney Axinn, Ph.D. 
Charles Guignon, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
March 9, 2009 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Deduction, Logic, A priori, Space, Time  
 
© Copyright 2009, Michael Thompson
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Abstract                  iii  
 
Introduction                    1 
 
Chapter One:  Problematics                  5 
The Problem of the Imagination                         5 
The Problem of Kant Studies               15 
Methodology                 17 
Generalist Narratives                23
   
Chapter Two:  Imagination in Greek Philosophy             35 
 Promethean Imaginings               35 
 Plato                  37 
 Aristotle                 49 
 
Chapter Three:  Imagination in the Middle Ages and Renaissance           70 
 Transition from Greek to Medieval              70 
 St. Augustine of Hippo               76 
 St. Thomas Aquinas                94 
   
Chapter Four:  Imagination in Early Modern Philosophy          108 
 Transition from Medieval to Modern            108 
 The Renaissance- Pico della Mirandolla           112 
Descartes                             117 
 D.  Locke and Hume              144 
 
Chapter Five: Imagination in Kant‟s Architectonic           162 
 Kantian Concerns              162 
 Kant‟s Concern              173 
 
Chapter Six:  Imagination in the Transcendental Deduction          178 
 The A-deduction              178 
 Reactions to the Deduction             198 
 
 
ii 
 
Chapter Seven:  An Integrative Proposal for a New Deduction         206 
A New Deduction: Objective Validity           206 
Schematism: Objective Reality            218 
From A to B                     224 
Critics and Defenders                   237 
 
Chapter Eight:  Is the Imagination a Faculty, One or Two?          257 
 
Chapter Nine:  Imagination and Error Production           273 
 Principled Error Production                   273 
 Summary of 1
st
 Critique             290 
 
Chapter Ten:  Implications and Integration I: Imagination in the  
  Critique of Practical Reason             296 
 
Chapter Eleven:  Implications and integration II: Imagination in the 
  Critique of Judgment             320 
 
Conclusion                 343 
 
Works Cited                346 
 
About the Author   `             End Page  
  
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: 
Imagination at the Core 
 
Michael Thompson 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Kant‟s critical philosophy promises to overturn both Empiricism and Rationalism 
by arguing for the necessity of a passive faculty, sensibility, and an active faculty, 
understanding, in order for cognition to obtain.  Kant argues in favor of sense impression 
found in standard empirical philosophies while advocating conceptual necessities like 
those found in rational philosophies.  It is only in the synthesis of these two elements that 
cognition and knowledge claims are possible.  However, by affirming such a dualism, 
Kant has created yet another problem familiar to the history of philosophy, one of faculty 
interaction.  By affirming two separate and exclusive capacities necessary for cognition, 
Kant has bridged the gap between the two philosophical traditions, but created a gap that 
must be overcome in order to affirm his positive programmatic.  Kant himself realizes the 
difficulty his new philosophy faces when he claims the two sources of knowledge must 
have a “common, but unknown root.”  To complete Kant‟s program one must ask: “What 
bridges the gap between sensible intuition and conceptual understanding?”   
 In my dissertation, I turn to Kant‟s philosophy and find the answer to this 
question in the productive imagination.  In order to evaluate the viability of this answer, I 
iv 
 
problematize the imagination as it has been found in the history of Western philosophy.  
By tracing the historical use of the imagination in archetypal figures from both empiricist 
and rationalist traditions, one finds a development of imagination that culminates in the 
fundamental formulation found in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason.  In his critical 
philosophy, Kant synthesizes the imagination (Einbildungskraft) and the use of 
imagination found in both traditions, thus demonstrating its role in both sensation and 
understanding. By employing the imagination at both sensorial and conceptual levels, 
Kant has found, I argue, the liaison that overcomes the dualism established by his 
requirements for knowledge, as well as the common root for both.
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
 Due to technical vocabulary, complexity of thought and overall intricacy of 
Kant‟s philosophical position, isolating any one element of his cognitive apparatus in 
order to make clear its function, status, role and employment in cognition presents an 
interpreter with a number of challenges.  For example, isolating sensibility from the 
rest of the cognitive structures e.g. the understanding and reason, and determining its 
constituent role in knowledge production appears to be nearly impossible if not 
entirely so.  How can one understand this element without reference to its 
counterpart, and, furthermore, how can one clearly determine its role in cognition 
without the contraposing faculty with which it combines in knowledge production?  
By focusing on one element in Kant‟s philosophy, one runs the risk of failing to 
illustrate said element‟s proper place in Kant‟s critical philosophy.  And yet, one 
cannot understand Kant‟s philosophy without providing an analytic of the elements 
by which one can isolate constitutive parts and determine them in their interactions.   
 For this essay, I would like to propose that an isolation of one element is not 
only possible, but also necessary in an interpretation, defense and emendation of 
Kant‟s critical works.  By focusing on the imagination, one will be able, I argue, to 
interpret and defend Kant‟s critical evaluation of scientific, metaphysical, practical 
and aesthetic knowledge.  Knowledge is, according to Kant, a synthesis of two 
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separate and heterogeneous faculties, sensibility and understanding.  With such a 
formulation, Kant must present an explanation for how two such disparate faculties 
can be synthesized.  The imagination, I contend, is just such a liaison between 
sensibility and understanding.  My intent here is to focus on the imagination in order 
to gain greater insight on this “blind but indispensible function” as well as to defend 
Kant‟s description and prescription for knowledge claims. 
 Moreover, by focusing on the imagination one is able to further illustrate 
central doctrines of Kant‟s critical philosophy.  Describing the functions of other 
faculties as well as the origin and development of their products is one such chief 
concern.  By defining knowledge as a synthesis of the products of sensibility and the 
understanding, intuitions and concepts respectively, Kant presents himself and the 
reader with a considerable dualism.  Sensibility has its own processes and products 
separate from understanding.  So too does the understanding have its own processes 
and products removed from the influence of sensibility.  By bifurcating knowledge 
production between two separate faculties, Kant resurrects and defends a doctrine that 
will reconcile the passivity of empirical sensation with the activity, spontaneity, of 
intellectual processes involved in understanding.  But such a dualism presents Kant 
with a number of problems:  What are the origins of the products of both capacities, 
that is, what is the source for the elemental factors involved in the separate faculties, 
what do they have in common, and what ensures the correct applicability of concepts 
to intuitions, in short, their objective validity?  If they are mutually exclusive faculties 
and their products are radically different, how can such a synthesis come about, and 
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what applicability do we find in human experience, in short, their objective reality?  
Kant must address not only the sources and the correctness of the products of the 
faculties, but he must also demonstrate that they are connected in application and use 
in knowledge claims.  By turning to the imagination, I hope to present a coherent 
interpretation and defense of this central doctrine of Kant‟s critical works, but also to 
gain insight into this overlooked and often marginalized, but necessary, capacity of 
human cognition.  
Rather than approaching this topic through the regular means—by examining 
the arguments found in the Transcendental Deduction of the 1
st
 Critique, an approach 
most Anglo-American Kant scholars pursue—I prefer to examine the imagination in 
several of Kant‟s works. The Anglo-American debate has combined to present a 
standard interpretation, one which posits Kant‟s pure concepts, categories, as having 
no explanation other than his assumption and emendation of Aristotle‟s categories in 
conjunction with a table of logical judgments.  To combat this interpretation, I would 
like to center the focus of this protracted debate around the use Kant makes of the 
imagination.  The mediating capacity of the imagination, between sensibility and 
understanding, is a provocative suggestion Kant himself makes, one to which non-
Anglo-American philosophers only occasionally attend and Anglo-American 
interpreters generally neglect.  Treatments of the imagination in Kant‟s corpus, 
however, one finds to be remarkably incomplete.  More often than not, imagination is 
discussed in context of Kant‟s 3rd Critique and analysis of aesthetic judgments.  But it 
is precisely with the aesthetic that Kant begins his critical enterprise.  Therefore I 
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propose to examine the imagination not only in context of Kant‟s 3rd Critique, but 
also in terms of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the 1
st
 Critique, his discussion of 
sensibility, and its connection to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant‟s discussion of 
the understanding.  By focusing on the imagination, I propose to draw connections 
between Kant‟s works and to provide an explanation for the list of pure concepts Kant 
provides, all under the auspices of determining the objective validity and reality of 
our concepts.  The general thesis of this work is that Kant‟s use of the imagination is 
well-informed and radical.  And as such, I propose to illustrate the various treatments 
of the imagination from various archetypes in the history of philosophy, to 
demonstrate formulations that presage and pre-figure Kant‟s understanding in order to 
provide a heuristic against which Kant provides his own account.  By employing the 
imagination as the liaison between sensibility and understanding, Kant draws upon 
the historical tradition that attributes this mediating function to the imagination, but 
he also transforms the imagination from the specious and mistrusted faculty of 
tradition into a necessary element of human thinking.   
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Chapter One: Problematics 
 
The Problem of the Imagination 
 
The imagination is largely an untreated and ambiguous topic in the history of 
philosophy.  The ontological status of both the imagination and its products as well as 
the epistemic role they play in human cognition is underdeveloped in most major 
philosophical thinkers.  From some of the earliest Western philosophers, Plato and 
Aristotle, to the end of the modern period, Kant‟s critical works, authors acknowledge 
some use of the imagination in cognition, but more often than not excoriate the 
imagination as an instrument of folly.  Plato broadly cautions against imaginative 
mimesis while Kant indicates the importance of the imagination while failing to 
expound upon it properly.  This comprehensive confusion might indeed lead one to 
say the state of the imagination is a mess.   
The difficulty of this inquiry is compounded by several factors.  Not only are 
primary texts often inexact, obscure and inconsistent, but secondary authors 
discussing the imagination in the various primary authors of tradition are in radical 
disagreement concerning how the inquiry should be approached.  Scholarship on this 
issue is divided as well as divisive.  Depending on proclivities, scholars typically 
evaluate the uncertain status of the imagination according to literary, psychological, 
or philosophical perspectives or any combination of thereof.  Also, depending upon 
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proclivities, scholars approach this issue from a conceptual or historical or 
phenomenological standpoint.  Methodology is always at issue; whether to focus on 
particular individuals or represent the entirety of history, whether to pursue 
imagination conceptually or descriptively, often phenomenologically.  
One further obfuscation is whether one can look to a certain author or group 
of authors and distill a theory of the imagination, or whether one attempts an inquiry 
more comprehensive in scope.  Certain scholars prefer a fine grain analysis of one or 
few primary authors, others favor a global approach writing topically, but 
superficially, on a great number of authors.  The former presents deeper analysis 
while losing comprehensiveness, the latter is all-inclusive while risking critical rigor 
and philosophical insight.  It would seem that not only is the state of imagination a 
mess, but also the state of commentary on the imagination, is a mess. 
Even with such intricacies, I believe the state of the imagination and the 
authors who deem fitting to discuss such obscurities may be summarized according to 
three generalizations: those who find the imagination as a superordinate faculty, those 
who find the imagination as subordinate and subservient to other faculties and those 
who find the imagination as a mediator between faculties.  The first of this three-fold 
division are those literary and philosophical masters we find in the 19
th
 Century 
Romantic movement, particularly English Romanticism, and German Idealism.  
These authors sing paeans to the glory of the imagination, the sine qua non of human 
experience.  Literary figures like Baudelaire, Coleridge, Keats and Blake exalt the 
imagination in sentiments such as:  
 7 
 
imagination created the world
1
 
 
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living power and prime 
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of 
the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM
2
  
 
and 
 
The world of Imagination is the world of Infinite and Eternal… There 
exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every thing 
which we see reflected in this Vegetable place of Nature.
3
 
 
Soberer thinkers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel also promote the imagination as 
the  
 
central creative process that allows human experience.  Fichte observes: 
 
Through this passage of an indeterminate product of the free power of 
imagination to its total determination in one and the same act, that 
which occurs in my consciousness becomes an image [Bild] and is 
posited as an image.  It becomes my product because I must posit it 
through absolute self-activity.
4
 
 
In Fichte‟s cryptic phraseology, he attributes certain processes enabled by the 
imagination as the cornerstone of the appearance of self and world at all.  A more 
aggrandizing sense of the imagination is difficult to behold. 
 Conversely, there are those who denigrate the imagination and marginalize it 
as subordinate to all other processes involved in human experience.  Most notorious is 
Plato‟s relegation of the imagination [eikasia] and products of the imagination [eikos] 
                                                          
1
 Baudalaire, Charles. “La Reine des Facultés” in Curiosités esthétiques [et] L’Art romantique, ed. H 
Lemaitre (Paris: Garnier, 1962), p. 321.  from Casey. 
2
 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor.  Biographia Lieteraria, ed. George Watson  (London: Dent, 1965), p. 167. 
from Casey.  
3
 Blake, William.  Between 1790 and 1820, The Poems ed. W.H. Stevenson  (London: Longman, 
1971). p. from Brann. 
4
 Fichte  Wissenschaftslehre  p. 3. 
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to the third remove from reality.  Plato decries the imagination because of its mimetic 
function, stating “imitation is far removed from the truth.”5  Imagination, for Plato, is 
the lowest form of human experience and knowledge.
6
  Less conspicuous, but more 
telling, is a general oversight for most thinkers to treat of the imagination at all and 
the implication that it is subordinate to more important matter of cognition and 
metaphysics.  Even the seemingly most systematic of philosophers, like Aristotle or 
Kant, offer only oblique references and obscure explanations for what appears to 
most as an integral portion of both cognitive processes and metaphysics.  Edward 
Casey attributes this to the Platonic invective against imagination at the beginnings of 
Western philosophical discourse.  “The course of philosophical theorizing about the 
imagination” he writes, “is launched in a highly critical vein.”7  Thus, a consequence 
of Plato‟s critique is an original suspicion and mistrust of the imagination that carries 
into most subsequent philosophers. 
 A third way of evaluating places the imagination as a mediator between other 
powers of the mind.  According to this view, imagination is neither the “queen of the 
faculties” nor is it a mere slave or false mimesis of higher, truer cognitive processes.  
Integral to human experience, this third way argues for the imagination as the 
mediator between sense perception and intellection/reason/understanding.   This route 
neither belittles nor exalts.  Classically, authors like Aristotle, Kant and most 
                                                          
5
 Plato. Republic, Book X, 598b” in Plato Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper  (Cambridge:  Hackett, 
1997), p. 1202. 
6
 Republic 513e. 
7
 Casey, Edward S.  Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1976), p. 16.  
 9 
 
medieval thinkers attribute some mediational felicity to the imagination.  Aristotle 
claims: 
Imagination (phantasia) is different from either perceiving (aesthesis) 
or discursive thinking (dianoia), though it [imagination] is not found 
without sensation, or judgement (hypolepsis) without it.
8
 
 
Kant echoes this sentiment when he writes, 
 
Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the 
power of imagination (Einbildungskraft), a blind but indispensable 
function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.
9
 
 
For this group of thinkers, the imagination is typically both a 
faculty/capacity/function, with a specific product.  The faculty is denoted by the 
unique function the imagination obtains in the transference of sense perception to 
thinking, and no knowledge, no judgment, no intellection about what is availed by the 
senses is possible without the employment of the imagination. 
 These three evaluations, superordinate, subordinate and mediational are 
representative of the three standard approaches to imagination.  Prima facie, one can 
attribute the ranking of the imagination to each groups‟ approach and definition of the 
imagination, and this depends upon the very conceptualization the word 
“imagination” warrants for each group.  Moreover, the etymology of imagination 
further demonstrates the mire in which one finds oneself in such an inquiry.  The 
Latinate imagination has no clear etymological foundation.  Phonetically, it is related 
                                                          
8
 Aristotle De Anima III.3 in The Complete Works of Aristotle ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 680. 
9
 Kant, Immanuel  The Critique of Pure Reason A78/B103 trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: 
Macmillan & Co, 1965), p. 112. 
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to the noun imaginationem and the verb imaginari.  Another clear connection is to the 
noun imago, the product of such activity, from from the Latin imaginem and imitari.  
From these last words we gain not just imagination and image, but, also, imitate and 
imitation.  The Latinate “imitation”, mimus, is thus traced back to the Greek mimesis, 
mimo.  Plato‟s condemnation of imagination can be attributed to this mimetic 
function found in the etymology of the term “imagination.”  Imagination, according 
to the head of the Academy, neither creates, discovers, nor thinks, it merely copies 
what has presented itself.  The term Plato employs, however, is that of eikasia.  
Another difficult term to disclose fully, eikasia, engenders terms still in currency 
today.  Icon, iconoclast and idea all cluster around eikasia and eikos, which is closely 
akin to the Greek eidola, eidos.  The connection between icons and that which they 
represent in religious ceremony is not far from the original understanding of what 
ideas are and what they entail.  The correct eidos is to grasp reality; so, too, to possess 
a true icon is to possess something of the divine. 
 But eikasia is not the only Greek term for imagination.  Although Plato 
employs eikasia, phantasia was also available to the Greek speaking world.  
Phantasia is the nominal form of the verb phanesthai, to appear.  What appears 
through the process of phanesthai is phantasia or a phantasia.  Phantasy, or fantasy, 
in its original usage had little to do with flights of fancy, it pertained to what was 
appearing/what appears.  In ancient and medieval use, phantasia, phantasy, is the 
very process of presenting what appears.  Ancient and medieval thinkers appealing to 
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the mediational nature of imagination draw from this source.  What appears to the 
senses must appear to the intellect by means of phantasia. 
 In German, one finds two terms for imagination, both Imitation 
(Nachahmung) and Einbildungskraft, each with their own etymological origins.  
Imitation follows the Latin etymology closely, but Einbildungskraft has different 
sources.  Literally, it is a, ein, power, kraft, of formation, bildung, from das Bilden.  
Futhermore, das Bilden possesses several connotations; from building in a literal 
constructive sense to articulation in physical and mental.  The imagination is the 
power to build or construct.  Mediational employment of imagination in German 
thinking, Kant especially, draws from this sense of building a bridge between sense 
perception and understanding.  
 Traditional etymologies lead from imagination to imitari to mimesis and 
phantasia.  Unorthodox etymologies, however, might also prove insightful.  The goal 
behind such etymological discussion is to capture what concepts the term 
“imagination” brings to bear.  And while much of the standard etymological picture 
explains the subordinate and mediational camps of imagination authors, further 
inquiry may shed light on the third.  What we seek is not literal phonetic and 
morphological etymology, but a conceptual etymology as well.  To explain the 
superordinate elevation of imagination, further etymology can be unearthed. 
 If one focuses on the phoneme “mag” in imagination, one is easily led to the 
mago, magus, found in Latin.  The magus, a wise and often magical individual, 
possesses truth and utilizes exceptional means to obtain such.  Wizardry and magic 
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appear to be instruments of imagination and supernatural abilities lend themselves to 
those who employ imagination.  But with this supernatural access typically comes 
mistrust.  Also, in tracing the development from mim(o) in the Greek to the Latin 
imitatio, one apprehends that in the transliteration the first consonant “m” is dropped.  
Mim(o) first becomes “imo” to which is then added further phonemes.  Pausing at this 
transitional point, however, another set of related, but often overlooked words comes 
into appearance.  “Imo” is phonologically related to “emu” as found in the family of 
words surrounding emulate and emulation.  Conceptually similar, emulation is a 
copying, a mimesis.  Additionally, with emulation, comes the connotation of 
attempting to equal and often overpass.  The superordinators of imagination subscribe 
to this understanding of imagination.  The imagination is not merely some faculty, or 
a middle player in the process of human experience.  Rather, the imagination 
surpasses all other processes to ascend to the apex of human experience.  Imagination 
is the world and creates the world for these authors.  But as with magic and 
supernatural abilities to obtain truth, just such ennobling of the imagination meets 
with skepticism and mistrust.  This very sentiment of both glorification and wariness 
is found in the ancient Hebrew term yetser.  Yetser can be both good (yetser ha-Tov) 
and/or bad (yetser ha-Ra).  Yetser derives from the same root word yzr as creation 
(yetsirah), creator (yotser) and create (yatsar).  A creative impulse, one marked by 
caution, informs those authors who wish to elevate the imagination to a creative 
impulse. 
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 In contemporary discussions of the imagination, recent authors have attempted 
to acknowledge both the historical and etymological curiosities of imagination and to 
account for the equivocity of imagination in its conceptual and etymological 
obscurities.  Prodigious authors such as Jean-Paul Sartre, John Sallis and Edward 
Casey approach the imagination from a phenomenological perspective.  Sartre 
continues a roughly standard interpretation accounting for the imagination as a 
hermeneutic device through which both pretensions (projections) and retentions must 
proceed and then concerns himself with a theory of the nature of images.  He 
surmises “the only way to establish a true theory of the being of images is to propose 
nothing which does not have a direct source in reflective experience.”10  The latter 
two authors follow Sartre‟s phenomenological lead, but focus on the verbal 
component of the term “imagination,” Sallis calling it a force or power at work in 
human cognition, Casey exploring the imagination as it takes place in an act, in 
imagining.  Casey‟s assessment of the problem of the imagination explores the 
ambiguity that the term has received in canonical accounts and proceeds to describe 
the details involved in the imagining act itself and not any evaluation of powers or 
faculties.  Sallis commends Casey for his methodological approach, but chides him 
for reducing the imagination to mere imagining, while himself treating the 
imagination as many classical authors do while employing a phenomenological 
method.
11
   
                                                          
10
 Sartre, J.P. Imagination trans. Forrest Williams (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 
3. 
11
 Sallis, John  Force of Imagination (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 15. 
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 In a different vein, historical scholars have attempted to provide individual 
accounts, epochal understandings and entire histories of the imagination.  Each of 
these factions attempts to arrange etymological and historical facts into a coherent 
narrative for their respective projects.  The range of historical scholarship runs the 
gamut from particularists to generalists. With Robert Brumbaugh
12
 and his 
exploration of images in Plato‟s mathematical treatises, one finds specialists who 
focus on a particular individual, even an obscure doctrine of a singular individual, in 
history.  With figures such as Jacques LeGoff
13
 and Murray Bundy
14
 who represent 
the authoritative voice for medieval scholarship on the imagination, one finds an 
epochal conceptualization.  With historians like J.M. Cocking, who until his death 
worked on a manuscript delineating a complete history of imagination, Richard 
Kearney and Eva Brann, one finds an historical approach that borders on the 
comprehensive. 
 With so many approaches and so many projects, with so many interpretations 
and with so much disagreement, what is to be made of the imagination?  The first 
theme of this essay—tracing the history of imagination up to the time of Kant—
presents considerable obstacles. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Cf. Braumbaugh, Robert S. Plato’s Mathematical Imagination: The Mathematical Passages in the 
Dialogues and their Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 1954.  
13
 Cf. LeGoff, Jacques The Medieval Imagination trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press) 1985. 
14
 Cf. Bundy, Murray W. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought (Champaign, 
IL: University of Illinois Press) 1927. 
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The Problem of Kant Studies 
 
 The second theme of this thesis—the imagination in Kant—fares little better.  
Kant scholarship does not find itself in much better shape than the arena of 
imagination.  While there are well-established translations, well-rehearsed arguments 
and well-defined doctrines of Kantian philosophy, methodological and conceptual 
disagreements have relegated the field to certain fiefdoms, which, once certain claims 
are made, are bitterly defended.  And, once and again, forays are made into other 
lands, exploratory, invasive raids are made in attempt to expand empires.  These 
empires, much like feudal lands are bequeathed to trusted vassals, inheritors of the 
realm.   
 Much as we find with the imagination, Kant scholars disagree on 
conceptualizations, methodology and specificity.  Depending on whether one pursues 
the Marburg, Southwest or Anglo-American schools of thought, disparate 
interpretations and infighting occur on issues aesthetic, metaphysical, epistemic, 
moral and now even environmental.  One oversight in the establishment of these 
feudal properties is a holistic approach.  Much current scholarship confines itself to 
the well-documented “critical period,” roughly 1781-1894.  Inherent in this narrow 
approach is a marginalization of the “pre-critical” period and the late writings of an 
academic in retirement, one that might present a coherent narrative to Kant‟s life and 
 16 
 
works rather than the disparate story commonly told.
15
  An integrationist approach is, 
however, fraught with peril of its own.  With internal inconsistency, evolution of 
ideas, different versions of the same texts, difficulties surrounding legitimacy of late 
texts and seeming ravings at the end of his life, attempting to provide and account of 
the entirety of Kant comes across as fool-hardy.  Kant studies, while not mired in the 
same morass as imagination, does find itself in an analogous situation, an abundance 
of source material and yet no cohesion.  And so, a similar question arises, what 
should one make of Kant?  More specifically, what should one make of imagination 
in Kant? 
 I propose to attempt my own foray into such an imperiled landscape; I 
propose an integrationist approach to determine the role imagination plays in Kant‟s 
philosophical corpus.  It is not lightly that I undertake this project, but with caution in 
mind; my aim is not to tilt at windmills.  Like any interpreter, one must pick and 
choose salient features to one‟s project.  Much of Kant scholarship provides exacting 
analyses of many key issues.  One, however, that is not thoroughly represented is 
Kant and the theory of imagination.   
 More often than not, Kant and his employment of imagination are relegated to 
marginal treatment or, worse, isolated to a passing footnote.  For those authors that do 
treat the imagination in Kant more extensively, the focus is isolated on one or perhaps 
                                                          
15
 Manfred Kuehn is one author who makes excellent inroads overcoming the common conception that 
Kant breaks completely with a Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy during the “silent decade” after which 
he begins his “critical period.”  Kuehn illustrates trends in Kant‟s thinking that present developmental 
connections from the so-called periods of Kant‟s life.  While not a biography, this work follows this 
lead by drawing connections between different works and periods of Kant‟s life in order to show the 
development and importance of imagination in his thought.  Cf. Kuehn, Manfred Kant: A Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2001. 
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a few texts.
16
  Sarah Gibbon‟s work, Kant’s Theory of the Imagination, is the only 
text that attempts an integrationist account of the imagination in all three critiques.  
Conspicuously lacking, however, is much connection to the pre-critical period, the 
Anthropology and the Opus Postumum.
17
 Moreover, by emphasizing “the possibility 
of cognition from the point of view of the judging subject”18 and the mediational role 
of imagination, Gibbons misses a more radical origin of the resources of cognition, 
that is from the imagination itself.
19
  Furthermore, Gibbon‟s work fails to illustrate 
the historical tradition from which Kant draws his development of imagination, 
subsequently failing to note the radical transformation of this faculty in Kant himself.   
No volume exists that attempts to integrate a comprehensive and radical view of the 
imagination and its employment in Kant‟s corpus. 
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 In order to undertake such a project a programmatic must first be established.  
Attempting to combine a thematic delimitation of imagination within a particular 
individual‟s philosophy runs counter to most methodological intuitions.  One needs 
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either to present a comprehensive theory of the imagination or narrow the search to a 
particular epoch or individual, so standard concerns with methodology dictate.  I 
would rather, however, assert that the story of the imagination is one that needs be 
told, and in the telling of that story we find in Kant‟s philosophy a climactic and 
radical use of the imagination.  In his works, Kant employs two imaginations, both 
productive and reproductive.  The latter employment accounts for much of the 
standard mediational interpretations of the use of the imagination, one necessary for 
cognition, one that is more often a mere instrument in higher order cognitive 
processes..  The productive imagination as Kant presents it, however, implies a 
fundamental grounding of all cognitive capacities in imaginative acts.
20
  The 
categories of pure understanding themselves, as I intend to address later are products 
of the imagination.  Likewise, the unified manifold of intuition, that may then be 
subsumed under a category, is a product of the imagination.  The act of synthesis 
itself, as Kant pointedly reminds his reader, is “the mere result of the power of 
imagination”21  In recounting the story of the imagination, I am really presenting 
preliminary attempts to understand an elemental power, which finds its rightful, if 
undocumented, employ in the philosophy of Kant.  In tracing the history of the 
imagination, I hope to discern certain philosophical precedents, ones that inform 
Kant‟s use, and to demonstrate his continuity within the historical tradition.  Once the 
history is complete, the second effort is to determine to what extent the imagination 
informs Kant‟s philosophy.  The claim already alluded to is that in Kant we find a 
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synthesis and radicalizing of the importance of imagination.  His two-fold description 
of reproductive and productive imagination incorporates the historical dimensions 
while involving transcendental arguments for the necessity of imagination in human 
cognition.  After Kant, the history of imagination is changed forever. 
 In order to carry out this project, I will employ a variety of methodologies.  
Archeological, etymological, historical, inter and intra-textual analysis will be 
offered.  I propose a four-fold methodological inquiry.  Following John Sallis‟ 
methodological explication in The Gathering of Reason, I will present four levels of 
interpretation/interrogation: duplex, projective, inversive and subversive.
22
  Duplex 
interpretation is mainly used in the historical exegesis of the imagination as it has 
unfolded in archetypal figures from the history of philosophy.  This strategy involves 
primary documents and a duplication of them as representative of certain species of 
philosophical inquiry on the imagination.  In presenting a copy of another author‟s 
thought, the image-making function of imagination is inherently at work, or, perhaps, 
in these cases a sketch/schema-making function.  Furthermore, in the reproduction of 
others‟ theories, room is made for reflection on the topic.  This reflective process, 
while remaining within the horizon of the original author‟s framework, sanctions 
clarification of the conceptualization and aims of the author‟s use of the imagination.  
In duplicating historical authors the imperative is to faithfully present the authors‟ 
understanding.  
 Projective interpretation is a process by which one subordinates duplicative 
reflection in favor of a reflective recovery.  Projective interpretation attempts to 
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return to origins in the historical understanding of the project.  The endeavor is to 
return to the origins from which one may gain insight on the current project.  In 
venturing a history of imagination, the promise is to return to Kant‟s conception with 
a more robust sense of the precedence that has led to Kant‟s use.  This is not to imply 
causal connections between authors or an evolutionary conceptualization of the 
imagination in history.  Rather, the endeavor is to uncover the experiential dimension 
from which traditional authors draw their explications, or lack thereof, of the 
imagination.  Reflection on the origins and the history of the imagination support and 
corroborate Kant‟s radical theory of imagination by informing it and being 
transformed in it.   
 The third interpretive strategy, the inversive, will chiefly be employed in the 
inter- and intra-textual interpretation of Kant‟s theory.  Inversive reflection broadens 
the textual base by inverting components found in the faithful duplicative process.  
Rather than merely presenting the standard formulations found in textual sources, the 
inversive process promotes insight, perhaps not ventured by the author.  By drawing 
attention to obscure and often inconsistent passages in Kant‟s philosophy, I hope to 
draw out the  nature of Kant‟s understanding and the radical employment he makes of 
the imagination.  The promissory note here is that such inversion will unearth a 
concealed stratum in Kant‟s philosophy, perhaps unbeknownst to the author himself.  
As Kant himself expressed, “it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts 
which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary 
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conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has 
understood himself.”23 
 The final stage of interpretation is the subversive.  In this phase, one re-
installs the texts within the general history, to subvert tradition in order to gain insight 
on current issues.  By returning to the history with new-found reflection, the leading 
question in this inquiry; “what do we make of the imagination?” will once again be 
promoted.  In turning away from specific texts, one returns to the conceptual issue at 
hand.  This final phase of interpretation is intended to gain ground on contemporary 
questions still present in both scholarship on Kant and the imagination.  This last 
interpretive strategy will not find complete execution in this work.  For the sake of 
brevity, only general consequences of Kant‟s transformation can be drawn in this 
work.  The tenor of this text, however, resonates with the implications of Kant‟s 
ingenuity.  Unfortunately, these suggestions can only be hinted at in the closing 
remarks of this work.  However, the first three interpretive strategies, I believe, come 
to fruition.  Not only will a faithful reproduction of archetypes of philosophy and 
their use of the imagination be presented, but I will endeavor an archeology that 
attempts to unearth the origins and questions that prompt such uses of the imagination 
in the history of ideas.  Drawing from these duplicative and projective exercises, I 
will attempt an inversion of the imagination in Kant‟s critical works, while 
illustrating preliminary connections with some of the non-critical works.  The 
implications and integrations necessary to the final stage, the subversive, are 
presented in abbreviated form, but offers promising research in the future, one that 
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will perhaps be able to shed further light on the imagination both itself and within the 
greater context of Kant‟s complete works.    
 Following these interpretive strategies for the imagination I hope to maintain 
the reflective openness such a term connotes.   It is my understanding that I approach 
both topics from a generalist view yet with particular application.  In using these 
strategies, I look to delineate the imagination and demonstrate its conceptual 
stronghold in Kant‟s philosophy.   Boldly stated, the imagination is the mark of 
human finitude, human life and human experience.  It remains at the center of 
perception, judgment, protentions for the future, the retentions of memory, synthesis 
and a sense of identity- it is at the heart of the any knowledge obtainable by humans 
cognition.  Following the romantic German and Anglo Idealists, it is the sine qua non, 
without which human cognition would not be human cognition.  But mitigating the 
romantic nostalgia, my claim is merely that it is integral to the processes.   This 
position does not deify the imagination as found in romantic sensibilities.  Rather, it 
gives the imagination its proper dignity among the processes of human cognition. 
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Generalist Narratives 
 
 When surveying the literature that deals with the imagination and its role in 
human cognition, it is not until the beginning of the sixteenth century and the work of 
Pico della Mirandola, On the Imagination published in 1500, that one finds a text that 
thematically examines the topic on its own.  Fortunately, Pico‟s work establishes 
precedent in treating the imagination as a topic worthy of exclusive treatment; 
unfortunately, Pico‟s ideas are not original, but merely a compilation and summary of 
the fragmentary treatment of the topic in Medieval thinking.  Nevertheless, Pico 
ushers in an era in philosophical investigation where the imagination begins to play a 
more prominent role and embarks upon establishing the imagination as a topic worthy 
of consideration in its own right.  Quite recently, authors have taken up the work of 
Pico and have begun to chart the historical dimensions of the imagination, expanding 
Pico‟s work from a compilation and thematic coherence of only the Medieval period, 
but have begun to include the echoes of imagination in Plato, the references Aristotle 
makes to the topic, the place of imagination in the cognitive hierarchies of the 
Medieval period, the role and possible transformation of imagination in the modern 
period, and even the suggestion of a post-modern imagination.  The imagination, it 
would seem, has arrived. 
 The contemporary approaches vary as much in methodology and content 
as the history of philosophy displays for any topic.  The trends in scholarship 
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run from particularists to generalists; from analytic to continental, psychological 
to philosophical to religious.   
 The foremost generalists who address the history of imagination are Eva 
Brann and Richard Kearney.
24
 Both authors present a comprehensive 
accounting of the history, provide detailed analysis of individual and epochal 
conceptualizations and attempt a coherent narrative for the development of the 
imagination.  Unfortunately, with these general concerns their similarities are at 
an end.   
 Brann‟s formidable compendium, The World of Imagination, attempts to 
exhaust multiple fields of inquiry concerning the imagination; including 
philosophy, psychology—classical  and experimental—, religion and literature.  
This voluminous work centers around Brann‟s central claim that, while given a 
pivotal role in various disciplines, the imagination has long suffered from 
limited explanation, and her endeavor is to provide a unifying explanation 
throughout the disparate fields.  Central to her claim is the understanding of the 
imagination as a “faculty of representation” responsible for „creating‟ images.  
This fundamental function is manifest in various formulations throughout the 
history of ideas;   
a) in philosophy, as a power mediating between senses and reason by 
virtue of representing perceptual objects without their presence.  
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b) in psychology, as a class of representations, quasi-sensory or quasi-
perceptual which occurs in the absence of the usual external stimuli 
and which may have behavioral consequences different from those 
attendant on their sensory counterpart. 
c) in ordinary discourse, as the capacity for seeing things in one‟s 
head.
25
 
 
Notably, all three definitions cluster around the ability and/or product of presenting or 
re-presenting the objects of sensation as ideas.  This representing, or “image-making” 
as Brann describes it, is the signal and exclusive function of imagination.  Throughout 
history, commentators- philosophical, psychological, religious or literary- all employ 
imagination homogenously, or nearly so.  What is missing, however, is adequate 
explanation for the homogeneity of the image-making function found amongst the 
various authors.    
 Kearney, on the other hand, denies homogeneity of the imagination in his 
work, The Wake of the Imagination.  Here Kearney plots a course through history 
demonstrating an evolution of use and conceptualization of the imagination.  He 
accords his own methodology the laudation of genealogy, tracing the family 
resemblance of all the terms used as imagination.  In its first employment, in ancient 
Greek and Medieval thought, the imagination is merely a mimetic faculty.  Kearney‟s 
paradigmatic metaphor for this epoch is a mirror.  What human imagination performs 
in this era is an image-making function of nature, deus sive natura.  The locus of 
reality and truth is located in the natural order of things.  Moreover, meaning 
ascription is located in the original.  Human cognition in its imaginative capacity 
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simply mirrors the world in its original meaning.  In ancient Greek culture, the 
meaning of objects and the world is found in the dynamic cosmos of change and 
becoming.  The imagination in its reproductive capacity has the ability to create 
temporary stases in the world of flux and thus ensconce meaning in eternal, 
immutable ideas.  In Medieval thought the imagination finds itself not reproducing 
merely nature, but the order of the universe as created by God.  Human understanding 
as reflected in the mirror image of the world is ultimately dependent/derivative on the 
totalization depicted in God‟s knowledge or nature‟s order.   Both ancient and 
medieval formulations are inherently, Kearney claims, theocentric.
26
   
 Shifting from ancient and medieval imagination and the metaphor of the 
mirror, Kearney describes and compares the modern conception of imagination as a 
lamp to that of the ancient/medieval epoch of a mirror.  This productive imagination, 
found in the humanistic considerations of modern era, is the source of light and 
inspiration within human experience.  No longer dependent upon a transcendent 
world, moderns find themselves with the power and position to provide themselves 
with meaning in the world.  According to Kearney, this anthropocentrism marks the 
modern paradigm as it concerns the imagination.  Humans are no longer mere 
derivative beings, but are, rather, the inventors and creators of their world.   
The final stage alleged by Kearney is the ex-centric imagination found in the 
postmodern era of ubiquitous images.  Because of the sheer number of images and the 
technologically-enabled reproductive capacity we find in contemporary culture, 
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Kearney argues that the images afforded by imagination have no clear originals, 
neither in theo- nor anthropocentricism.  Images of images of images characterize the 
postmodern condition.  Losing sight of the originals, no longer are humans nor the 
world/god the locus of meaning, rather, meaning arises from a “labyrinth of looking 
glasses”  from which no origin can be found.27   Kearney‟s metaphor shifts, once 
again, from the lamp to the bricoleur,
28
 someone who plays with fragments of 
meaning, which she herself did not create.  This process, Kearney claims, is even 
unconscious to the bricoleur herself.  Often, creative artists, wordsmiths, poets, or 
philosophers, believe themselves to be the author of meaning, yet they are merely 
recombining already given fragments to express different permutations of already 
existing elements.  According to Kearney, the development of the imagination has a 
linearity that can be traced from ancient, anonymous, theocentric, mirror-like 
mimesis; to modern, self-expressive, anthropocentric, lamp-like creativity; to post-
modern, unconscious, ex-centric, labyrinthine playing.  Because of the ubiquity and 
commonality of images and imagining, the imagination, he declares, is a “species 
under threat of extinction.”29  
Before the long argument for evolving imagination, Kearney offers a 
summary of the Western conceptualization of the imagination.  He enumerates the 
two basic definitions of the imagination as follows: 
a) as a representational faculty, which reproduces images of some pre-
existing reality 
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and 
b) a creative faculty which produces images, which often lay claim to 
an original status in their own right
30
 
 
Kearney even extends this analysis to four ways in which the imagination may be 
conceived.  In order to represent or produce, the imagination may employ different 
approaches.  Kearney cites them as the four main meanings of the term imagination, 
which are the following: 
a) the ability to evoke absent objects which exist elsewhere, without 
confusing these absent objects with things present in the here and 
now 
b) a construction and/or use of material forms and figures such as 
paintings, statues, photographs etc. to represent real things in some 
„unreal‟ way 
c) a fictional projection of non-existent things as in dreams or literary 
narratives 
d) the capacity of human consciousness to become fascinated by 
illusions, confusing what is real with what is unreal.
31
  
 
Kearney‟s approach allows him to embrace the equivocity that accompanies 
imagination through the many translations and transliterations.  Without isolating a 
singular definition of the imagination, he manages to agree with much of what Brann 
argues for, while maintaining a polysemantic undertstanding of the term.  
 The disagreement between Brann and Kearney is precisely about development 
of the imagination, or lack thereof.  Brann cites the homogeneity of the imagination, 
with its conspicuous lack of treatment in the history of philosophy, as a viable and 
interesting contemporary issue.   It is the “missing mystery” in the history of ideas, 
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one that needs exploring, explanation and demonstration.  For Kearney, it is the 
interesting development among epochal changes that elicits interest and demands the 
“story of the imagination” be told. More importantly, it is precisely the nature and 
employment of imagination upon which they seemingly disagree.   
However, upon closer scrutiny, both authors do actually describe remarkably 
similar accounts of the imagination as it appears in the use of historical figures.  
Neither Kearney nor Brann discount the representative power of imagination.  Neither 
deny the subordinate, mediate, and superordinate denigrations and elevations recited 
from the historical record.  Neither deny the claim that the imagination possesses the 
ability to present that which is absent.  What the two authors do disagree upon, is the 
role imagination takes in meaning ascription, world constitution and experience 
orientation.  In short, they disagree on the way humans understand the imagination.  
Both authors agree on the use and function of the imagination as a liaison between the 
senses and the intellect.  The imagination in its reproductive role, they both contend, 
does mediate between the senses and the intellect.  In addition to the standard role of 
imagination as handmaid to reason or intellection, is the often overlooked application 
of reason and judgment back into the practical life-world.  It is in this second aspect 
that Kearney cites the true difference between his three paradigms of the imagination.  
If the imagination is merely a reproductive capacity, then it is just a mediator.  If, 
however, the imagination serves a more productive role in meaning and orientation, 
then he has a strong case for his evolutionary story of the imagination.  Yet, it is just 
at this juncture that Brann and Kearney can be reconciled.  If the function of the 
 30 
 
imagination is nearly always the same, it is on other metaphysical issues, those 
pertaining to the sources of meaning and whether humans create meaning or receive it 
from an external source, that Brann and Kearney disagree.  The imagination may 
indeed be the same throughout the course of history, but what it reproduces, or 
produces for that matter, and the source of the „original‟ is the issue at contention.  
Kearney‟s extrapolation from imagination to meaning-making is the contention that is 
outstanding.  It needs both explanation and justification.   
 The aim of this historical section is to follow the historical ledger, largely as 
Brann, Kearney and others have, in order to present a coherent narrative or story of 
the imagination.  I hope to continue in the spirit of Brann and Kearney, both in 
illustrating the role of the imagination in historical figures, developing a story of the 
imagination, but, moreover, to isolate signature insights of antecedent philosophers in 
the understanding and employment Kant has of the imagination.  This historiography 
is an attempt to continue the work of Brann and Kearney.  To do so, I will supplement 
both Kearney and Brann‟s treatment‟s, providing the way specific philosophers 
understand the imagination in particular epochs, something Brann tends to overlook 
in arguing for a single imagination in history, and isolating a single function of the 
imagination, a claim Kearney never denies, but fails to include in his development of 
human orientation.  In short, my own historiography is a synthesis of these two 
approaches.  In so doing, I hope to demonstrate in greater detail both the agreement 
and disagreement between these two eminent scholars, and to continue work begun 
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by these authors in excavating the imagination from the arcana of the history of 
philosophy.  
And yet, this historical section is more than presenting an account that offers a 
suggestion of reconciliation between these two authors, one that can affirm an 
essential function of the imagination while leaving room for variety in the use of its 
products.  This historical section purports to build a narrative of the imagination, to 
show its fulfillment and culmination as Kant employs it in his philosophical system, 
while finding historical precedent in his predecessors.  The historical sections will 
begin with ancient Greek philosophy and end with a pre-amble to Kant found in the 
empiricist philosophies of  Locke and Hume.   
With all the contention concerning the imagination, as a linear development, 
as an essentially static faculty, whether it is subordinate or superordinate- all these 
issues can only be addressed by addressing the history proper.  So it is to the ancient 
Greeks I propose to turn first.  But before beginning, I feel it imperative to establish 
some programmatic concerning the analysis and treatment of the historical 
individuals represented here.  The figures represented in this abbreviated history are 
chosen because they are the earliest recorded harbingers of schools of philosophy that 
arise as a consequence of their works.  From Plato is established a trend in thinking 
that is roughly approximate with his writings, Platonism; from Aristotle we gain 
Aristotelianism and his dominant influence in Western philosophy for nearly two-
thousand years; from Augustine and Aquinas we are left with a trenchant 
Scholasticism, the likes of which are only overthrown (arguably) by Descartes 
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himself and his foundationalist paradigm for philosophy and science; from Descartes 
both rationalism and empiricism arise.
32
  These archetypes of philosophy each, in 
their individual ways, influence the discourse of the imagination.  And, in order to tell 
the story of the imagination, each figure must in turn be treated to trace the subtle 
transformations, in our understanding of the imagination itself.  What I propose in 
these historical sections is to treat each figure independently by interrogating the 
understanding and use each figure places on the imagination in their particular 
philosophical formulations.  The hope is to illustrate how the imagination works 
within their philosophical systems, which, in turn, will shed light on their archetypal 
understandings of the imagination.  This archeology of the imagination will in turn be 
able to demonstrate developments of imagination, if there be any, and establish firm 
precedence for Kant‟s employment of this faculty.  In order to interrogate these 
historical figures, it will be important to ask several questions, all of which some will 
be able to answer, and others who will be able to answer only some of the questions.  
Inherent in such a topical treatment, the single most important question is:  “what is 
the nature of the imagination according to person X.”  But such a questioning elicits 
more questions than answers.  To facilitate answers to this overriding question, I 
propose to decompose this broad question into narrower foci.  One deep problem with 
the imagination is its role in cognition; whether it is reliable, and whether the 
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“figments” of the imagination are in any way real.  Thus I intend to address these two 
concerns by explicitly asking two related questions: 
1) What is the ontology of the imagination and its products?   
and 
2) What relation do the products of the imagination bear to the 
deliverances of the senses? 
 
The first question interrogates the metaphysics of any particular historical character 
and places the imagination within his schema for establishing the ultimately real.  The 
second question addresses questions concerning the role of imagination in veritative 
judgment formation, that is, it addresses the epistemic question. 
   Because the study of cognition has historically found itself entrenched in 
problems of its own, I propose to examine the imagination in terms of faculty 
psychology.  This approach is not an attempt to entitize certain powers or capacities 
of the mind itself, but, rather, allows us to draw contrasts between different, 
recognized powers of the mind by nominalizing these capacities.
33
  This 
nominalization of the powers of the mind permits predication in order to ease 
discussion of the capacities and functions of our mental abilities.  Since this common 
heuristic is found in many of our historical figures, I feel it appropriate to address 
these thinkers on their own terms and to continue employing the vocabulary of 
faculty psychology.  In doing so, another question arises: 
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3) Where, in a particular thinker‟s faculty psychology, do we find the 
imagination?  or  In the hierarchy of cognitive faculties, where do we 
find the imagination? 
 
Answering this third question will assist in evaluating the responses to the other two 
interrogatives.  In other words, by applying the two basic questions to the faculties of 
the mind, we are then left with the questions, “Is the faculty of imagination and its 
products real (in any deep sense of the term) and what role(s), if any, do they play in 
making knowledge claims?”   
 A fourth question, one quite sublunary yet salient to the task of this study, is 
to ask: 
4) How do these formulations of the imagination presage or pre-figure 
Kant‟s understanding, or, alternatively, provide a heuristic against 
which Kant provides his own account. 
 
This last question is the tie that binds the historiography from the preliminary 
chapters of this thesis from those that address Kant‟s works.  In order to prove the 
contention that Kant employs the imagination in a conventional sense, but radicalizes 
the imagination into the ground for both sensibility and understanding, I hope to 
recount the established view in order to demonstrate the innovation in Kant‟s 
thinking.  Investigating this last question will facilitate an understanding of the 
narrative of the imagination and Kant‟s place within it. 
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Chapter Two:  Imagination in Greek Philosophy 
 
Promethean Imaginings 
 
 Arguably, Western culture has been molded by two primary influences, Greek 
culture and concepts and Judeo-Christian theology.  The Hellenic culture of 
speculative philosophy and the biblical tradition of Judeo-Christian revelation have 
provided Western thinking/philosophy with most of its formative concepts and have 
exercised an enduring influence.
34
  Not surprisingly, the theoretical framework by 
which we understand the imagination finds its roots in the Greek tradition. As 
Richard Kearney notes, “the first properly philosophical categories of imagination are 
to be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.”35  This does not imply, however, 
that imagination is not manifest before these two behemoths of Greek culture and 
philosophy. 
Poetic mythos had long been employing imaginative thinking, both in the 
production of myth and in the depiction of the narratives expressed.  Poets, rhapsodes 
and sophists utilized imagination in the production of their artistic and pedagogical 
representations.  Homer figuratively paints a picture of the travails of Odysseus and 
rhapsodes claim to interpret the words of Homer by emphasizing certain elements, 
highlighting with embellishment others, and down-playing even others by use of 
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imaginative variation.  Even in Greek myths themselves we find elements of 
fabrication and the art of making.  The Promethean myth provides a curious moral 
tale, cautioning humans against the hubris of claiming the status of original creator.  
At most, humans create images or replicas of Nature.  Prometheus‟ punishment is a 
reminder to the audience what occurs when one attempts to assume the privilege of 
divine fabrication/creation held by the gods.  Fire and the subsequent creative arts 
enabled by this unique catalyst of change and forge-craft, once exclusively the realm 
of the gods, was bequeathed to humanity by Prometheus‟ theft, but at a dear price.  
The primary punishment was Prometheus‟ bondage, but the secondary cost was the 
epistemic uncertainty concerning the correspondence of the creations of humanity to 
those of the gods.  Quite literally in some cases, the artifacts of human creation are 
considered forgery by use of fire/imagination.  Consequently, “the stigma of the theft 
was thus attached to imagination as that Promethean foresight which enabled man to 
imitate the gods.”36   This imitative understanding of imagination with its 
metaphysical and epistemic duplicity is explicitly documented by Plato and Aristotle 
and relegates the imagination to an often necessary component for human 
representation, both as knowledge and in artifacts, but one that undermines any 
claims to veracity.   Imagination as imitation does not, however, end with the Greek 
thinkers, it continues into medieval philosophy as well.  From Plato and Aristotle we 
see the first formulations of the imagination that gestate and increase in subtlety in 
medieval thought. 
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Plato 
 
 In Plato, we find an ambivalent account of the imagination; ambivalent 
because, while Plato seems extremely caustic to works of art, he also accedes the 
necessity of images in discursive thinking (dianoia).  This ambivalence is to have 
ramifications for the history of philosophy.  Suspicion of this faculty is to remain in 
many of the treatments of imagination, even while acknowledgment of its power will 
be understated.  Kant himself will suggest that certain imaginings should be 
considered folly and yet finds proper place for this powerful faculty.  This 
ambivalence in Plato draws directly from his metaphysical view of reality, and, 
subsequently, the assignation of epistemic verity, or lack thereof, in the physical 
world of human sensation.   It is in Republic Book VI that we find the articulation of 
Plato‟s metaphysical model, the so-called divided line analogy.   
 The real, according to Plato, is located in the world of the Form(s),
37
 which is 
inaccessible by human sensation.  The Form of the Good, for example, is, rather, 
accessed by intellect (nous) through the process of “pure seeing” (noesis).  Literally, 
the Form of the Good is “seen” with the soul through pure understanding/reason, the 
purely intelligible.  Plato likens the act whereby the soul comprehends the truth of the 
Form(s) to a metaphor of seeing objects by the visible light of the sun.  In his words; 
“when the [soul] focuses on something illuminated by the light of truth and what is, it 
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understands, knows and apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on 
what it mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is 
dimmed.”38  What “comes to be and passes away”, according to Plato, is the realm 
not of truth, but of doxa, belief.  In the act of noesis, the knower comes to 
comprehend the truth, which is unchanging, permanent, immaterial, and eternal.  The 
visible, material world provided by sensation cannot meet the criteria of seeing the 
Form(s) with the figurative “mind‟s eye.”  What humans gain by the deliverances of 
the senses are merely sensible, commonly visible, tactile and/or audial representations 
obscured by becoming and decay. Thus sensation cannot yield knowledge of the truth 
and is relegated to the realm of facsimile or mimesis of the truth of the Forms.
39
  
These replications, however, can never be true copies or images of the Forms, owing 
to the operations of sensation and its inability to reproduce the constancy required for 
episteme, true knowledge.
40
 
 In Plato‟s divided line, purposive, creative images and even accidental 
reflections are even further removed from the Form(s) than sensation.  Since the non-
visible Form(s) are the locus of truth and objects in the visible world can never 
maintain the permanence of the Form(s), these objects are imperfect replications of 
the true Form.  Moreover, artistic representations and reproductions of the objects of 
sensation, are thus replications of replicas.  Eikasia is the name Plato ascribes to this 
act of reproduction, and he firmly places it at the lowest division in his divided line 
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analogy.
41
  To illustrate, Plato describes three types of bed.  The first “is in nature a 
bed, and… a god makes it.”42  Because it is “the very one that is the being of a bed” 
there can be no two beds made by “the god”.   In Plato‟s divided line, this original 
bed is placed at the level of intelligibility- the form of bed.  As such, there can be only 
one.  The second type of bed is that made by the carpenter.  The carpenter fashions a 
visible, physical bed, one that comes into being by the manipulations of the carpenter 
and yet does not remain, for its materiality is subject to decay and the process of 
becoming.  The third bed belongs to the artist.  An artist‟s likeness of a bed merely 
imitates what the god or the carpenter make.  Plato tells us “the artist‟s representation 
is a long way removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing, 
and a part that is itself only an image.”43  The artist‟s reproduction of any visible 
object is an imitation of something that itself is not ultimately real.  Artistic 
representations, Plato argues, are three removes from reality.  The first, true reality, 
belongs to the Form of the Good, from which “the god”/demiurge creates the form of 
bed, only one of which exists, as it is the being of all things humans classify as beds.  
The visible objects created by craftsmen only imitate the intelligible being that the 
form of bed itself possesses.  Visible objects accessible by sensation already present 
an initial chasm between reality, intelligibility, episteme, and the world of material 
objects, availing themselves only to sensibility, doxa.  The visible bed is already an 
imitation of the form of bed, which is derived from the Form of the Good.  Simply, at 
the level of doxa, human understanding is already two removes from reality.  Yet 
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redemptive at the carpenter‟s level is the act of making that participates in the form 
(and presumably the function) of bed and we accord belief (pistis) to the reproduction 
because of its participation in the form of bed.  When viewing an artistic 
representation of a bed, however, say a painting of a bed, only the superficial qualities 
of the object remain, even the integral participation between form and function is lost.  
A painting of a bed cannot be slept upon.  As an imitation of a representation of the 
form of that is drawn from the Form(s), artistic works are at three removes from 
reality.  Such distance from the real, Plato suggests, presents only the merest of 
appearance and in so doing presents us with little more than illusion.  Plato‟s 
excoriating criticism of eikasia leads him to banish artists and poets from the 
Republic, for they peddle illusion and do not further human development toward the 
Form(s).
44
 
 But even at the level of eikasia, the physical representations found in works of 
art, Plato wishes to make a distinction between veracity and falsehood.
45
  In image 
production, in imagination proper, we can distinguish between faithful and illusory 
imitation.  Among the many images found at the level of eikasia, Plato distinguishes 
between iconic images (eikones) and phantasy (phantasia). The former imitate 
faithfully, and are thus true images of forms, while the latter are purely illusory.  Art 
works and images that represent unfaithfully, like those depicting the gods or heroes 
in manifest immoral and irrational behavior, depict falsehoods and are pure 
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phantasy.
46
  This imaginative or creative imagination, what will come to be called the 
“creative imagination”, is just a species of deceit.47  They play upon strong sentiments 
and desire, irrational portions of our soul, and encourage immoral actions.
48
  
However, should poets depict elevating and ennobling sentiments in their work—
those that encourage intellection over passion, rationality, morality and truth—then 
Plato can readmit these artists into the Republic.
49
  Making for such allowances, the 
severest of strictures guided by pedagogical purposes, Plato ultimately displays the 
ambivalence and irony in his position on images. 
 In another powerful metaphor, the allegory of the Cave, Plato further clarifies 
the difference between faithful and unfaithful employment of images in judging.  He 
describes the process by which individuals may be liberated from the fetters of the 
visible, hence imagistic, thinking to determine true judgments.
50
  At the initial level of 
judging, in bondage, individuals are beholden to images projected upon the wall of 
the cave.  Plato suggests that accurate prediction of the sequence of images, that is, 
judging the order correctly, wins high esteem.
51
  By mixing the phantasia presented 
with rational judgment, according to the order in which images appear from memory, 
faithful predictions of order can be produced.  Plato argues that “sensation makes 
some sort of impression in the soul,” which is then stored and called upon as needed 
through memory.
52
  Memory may be either faithful or false, and faithful memory is 
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rewarded by the accurate prediction of the objects of the visible world, which is 
afforded through sensation.  This mixing of phantasia and rational principles in the 
act of judging indicates a proper pedagogic function of imagination, if only at the 
level of the visible—shadows this case.  Instructive here is Plato‟s willingness to 
employ images as they arise in memory, informed by rational principles, in the act of 
judging, in order to provide for empirical efficacy, prediction. 
 Furthermore, in the process of discursive thinking, “Plato concedes that 
knowledge, episteme, may at time have recourse to what he terms „thought images‟ in 
order to enable our human understanding (dianoia) to give figurative expression to its 
abstract ideas.”53 Analogous to the usefulness of imagistic thinking and memory in 
the prediction of empirical events, images may also be employed in discursive 
thinking to aid in the representation of abstract ideas.  Plato‟s most celebrated 
example of the role of imagistic thinking in discursive thought is that found in 
geometrical practices.  When mathematicians  
use visible figures and make claims about them, thought is not directed 
to them but to those other things that they are like.  They make their 
claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the 
diagonal they draw, and similarly with others.  These figures that they 
draw… they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others 
themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.”54 
 
In other words, when mathematicians utilize material models and sketches as inexact 
representations of abstract forms, “the dianoetic power picks up natural shapes and 
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diagrammatic drawing and interprets them as images.”55  Thus, dianoia stands a 
middle-ground between pure thinking (nous) and sensibility.  It employs the spatiality 
and visibility of sensation to provide the exemplars found in abstract ideas.  In 
drawing a circle, the geometer imperfectly represents an object, whose properties 
include all points on the circumference equidistant from the center, for the purposes 
of diagramming and exploring further consequences of its abstract definition.  Such 
diagrams may prove useful in clarifying relationships, aiding memory in faithful 
representation of abstract entities and discovering subsequent properties.  So also this 
obtains for other natural images.  In the process of abstraction and discursive 
thinking, images of visible objects are stored and compiled in memory, in order to 
facilitate human understanding of different forms. By sensible exposure to multiple 
instances of a type of object, memory records the natural shape, and perhaps other 
characteristics, and, by contrast and comparison of these shapes and characteristics, 
that is discursive thinking, renders an image employable for latter use with 
subsequent exposure to similar objects.  Thus, a form, an exemplar, imperfect though 
it may be, of any type of object is produced.  Accordingly, these abstract ideas 
generated by human understanding cannot be lauded as the form of any object, as the 
epistemic verity of the form may only be attributed to noetic understanding, but the 
importance of image production that enables abstract thinking can no longer be 
denied.  Plato must afford some positive use of imagination to explain the process of 
abstract thinking and its relation to visible objects.  In addition to natural and 
geometric images in the education and employment of discursive thinking, Plato 
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allows one further use of the imagination, that of the artist for moral and pedagogic 
edification.  Such examples are, presumably, like those works such as Plato‟s own 
dialogues.  By fostering discursive thinking through the use of image, metaphor, 
allegory, and analogy, Plato can accept artistic representation as positive in a 
pedagogical schema that can lead to truth.  Ironic as his condemnation of imagination 
may be, Plato affords a positive role, one that follows his own lead. 
 This ambivalence is the most commonly featured characteristic of Plato‟s 
imagination in the remarkably sparse commentary offered on the topic.  Generalist 
historians such as Kearney, Brann, Sallis and Cocking all note Plato‟s seemingly 
mixed attitude to the imagination and the place of images on the divided line.
56
  This 
ambiguity is characterized by the use of twin terms eikasia and phantasia.  
Commentator H.S. Thayer mitigates this confusion translating eikasia as likeness and 
phantasia as semblance.
57
  Likenesses are created in an attempt to replicate the real 
for the purposes of exploring and disclosing further characteristics.  Semblances, on 
the other hand, are taken for the real and thus mistake mere facsimiles for the real. 
This division within images supports Plato‟s division of true images, icons (eikones), 
from false, fantasy (phantasia).  In addition, this affords Plato the opportunity to 
reintegrate images and imagistic thinking, myths and geometry, into his ideal state, 
but only on the condition that any reference made by images or imagistic thinking are 
in the promotion of the Form(s). 
                                                          
56
 Cf. Brann, pp. 35-40; Cocking, p. 13; Kearney, pp. 87-105; Sallis (1995), p. 13; Sallis (2000), pp. 
46-51. 
57
 Thayer, H.S. “Plato on the Morality of the Imagination” The Review of Metaphysics (30: 594-618) p. 
594-595.  Also in Sallis (2000), p. 46-47; Cocking, p. 13. 
 45 
 
Robert Brumbaugh presents a notable work decribing how mathematical 
schemata provide just such semblances that can abrogate Plato‟s often difficult 
mathematical analogies.
58
  Brumbaugh‟s stated goal is to provide a “new primary 
source material for the study of Plato” by describing diagrams which “were intended 
to accompany and clarify [Plato‟s] text.”59  Laudable as this project is, unfortunately, 
Brumbaugh does little in the clarification of imagination in Plato.  Rather, he focuses 
on providing mathematical diagrams for esoteric references in Plato‟s corpus.  The 
upshot of Brumbaugh‟s work is to show that the discursive mathematical examples 
Plato employs are indeed imagistic and these images do indeed aid in dialectic by 
which human cognition approaches noetic thinking.  Images do have a beneficial 
place in Plato‟s hierarchy.   It is in the eikastic representation of diagrams by which 
humans represent mathematical truths that propels the dialectic forward to “pure 
knowing.”  Eikastic images are, in the final analysis, at the level of discursive 
thinking, a propaedeutic encouraging the dialectic to continue.
60
  As a propaedeutic it 
is “a matter of seeing the truth instead of an image… that is, in that appearance that 
[the image] offers.”61   The knowledge obtained even at this level of thinking is still 
knowledge of particulars
62
 that are beginning to be generalized over groups according 
                                                          
58
 Brumbaugh, Robert S. Plato’s Mathematical Imagination  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1954). 
59
 Brumbaugh, p. 3. 
60
 Sallis (2000), p.49. 
61
 Sallis (1995), p. 14. 
62
 Particulars in this case is an extraordinary usage.  Plato clearly says knowledge of particulars does 
not obtain, because particulars are in the flux of becoming and are constantly changing.  The 
knowledge of particulars here is knowledge of particular kinds i.e. geometrical figure e.g. circles etc.  
“Plato‟s ultimate purpose in introducing mathematical Forms is, of course, to show that mathematics is 
propaedeutic to dialectic.” from D.W. Hamlyn‟s article “Eikasia in Plato‟s Republic” in The 
Philosophical Quarterly  Vol. 8, No. 30 (Jan., 1958), pp. 14-23. 
 46 
 
to hypotheses.
63
  Knowledge of kinds begins to obtain and from this initial 
propaedeutic, images, at last, must be left behind in order to obtain true knowledge, 
episteme.  Thus particular images perceived through sensation may be legitimated, so 
long as they are of mathematic, or moral, edification.  In a strange reversal from the 
standard Platonic interpretation concerning the images and the beneficence of such 
entities, images may be employed to advance human understanding to the level of 
knowledge. 
It is by precisely distinguishing these beneficial images, eikones, from mere 
illusion; it is by dividing educational images from those that compel humans to 
immoral behavior, and it is the demarcation of true images from those that lay claim 
to the truth, mere fictions, that Plato bequeaths a legacy to Western philosophy.  In 
the words of Richard Kearney: 
the human imagination is only deemed legitimate to the extent that it 
acknowledges the three following conditions: i) that it is an imitation 
rather than an original; ii) that it is ultimately subordinate to reason; 
and iii) that it serves the interests of the divine Good as absolute origin 
of the truth.
 64
  
 
Such constraints emphasize the subordinate position of imagination to reason and/or 
noetic vision in Plato‟s hierarchy. Furthermore, because the imagination found itself 
in no philosophical discussions before Plato, and after the systematization of 
philosophy found in his works, the imagination is indelibly marked.  The first two 
criteria are to have long standing influence on conceptualizations of imagination, and 
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the third occupies a playful situation of disappearing and re-appearing in the course of 
Western thought.   
In summary of Plato‟s ambivalence to the imagination, we can enumerate 
prohibitions and exceptions of the use of the imagination and image making that will 
reverberate through the history of philosophy.  By and large, artistic representations 
are to be condemned: 
1) on epistemic grounds.  Artistic images are not real, do not represent 
the real, and are mere facsimiles, three removes from reality, yet 
are often depicted as truth.* 
2) because they are non-didactic.  Artistic images teach us nothing of 
the reality of things.* 
3) because they are irrational.  Artistic representations prey upon 
extremes of desire, eros.  They introduce conflict and 
contradiction, which directly oppose reason, which unites. 
4) because they are immoral.  Artistic representations often depict 
immoral actions of the gods and heroes. 
5) because of the propensity to idolatry.  Taking the superficial 
depiction as truth amounts to elevating an eikon to the level of 
permanent being.
65
 
 
Plato‟s condemnation is grounded on a fusion of any, and often all, the five 
explanations.  Any image production that runs afoul these objections, violates Plato‟s 
programmatic for knowledge and knowledge acquisition.  Proscriptions three through 
five are strict censure and typical image making is usually in violation of them.  
Condemnations one and two however, are mitigated.  If an image is not taken for the 
real, but merely a representation of the truth and the image‟s purpose is to guide the 
maker of images to the Form(s), such employment is acceptable. With these two 
exceptions, images may find some place in veritative cognition, thus becoming 
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integral to human understanding.  So long as images faithfully depict, schematically, 
make no pretence to the final truth of the object, and can be employed in the upward 
movement of discursive thinking, then images may be of some use in knowing.  
Likewise, when artistic representations make no pretence to depict reality, they may 
be deemed acceptable.  Provided humans concede the inferiority of visible 
representations to the Form(s) and avoid mistaking visible, material, changing images 
with the eternal, immaterial permanent truth of the Form(s), representation in any 
form is deemed acceptable.  “What distinguishes this legitimate function of images 
from the normal practices of artists and sophists is that they are never treated as ends 
in themselves.  They serve rather as instrumental means for mediating between our 
sensible experience and our rational intelligence.”66  By conceding the superficial 
nature of visible representation, humans can then employ images, though discursive 
thinking, in the pursuit of truth.   
As an inheritor of Western philosophy and these expansive legacies, Kant will 
reject the first of these criteria. The latter two will be affirmed, as I intend to argue.  
In his employment of imagination, Kant will be influenced by the concern that images 
and imagination is subordinate to reason, but not in the way Plato imagines.  It is not 
the case that the imagination is governed by reason in determining its role in true 
judgments—Kant does not express belief in a world of pure Form(s) that is accessible 
only by reason.  Rather, reason aids in the use of imagination by providing 
parameters.  Nevertheless, reason and imagination are working in conjunction to 
provide the basis for epistemic claims.  The last criterion will find implicit expression 
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in Kant‟s moral philosophy and the ability to formalize maxims and employ them in 
the concreta of particular actions, always in the furtherance of morality.  Despite the 
temporal and philosophic differences, we find the very first suggestions of 
imagination and its proper function in human cognition in Plato, a legacy to be found 
in Kant‟s philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
Aristotle states: “Imagination (phantasia) is different from either perceiving 
(aisthesis) or discursive thinking (dianoia)
67
, though it [imagination] is not found 
without sensation, or judgment (hypolepsis) without it.”68  With this concise 
formulation, Aristotle gives us the key to unlock his philosophy of the human mind.
69
  
Because the imagination is a name traditionally given to one of the capacities of the 
psyche and because the human mind (nous) is atop a hierarchy of possible kinds of 
psyche,
70
 if we wish to comprehend his role for imagination in cognition, we must see 
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its place within the larger setting of Aristotle‟s faculty psychology.  It is within his 
text De Anima, that we find Aristotle‟s full exposition of the possible types of living 
beings, the possible types of souls, living beings.  It is here that Aristotle demarcates 
living beings into three different groups- plants, animals, and humans, according to 
the type of soul each possesses- vegetative, sensitive, and rational respectively.    
Vegetative (or, often, reproductive) souls possess only the capacities to obtain 
nutrients, grow, decay and reproduce.
71
  Their marked lack of locomotion, according 
to Aristotle, precludes any movement, which is based upon appetition and desire, and 
thus any real interaction with the environment.  In the middle of his hierarchy, 
Aristotle places the sensitive soul.  In addition to the capacities of the lower life forms 
(yet altered by a higher capacity) the sensitive soul possesses sense perception.  It is 
sense perception and the ability to respond to the environment, according to painful 
and pleasurable stimuli, that separates animal souls from those of the vegetative life 
forms.
72
  In contrast to the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul indicates a certain 
awareness and interaction with its environment.  But this immediate awareness found 
at the sensitive level does not imply intellection or thinking,
73
 merely the capacity to 
exercise mechanical reaction, not deliberate action.  To the immediacy of sense 
perception, the rational soul adds the possibility of mediated awareness, one that 
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allows for multiple, repeated re-presentations, which in turn allow for possibility of 
discursive thinking.
74
 The awareness attributed to sensitive souls is merely of 
particulars and is a reaction to pain or pleasure. The rational, thinking, soul, however, 
operates at a level re-presentation
75
 that allows for discursive thinking and the 
possibility of universals, abstraction, and generalization that typify the most advanced 
living beings.
76
    
Aristotle‟s faculty psychology, and consequently his divisions among the 
souls, is predicated upon the existence of forms in substances.  Aristotle suggests two 
distinctive types of forms: sensuous forms and essential forms, that is, those 
perceivable by the distinguishing faculties of animals and thinking beings, by 
sensation the former and thinking the latter.
77
  The sensitive faculty perceives the 
sensible form in objects of experience, which determine the various sensible qualities 
of the things we see.  The rational faculty perceives the essential form, which 
characterizes the nature of the thing and makes it what it is.  Hence the sensitive 
faculty perceives the particular form, the rational the universal form.
 78
 
If we follow Aristotle‟s assertion, concerning the distinction between 
thinking, imagination and sensation, and the order of descending necessity for the 
capacity above it, we find the imagination lodged between the key faculties that 
differentiate rational beings from animals, and also between the two different types of 
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forms these faculties perceive.  This unique position allows Aristotle to employ the 
imagination when discussing both sense perception and rational thinking.  In fact, 
with proper understanding we can come to see the imagination as the faculty that 
allows for the conversion of sensuous forms into the essential forms. (And possibly 
the other way around.) 
In depicting the sensitive powers, Aristotle claims:  
every sense is receptive of the forms of the sensible objects without 
their matter, and in the sort of way in which wax receives the 
impression of a signet ring without the iron or gold, for the wax 
receives the impression.
79
 
 
When the senses are affected by an object in the environment, the sense organs are 
affected in a way that responds to their proper function e.g. the eye sees color, hearing 
sounds etc.  The organs receive the particular, determinate form of the object 
perceived i.e. when seeing red the eye is imprinted with the form red or hearing 
middle C the ear it impressed with the form middle C.  The sensitive powers are not 
limited, however, to the standard five senses of touch, taste, sight, smell and hearing.  
To the standard canon Aristotle adds the ability to perceive information that is not 
administered by any one particular sense, i.e. motion, rest, magnitude, number and 
figure.
80
  These common sensibles are conveyed through various different senses and 
are not the specific intuition of any particular organ i.e. both sight and touch can 
convey the figure of an object.  In addition to the particularity of sensuous forms 
perceived by the various senses, their determinate qualification owing to the 
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singularity of the object, Aristotle adds that “sensations are always true.”81  What our 
body receives from its environment by means of the sense organs is always 
accurate.
82
 
What we have at the end of the process of sensation is a disparate group 
perceptions, each according to the special organ or the tandem operation of several 
organs in the case of common sensibles.  But what the sensitive faculty does not 
provide is a cohesive unity that combines these various perceptions.  This is the 
domain of the imagination.  Imagination, as its name suggests, is, for Aristotle, the 
power or habit “by virtue of which images are formed for us.”83  Imagination is the 
faculty in which the sensuous forms, particular sense impressions, presented by 
sensation are unified into a singular presentation.  Imagination combines the black 
and white patches received by my eyes, the smell of animal dander received through 
my olfactory sense, the sound of barking and the figure of a canine to produce the 
image of a dog- a particular image of a particular dog, a dalmatian. 
This initial level of imagination, one which Aristotle describes as the 
sensitive/perceptual, is found in all animals.  This explains how animals, essentially 
sensitive according to their defining faculty, the sensitive entelecheia, receive 
information from their environment, process it into a unified field and pursue or avoid 
the phenomenon according to the pleasure or pain it engenders.  Aristotle asserts that 
the sensitive imagination is immediately operative when sensation occurs, for it is the 
means by which animals unify the various sensations presented in experience.  As an 
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advanced form of animal, humans also possess this ability to perceive a unified field 
to which they can react according to the pleasure or pain it causes, (but this too will 
be altered by nous, the defining faculty, entelechia, of rational beings.)
84
   
If the imagination was limited to just this unifying aspect, it could be 
considered merely another operation of the faculty of sensation.  But, as Aristotle 
points out, rational beings can present images to themselves that are no longer present 
e.g. I can remember the dalmatian I saw as an eleven year child.  This second 
function of the imagination, the one most salient to rational beings, Aristotle entitles 
the deliberative/rational imagination. In the sensitive soul, one governed by appetition 
and sensation, imagination only performs an operation that allows for immediate 
discrimination of objects in the environment, that they may be pursued or avoided.  In 
the most complex soul, the rational, one which possesses all the faculties of the lower 
and nous, imagination performs the same function, but also adds another role, a re-
presentative role, to its repertoire.  As this second function of imagination suggests, 
rational beings can present images of sensation long past- that is, imagination is the 
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 In this regard Aristotle describes imagination as “a movement resulting from the actual exercise of 
the power of sense.” DeAnima 429a2. This is to say, the imagination, in unifying our sensation 
presents the organism, the image to which we are either adverse or inclined and avoid or pursue as 
befits its taste.  This is also the place at which error may enter the system.  Sensation is always true, but 
images, Aristotle adds, “are for the most part false” DeAnima 428a11 or, in a less condemning tone, 
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optimal conditions.  
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faculty that allows for memory and the awareness of the passing of time, according to 
Aristotle.
85
  Souls of this type now have the capacity to re-present objects and events 
past for contemplation and deliberation in the present.   This second function 
illustrates how imagination is transformed by the defining faculty/entelechy of a 
thinking/rational being.
86
   
In order to understand how discursive thinking employs the imagination, 
Aristotle offers us a telling analogy.  “To the thinking soul,” he writes, “images serve 
as if they were the contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be 
good or bad it avoids or pursues them).”87  Imagination and the images it produces are 
thus at the very heart of the capacity to think—as the opening quote of this section 
suggests, there is no thinking without images, according to Aristotle.  Nous employs 
the images afforded by the imagination to evaluate, discriminate and judge the forms 
it perceives.  As the name of the second feature of imagination suggests, the images 
are to be employed for deliberative purposes.  By Aristotle‟s analysis, discursive 
thinking perceives the form offered in the image, and is afforded the opportunity of 
evaluating, comparing and cataloguing these forms. 
It is at this point in Aristotle‟s faculty psychology that a subtle, yet 
informative distinction is made.  Much like the sense organs receive an imprint of the 
object of experience—that is, it receives the form (sensuous) of the object perceived; 
thinking, Aristotle asserts, perceives the form (essential) of the image presented by 
the imagination.  Thinking does not intuit the particularities of the image, but rather 
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perceives those forms without which the image would not be what it is—“the faculty 
of thinking thinks the forms in the images.”88  Deliberative imagination provides 
thinking the opportunity of doing so, by what will come to be known later as the 
function of recombinant imagining.  This function allows discursive thought to 
remove, add, unify, divide and discriminate certain particular qualities in the images, 
in order to see if the object still remains what it is.  We can remove the spots from the 
dalmatian and it will remain a dog- it will certainly no longer be a Dalmatian, but it 
will remain a dog.  By adding or removing particularities to the image, thinking 
compiles a list of essential requirements for a thing to be what it is, the essential form.  
Systematic knowledge of universals (scientia) is the final product of this protracted 
activity. 
By the process of evaluative thinking, Aristotle completes the movement that 
began with the perception of a particular, with all its variety and contingency, and 
arrives at the essential knowledge concerning the subject at hand.  Thus Aristotle can 
say “actual sensation apprehends individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is 
universals.”89      
At the universal level, thinking is disconnected from the world and operates in 
the realm of theoria, but it is not necessarily removed from the world.  The most 
important function for (calculative) thinking, in Aristotle, is the ability to re-enter the 
world with the judgments obtained in discursive thinking.  It is here that imagination 
re-surfaces, in the form we most often recognize it today.   One concrete realm where 
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imagination is employed in our engagement with the world is when we deliberate on 
a course of action.  Unlike the sensitive souls, rational animals have a calculative 
ability that can imagine various scenarios, determine the probable consequences and 
decide on actions accordingly.  After providing a compendium of knowledge 
concerning concrete situations in the world, the imagination provides the means by 
which we can envision how possible scenarios might come about (that is based upon 
this volume of knowledge and the particularities of the specific situation). 
Thus we can see that imagination is both an internalizing process by which we 
move from sensation to thinking, as well as one by which we think and then act in the 
world.  Not only does it provide us the contents of thought, it lends itself to rational 
deliberation with the purpose of acting in the world.  Imagination, it turns out, is the 
medium through which we engage with the world, it is the link between the world of 
experience/sensation and our understanding of this world. 
 
Because Aristotle distinguishes these two types of imagination, sensitive and 
deliberative; because Aristotle‟s analysis is scattered throughout many different texts; 
and because Aristotle‟s own analysis is seemingly inconsistent and incomplete, there 
has been a good deal of commentary and even more dissent among Aristotle scholars 
regarding the status of this vital process.  The place and role of imagination has led 
some commentators to conclude the “imagination has an unsatisfactory halfway status 
between perception and the intellect and its exact position is never made clear.”90  It 
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is to this discussion that I now wish to turn, in hope that the ongoing debate may 
enhance the preliminary view sketched above. 
Commentators on Aristotle depict his imagination in a wide variety of 
different possibilities.  Standard interpretations, like the one expressed above, define 
the imagination as an image making faculty, a distinct faculty by itself (phantasia)- 
one that involves an imaginative state (phantasma), that by which imagination takes 
place (phantastikon), an imagined object (phantasmaton) and imagining 
(phanezesthai).
91
  This standard interpretation is represented in the literature by such 
notable characters as R.D. Hicks
92
, W.D. Ross and, to some extent, D.W. Hamlyn.  
And while these figures where instrumental to provide a canonical theory of the 
imagination, they are not without their critics- in fact they split a median between two 
extreme and polemical positions.   
Martha Nussbaum represents one faction in the current polemic regarding 
Aristotle‟s phantasia.  Her interpretation involves imagination in a hermeneutic 
process that attends to certain features of sensation in order to provide a familiar 
“seeing as” that can then be employed by discursive thinking.  Nussbaum does not 
limit the imagination to an image producing capacity, for this locution, driven by its 
ocular metaphor, overlooks imagination‟s discrimination in the other senses.  
Nussbaum does not deny the image producing function of the imagination, but, 
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rather, wishes to expand its role to an overall discriminating faculty that attends to, 
orders, and focuses sensation into something employable.   According to Nussbaum‟s 
account, the imagination is a distinct faculty, but one whose role is greater than just 
image production. 
On the other side of the polemic is Michael Wedin.  Contra Nussbaum‟s 
interpretation, Wedin affirms the image making function of the canonical theory, but 
denies the imagination any independent status as a faculty.  The imagination, he 
claims, “is not a full faculty” but “is surely involved in the actual use of such 
[complete] faculties.”93 
The disagreement between the two polarized factions is owing to the source 
material from which each commentator draws their central theory.  Wedin claims 
DeAnima 3.3 to be the definitive and complete account of Aristotle‟s imagination, to 
which any disagreement, inconsistency or confusion in auxiliary passages must 
conform.  On the other hand, Nussbaum, while recognizing the importance of the 
DeAnima 3.3, emphasizes passages found in the Parva Naturalia De Motu Animalium 
and even the Posterior Analytics.  Her approach is “not to try to read the 
inconsistencies away, or to try to make everything fit with what seems the most 
technical passage, but to allow Aristotelian phantasia the broad scope… that it 
evidently has… and recognize the diversity of the phenomena in question.”94  The 
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fundamental disagreement between the two factions centers around two basic issues; 
whether the imagination is a separate and complete faculty, and of what does the 
nature of its activity consist.  However they may he argued separately, I find both 
issues spiraling around a unifying, but as yet unnamed issue- the fullness and 
completeness of a faculty being based upon an exclusive, active capacity for which no 
other faculty can account.  In conjunction with this issue is the concern whether the 
imagination as preparation and presentation of the unified sensations can fulfill 
Aristotle‟s criterion of an independent faculty and as such entitle historians to trace 
the use of imagination in his corpus.  
On the first issue, the disagreement is more tacit than explicit.  Integral to 
Wedin‟s formulation is the “functional incompleteness of imagination.”  According to 
his analysis, “faculties are certain potentialities… which must be capable of actual 
use” and thus the “imagination can hardly be a genuine faculty if it has no actual 
use.”95  In other words, Wedin argues if there is not actual, presumably active, use of 
a purported faculty, then the so-called faculty is not complete and distinct to itself.  
Modestly, and wisely I think, Nussbaum does not posit such a strict definition of 
faculty based solely upon this single criterion.  She may even be willing to grant 
Wedin this premise, but will add further criterion for the definition of a faculty. (But, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with Nussbaum‟s hermeneutic understanding of phantasia.  He seems to recognize that it is a faculty, 
but emends Nussbaum‟s interpretation and relegates the imagination to an activity that possesses little 
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might be said, represents the middle ground between Wedin and the standard interpretation.  Although 
Frede concedes the imagination as a faculty complete in itself and with its own activity, she allies 
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if so, perception might not be a faculty—depending  upon the weight you give the 
sensus communis)   
Following his premise concerning the status of faculties in regard to their 
activity, Wedin continues and attempts to show that the activity of the imagination 
occurs simultaneously with sensation, as in the case of the sensitive imagination 
found in animals or with thinking, as in deliberative imagination.  This second issue 
reflects back on the first and is rallying point of either faction in the debate.  He 
contends that the unification of the sensibles occurs in sensation, in the sensus 
communis, and that imagination is merely a passive re-presentation of the initial 
presentation afforded by common sense.
96
  Nussbaum suggests this interpretation 
likens the imagination to a mirror, which reflects what is given to it, but without 
actively creating any images itself.
97
   
Furthermore, Wedin denies phantasia the power of movement.  He 
reinterprets DeAnima 3.10 433a20-21 to say that movement in an animal that is the 
product of an imagination and desire, is not the activity of imagination, but the 
activity of the animal, not any specific faculty.  To support this view Wedin adds that 
it is either the sensitive faculty (the sensus communis located firmly within the faculty 
of sensation) that unifies the sensations, to which animals immediately respond, or the 
thinking faculty that demands/conjures bygone images
98
 that they may be the 
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inspiration for action.  It is desire, either immediate or mediated, he concludes, that 
creates movement, not the imagination. 
The imagination, Wedin contends, has no role found outside the operations of 
other faculties.  This interpretation does not deny the imagination, in either role, “has 
no occurent or episodic employment but only that it will not be the actual 
employment of a full faculty.”  To this he adds, “in reading the imagination as a 
general [re]presentational capability subserving other faculties, the it will… occur in 
the course of another faculty‟s operation.”99  Thus without any active, exclusive 
employment Wedin concludes the imagination to be an incomplete faculty, one that 
acts only at the behest of another, that is it only acts passively upon command and 
never at it own initiation or actualization.
100
   
Nussbaum, more than any other commentator, takes exception to Wedin‟s 
final pronouncement about the independent activity, or lack thereof, of the 
imagination.  In her analysis she approaches the issue much the same as most 
commentators, but her emphasis on De Motu Animalium and the Parva Naturalia set 
her apart from many contemporaries  While she employs the main texts, Nussbaum‟s 
orientation to the faculty of phenomenon is not one of standard faculty analysis, but, 
rather, from action.  She approaches the imagination from a passage Wedin has 
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explicitly tried to explain away/denied.
101
  Following Aristotle‟s analysis in DeAnima, 
Nussbaum encourages caution regarding the completeness of chapter 3 and purported 
inconsistencies in the other works. 
Nussbaum‟s attempts to establish the activity of phantasia by pointing out the 
standard interpretation, that the imagination produces images of the data of sensation, 
which will than be employed in thinking, entails several requirements overlooked by 
most commentators.  Nussbaum suggests that the mirror analogy contains a naïve and 
flawed understanding about how likenesses are created, viewed, and understood.  In 
her words; “we can never copy an object in all the ways it is; we are always 
representing it as something.”102  Implicitly involved in this process of “seeing as”, 
according to Nussbaum, is the activity of discriminating, of focusing our attention on 
certain features of the image.  If the imagination is a process of reproducing and 
representing what we perceive through sensation, the imagination must determine 
what features are more salient to our seeing.  This is to say that the imagination 
selects background and foreground information when depicting any given image- 
certain features are more readily available e.g. the visual is usually given priority over 
the olfactory.  Nussbaum‟s claim is that if the imagination were merely a mirror, all 
the features would be represented according to how they are received by sensation, 
without particular focus.  
                                                          
101
 The passage cited above, DeAnima III.10 433a20-21. 
102
 Nussbaum, 227 
 64 
 
Nussbaum goes even further to claim that sensation is a passive faculty.
103
  
“We are always,” she writes, “passively receiving perceptual stimuli...”  If sensation 
is passive, the discriminating, distinguishing and unifying- the activity- required to 
produce an image must take place elsewhere.  Nussbaum continues saying, “… but 
when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its 
context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of phantasia, or the phantasia-
aspect of aisthesis, is called into play.”104  Imagination, thus, is a capacity above the 
mere re-presentation of the data of sensation.  It is more than even mere unification in 
image production.
105
  It underlies, according to Nussbaum, our very ability to 
discriminate object from background.  It is our ability to see the data as something 
intelligible.  “The phantasia is just our interpretation of the data presented to us.”106 
To support the use of imagination outside of sensation Nussbaum cites 
DeAnima III.3 which tells us sensation is always present, but not imagination is not.  
Nussbaum interprets this passage as saying that while we are always receiving 
sensation, we are not always attending to it, that is we are not always seeing the data 
as intelligible.
107
  In a related issue Aristotle presents us with a surprising turnabout.  
In De Somno, 455b10-13, Aristotle describes the faculty operative in sleeping.  
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During sleep, Aristotle contends, sensation is incapacitated,
108
 and yet there is still a 
re-presentation of images.  Sensation accounts for these images.  As wakefulness is 
necessary for thinking (reflecting) as well, neither can thinking be the operative 
faculty.
109
 In dreaming, then, Aristotle provides one case in which imagination is 
operative without sensation or thinking.         
Even according to Wedin‟s criteria, Nussbaum‟s interpretation accounts for 
the imagination as a separate and distinct faculty.  While it does not occur 
independently of another faculty, it meets the fundamental criterion of performing an 
active function not accounted for by another faculty. A point might be made here 
about the overzealous restrictions Wedin places on the definition of faculty here. If 
his premise holds, locomotion will be subsumed under either sensation or thinking 
just as imagination is, for locomotion never occurs without either desire operating 
immediately on the data of sensation or the manifest order of thinking, which is the 
rational mediation of the data of sensation.  Because it may have ramifications that 
expressly contradict Aristotle‟s text,110 perhaps, Wedin‟s restrictions are too severe.   
Thus we can see that Nussbaum‟s analysis, despite its broadening of the 
imagination‟s sphere and influence- to an extent that the imagination acquires powers 
not explicit in Aristotle‟s works; is more both more plausible and more generous to 
the texts and the standard interpretation.  Imagination is, minimally, a faculty in its 
own right, one that is responsible for the activity of making images, and, perhaps, our 
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attending to and understanding these images as intelligible (at least distinct from their 
background, that is making an image rather than just a blooming, buzzing confusion.) 
 
The use Aristotle makes of the imagination in his corpus can now be 
correlated with the programmatic questions established for this historical inquiry.  
When discussing the nature of the imagination in Aristotle, one must be careful to 
distinguish between the imagination as it is elucidated in terms of sensitive souls from 
the function it performs in rational souls.  In sensitive souls, the function is to collate 
the deliverances of the senses into a single image entity, to which the organism 
responds according to appetition, pleasure and pain.  This production of images from 
the immediate deliverances of the senses allows for Aristotle to expound what the 
senses are and the role they perform in the interaction animals have with their 
environment.  The immediate production of images allows animals to perceive as a 
single entity that which is presented in perception.  When we turn to rational souls, 
this basic image making function of the imagination continues, but owing to a change 
in the superlative faculty, nous, in the case of the rational soul, a corresponding 
change in the functions of the imagination.  As the complexity of the soul increases, 
so will the functions of the imagination.  The changes to imagination highlight the 
chasm between appetitive souls and the rational soul Aristotle explains for our 
distinctly finite, human existence. 
  In the rational soul, just as in the sensitive soul, the imagination performs the 
function of collating the deliverances of the senses for the presentation of objects 
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immediately before the perceiver.  The additional function is the ability to re-present 
these objects when they are absent.  This reproductive capacity allows for discursive 
thinking, which in turn allows for the determination of essential forms, intellectual 
knowledge of objects, as well as the production of fictions.  This re-productive 
capacity coupled with variation found in discursive thinking affords a curious note of 
productivity.  Strictly speaking the imagination is reproducing images for 
employment in discursive thinking, but the variation found in discursive thinking, the 
addition and removal of qualities or features must surely be coordinated with the 
imagination in the presentation of a new image.  Thus there is even in the earliest 
framing of imagination as a component in abstract thinking an allowance for a 
creative or productive feature. The coordination of imagination and discursive 
thinking present new material for further employment.  Hence the imagination is 
integral in the production of knowledge, but also, when discursive thinking goes 
awry, the production of fictions. 
This re-presentative ability of the imagination as found in rational souls elicits 
the epistemic and metaphysical questions cited earlier as threads of thematic 
continuity throughout this historical section.  Aristotle is adamant about the truth of 
perception in normal, non-diseased, sense apparatus.  Combining this article with the 
simplistic function of imagination found in sensitive souls, Aristotle can affirm that 
animals have immediate perception of their environment, one which is inherently 
faithful to the circumstances of the given situation.  Judgment and error do not occur 
in sensitive souls and hence Aristotle deems that animals may have a faithful 
 68 
 
presentation of their environment.  When turning to the rational soul, however, the 
epistemic status of images becomes more specious.  One might contend, that if a 
rational soul merely operates at the level of sensibility thus employing the 
imagination as the collation of sense data, human might never err.  This evaluation 
seems to fit with the general suggestion that, if humans never make judgments, they 
can never err.  But this is not the case for the rational soul in Aristotle.  Because the 
imagination is governed by nous rather than sensation in the rational soul, the 
reproductive capacity and the employment of this capacity in discursive thinking 
alters the fidelity once ascribed to an animalistic imagination.  Error may occur in the 
hermeneutic component of imagination as well as in the fidelity of the memories 
produced by imagination.  Aristotle even goes so far as to say that that images are 
“for the most part false” or “can be “true or false” in human reproduction.  This error 
is owing to the lack of immediate experience found in the primitive imagination.  
Because of a temporal remove—that is, because of the mediated nature of images 
presented by rational imagination—Aristotle cannot ensure the faithfulness of images 
presented by the imagination in memory.  Furthermore, because of the role 
imagination performs in discursive thinking itself, the adding or deleting of certain 
qualities in the presentation of images to dianoia, the creations of this discursive 
imagination may  not be faithful to any objects in the world e.g. we can create images 
in thinking of chimeras, satyrs, etc.  In order to mitigate this inherently fictional 
ability of discursive imagination Aristotle recommends recourse to logical forms and 
the justificatory presentation of our memory and perceptions working at optimal or, at 
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least normal, levels.  In conceding the fallibility of images through the role of 
imagination in discursive thinking Aristotle bespeaks the phenomenological 
difficulties found in human experience itself.  Aristotle wishes not to explain away 
the problem of error, but to account for how it is possible, and this possibility centers 
around the presentations available to human thinking—that is to the presentation of 
the imagination itself.
111
  
The development and distinctions of types of imagination found in Aristotle 
are to have profound implications for the history of philosophy.  Not only will 
Medieval thinkers appropriate and refine these distinctions, but, moreover, their 
legacy extends to modern philosophy.  The appetitive imagination found in animals 
and its ability to provide sense-collation and presentation of environment finds echoes 
in the reproductive imagination in Descartes and Kant.  Furthermore, the distinction 
of an imaginative process unique and definitive of rational beings, a discursive 
imagination, will find a correlate in the productive imagination of Kant.   This 
primitive version of imagination establishes the precedent of two modes of 
imagination, one at the sensorial level, and another, at the level of discursive thinking, 
while introducing another concern—that of the connection between  sensation and 
thinking.  This heritage that questions the connectivity of thought and sensation 
becomes a central issue in epistemic concerns, one which Kant will take up, but also 
nearly every philosopher in the interim.  Although definitions of empirically real 
objects will differ amongst the various figures in philosophy, this concern will loom 
large for the remainder of philosophical concerns. 
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Chapter 3: Imagination in Medieval Philosophy 
 
Transition from Ancient to Medieval 
 
In the development of historical progression, the medieval philosophers find 
themselves the inheritors of the concepts of Greek philosophers.  They are not, 
however, mere imitators of Greek thinking.  Medieval philosophers
112
 acquire the 
concepts of Greek philosophy and blend them with biblical theology.  The 
combination of Greek ontology with Judeo-Christian theology “reached most explicit 
expression in the famous „Christian synthesis‟ of medieval philosophy.”113  The 
synthesis of ontology and theology prescribes a new type of philosophical inquiry, 
that of onto-theology, which equates the ontological-philosophical concept of being, 
found in Greek philosophy, with Christian theology‟s belief in God.  The expression 
and systematization of onto-theology finds its apex in the philosophical writings of 
Thomas Aquinas.
114
  Central to this paradigm of reasoning is the identity of static 
being with a divine creator, while becoming is associated with the physical world.  
Following Platonic and neo-Platonic thinking, being is characterized as eternal, 
unchanging and true.  Objects of the physical world in which we humans find 
                                                          
112
 This roughly defined as those authors and scholars inhabiting the time between the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, 5
th
 century CE and the fall of Constantinople in the 15
th
 century.  A notable exception 
here is St. Augustine. 
113
 Kearney, 114. 
114
 Copleston, 181. 
 71 
 
ourselves, however, come into existence and decay until they no longer are, literally 
they have gone out of being, they are no more, they are non-existent.  Objects in this 
world, while seemingly acquiring the status of being, do not or cannot maintain the 
eternal, unchanging status identified with Being/God.  Rather they are transient 
objects that seem to come into being and eventually ebb out of existence, they are the 
objects of becoming and decay.  The Medieval philosophers incorporate this 
conceptual apparatus into their theology and identify God and Being.
115
  Hence the 
Medieval philosophers describe an absolute, true order that never alters, now 
identified with the Christian god that is the author of the universe, and the physical 
world with the Greek conception of becoming and finite, human understanding.  The 
relegation of human knowledge to a lower stature in onto-theology emphasizes the 
subservience of finite, human knowledge, philosophical though it may be, to religious 
questions that support faith in a specified type of divine creator. 
Inherent in the medieval schema is the conceptual framework established in 
Hellenic culture—that of a natural order of things of which humans possess only a 
finite perspective and thus fallible knowledge.  All human knowledge (better said 
opinion) is an attempt to parallel and duplicate God‟s infinite understanding.  The role 
of imagination in this process finds original expression in the founding fables of their 
worldview, much like in Greek culture.  For the Judeo-Christian medieval, the 
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exemplification of imagination is found in the Adamic myth and the expulsion of 
humankind from the Garden of Eden.  Both Adam and Eve succumb to the temptation 
to possess the knowledge of God, to know good and evil and to become like Him.
116
  
By eating the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, humans have aspired to 
knowledge possessed only by the divine.  To such emulation and theft humans are 
forever cast out of paradisiacal glory.   As punishment for duplication of God‟s 
knowledge Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden and, parallel to the 
Promethean story, a stigma is attached to humankind‟s ability to create and employ 
the imagination in the process of representation, both artistic and epistemic.  The 
ability for abstract representation and the knowledge obtained by such processes are 
relegated to mere duplicity of higher order, divine knowledge.  Thus any processes by 
which such knowledge obtains, the imagination in our case, will be infused with 
suspicion and questions concerning its legitimacy and use.  Yet, neither Greek nor 
medieval Judeo-Christian understanding of the imagination is left exclusively to the 
myths of their cultures.  Employment, evaluation and often condemnation of the 
imagination are found explicitly in archetypal thinkers of their respective times.  In 
Greece we find explicit treatment of the imagination, however incomplete, in Plato 
and Aristotle.  Continuing this treatment in the Medieval period, authors such as St. 
Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas loom large in the development of 
cognitive capacities and their role in both human and divine ordering.   
Contrary to common opinion, the medieval period is not a barren landscape 
concerning philosophical questions concerning human cognition and the status of 
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capacities of the mind.  Rather than the “dark” ages as they are often described, the 
medieval period was an excess of riches in these respects, and in so doing will 
provide a deeper exploration of developments of cognitive capacities. Eva Brann 
describes the Medieval period as “rich in acute and interesting distinctions, the kind 
brought about by a subtle and steadfast application to the matter and by a reverently 
refined reading of the received texts.”117  What we find in the medieval period is a 
careful development of the Greek concepts found in the works of Plato and Aristotle.  
As Brann continues she notes that, despite its excellent exegesis and explanation of 
Greek thinking concerning the imagination, along with its incorporation into Judeo-
Christian theology, the medieval treatment of the imagination is “poor in 
revolutionary new departures.”118  Thus, while the Medievals refine and expand 
conceptual understanding of imagination, they are, to a great extent, mere inheritors 
and imitators of Greek concepts, within a newly established theology of course, and 
can be viewed as extensions of Plato and Aristotle.   
Aristotle‟s influence in the medieval period is not insignificant.  His 
elaboration of the processes of cognition and expression of these processes in terms 
of faculty psychology pervades medieval literature.  In the accounts of these 
processes, two dominant schools become prevalent in the transition from Greek to 
Medieval thinking.  The first group that describes the processes of human 
understanding lays claim to the imagination as a faculty open to divine, spiritual or 
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intellectual influences.  This “top down” school of thought, found most typically in 
neo-Platonic thinking, draws from the obscure passages in Plato‟s Republic, and 
suggests images in dianoetic thinking, encountered and elaborated in geometric and 
moral reasoning, can faithfully represent the Form(s).  Because the images employed 
in geometric and moral reasoning are employed as hypotheses that pure thinking, 
noetic intellection, confirm as first principles, the imagination may have a role in 
knowledge acquisition in even the harshest of neo-Platonic critics.  These critics will 
caution against most employments of images, but, in exceptional cases, when the 
images may be received from noetic thinking itself, the images enjoy an epistemically 
privileged position.  The “top down” schools argues that those faithful representations 
employed in the inherently imagistic thinking at the lower level must have been 
originated from the Form(s) or, in Medieval thinking, God Himself.  Without eternal 
truth as the source for the images employed, the processes of geometric and moral 
thinking cannot serve as a propaedeutic for dialectic and consequently pure 
intellection.
119
  Without a source from above, “a downward mirroring of intellectual 
objects,”120 the veracity of these images can never be confirmed and Plato‟s general 
critique of imagistic thinking still obtains.  Images, because of their imitative and 
                                                          
119
 It may be noted here an inherently circular reasoning; God ensures the forms employable in 
dianoetic thinking, which in turn allows a platform from which pure thinking can “see” the form(s) as 
true, thus affirming the guarantee of God‟s imparting the forms to human thinking.  However, this 
epistemic circle, though it may be, is mitigated by the belief that God‟s knowledge, an ontological 
fact/article of faith, is the guarantor of the veracity of human thinking.  When attempting to determine 
the epistemic status of imagistic thinking in human cognition, the ontological fact of God‟s knowledge 
is not an epistemic not priority, but, rather, an ontological concern.  The justification of human 
knowledge is the noetic vision involved in intellection, which happens to affirm the belief of God‟s 
omniscience.  The circle is simply epistemic and highlights the faith involved in onto-theological 
considerations. 
120
 Brann, 61. 
 75 
 
often duplicitous nature, cannot serve to determine axioms nor first principles— a 
problem Plato clearly foresaw. 
A second trend in medieval philosophy, one that follows Aristotle more 
closely, presents a “bottom up” model.  It is this second school of thinking that 
characterizes most medieval philosophers.  According to the “bottom up” model, 
nothing comes to the imagination nor is any image produced that does not first come 
from, up through, the senses.  The imagination is typically found next to sense 
perception and memory in a hierarchical order of the faculties.  These hierarchies are 
significant because they are “an ordering, which while assigning to each element [of 
cognition] a lower and higher place, also gives each its proper dignity.”121    
The cornerstone to both approaches is the blending of Greek concepts within 
Christian theology. Much as we find in Greek philosophy, all the hierarchical, 
medieval systems claim the imagination plays a significant role in cognition, but, in 
order to satisfy epistemic concerns, must be properly subordinated to reason.
122
  
Following the guiding influence of the Greek philosophers, the imagination does play 
a vital role in human cognition, but it must be placed properly in the hierarchy and, 
lest it succumb to the same fallibility found in those Greek thinkers, imagination must 
be governed by higher order faculties.  And while the Medievals seem to 
acknowledge the difficulties of image making and image employment in finite 
cognition, they attempt to ameliorate the problematic nature by allowing reason 
and/or revelation to guide the use of images in seeking truth and epistemic verity of 
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objects of experience—the very same task Kant will perform in his fundamental 
formulation of imagination (although Kant depends upon reason alone).  To 
exemplify how the imagination as found in Plato and Aristotle is incorporated in the 
onto-theology of the medieval period and the subsequent developments we shall turn 
attention to Augustine, Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Aquinas. 
 
 
 
 
St. Augustine of Hippo 
 
 Augustine typifies the early medieval ingenuity of “conscripting theology and 
ontology as joint allies in the pursuit of truth.”123  He promotes the use of 
philosophical concepts to articulate the Christian faith and theology surrounding the 
Bible.  Faith, which is of paramount importance, Augustine argues, can be maintained 
by one of two possible ways.  One way faith can be maintained is by trust in 
authority.  Trust in patristic order—priests, cardinals and popes—and the messages, 
doctrine and recommendations from positions in authority can guide faith and aid in 
the contest between belief and doubt.  John Marenboom notes that  
in the earliest days of the Church, zealots had little need for abstract 
speculation in order to preach the commands of the Gospels and 
elaborate their obvious moral consequences.  [And yet] as Christianity 
became first the leading, and then the official, religion of the Empire, 
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it gained more and more followers who would not so easily sacrifice 
the rational and humane values of a classical education.
124
 
 
Augustine finds himself in this pivotal period where the Church has recently become 
the official religion of the Roman Empire, and he himself sympathizes with classical 
education.   
The second way faith can be maintained, the one Augustine recommends, 
attempts to reconcile classical teaching with biblical faith and is a faith based not 
upon dogmatic authority, but reasoned argumentation and synthesis with already 
obtained knowledge.  To accomplish this synthesis, Augustine recommends the 
inquirer utilize a metaphysical understanding of the categories of Being to explain 
and understand the descriptions provided by belief.  By this prescription, Augustine is 
an important forerunner of the famous doctrine of “faith seeking understanding” 
(fides quaerens intellectus).  He himself establishes a route to and through faith that 
seeks understanding, not merely dogmatic obedience.  Rather than obediently comply 
with dictates of authority on issues relating to the faith, Augustine suggests that 
humankind may equate Yahweh, the god of creation, to Being.  According to this 
formulation, the Christian god is not only the source of being/existence (ousia, on) we 
find in this world, but also the very Being that exemplifies the permanence of that 
concept.
125
  Surely, this onto-theological alliance was “to have a profound and 
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enduring impact on the subsequent evolution of medieval thinking about 
imagination.”126 
 From the influence of Plato and neo-Platonism, Augustine draws the correlate 
of God with Being, and any being of lesser status is equated somewhere on Plato‟s 
divided line, as physical objects of doxastic appearance, or, further down, as 
reproduced images.  Augustine‟s chain of being exemplifies the hierarchical order, 
placing God atop the chain with facsimiles and illusion at the lowest levels.
127
  In 
addition, Augustine is “the first Latin author to use the term imagination in a 
consistent philosophical manner, combining biblical distrust of images with the Greek 
and neo-Platonic view of phantasia as a hindrance to spiritual contemplation.”128   
Because of humankind‟s inability to claim the products of the imagination as real or 
permanent, imaginative thinking, while perhaps practically useful, such products and 
subsequent knowledge claims find themselves placed at the margins of Augustine‟s 
chain of being.  The imagination is treated according to the standard, classical 
mimetic model, and the stigma attached to imitation, such as that found in Plato, 
translates directly into Augustine‟s philosophical treatments.  The epistemic 
difficulties classically attached to images and their ontological status plagues human 
employment and necessitates a role as unreal and illusory creation.  Once again, we 
find human creation, those images fastened by the mimesis of sensation in a mental 
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process, subordinated to God‟s creation.  Only one can be univocally real, thus human 
creation and expression must be a mere incomplete reproduction of God‟s eternal 
knowledge.
129
  
The ethical prescription found in Plato also works its way into Augustinian 
philosophy, with a characteristic theological innovation.  Demonic possession is often 
attributed to anyone who claims to be able to depict, in representative form, the truth 
of God.  Early mystics become denounced as heretics and infidels for attempting to 
summon a mere representation or image of the divine, tantamount to idolatry,
130
 and 
are often accused of trafficking with the devil.  Satan himself is often described as the 
master of illusion and carries this effect by imposing on human thinking the mistaken 
identification of the image with the real.  In his Confessions, Augustine will move 
away from the Manichean heresy and will suggest that it is not the entitival character 
Satan, but distraction from, or movement away from contemplation of God that is the 
very nature of sin and evil.  By denying Satan, or at least the Manichean version of 
the source for evil and error,
131
 Augustine shifts the burden of sin, heresy and evil 
onto individuals, and in so doing, levels more criticism against the imagination for its 
role in diverting humans away from the contemplation of God.  This theological 
innovation resonates with the human use of imagination already established—echoing 
Plato‟s caution against taking the image, a superficial and impermanent being and 
elevating it to the level of permanent being.  In short, Augustine cautions against 
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images found in idolatry.
132
   With such serious indictment of images and human 
imagination, there seems little hope for redemption for such a problematic element of 
human cognition and representation, indeed little hope for any use of images in 
human thinking that gives the divine its due respect. 
 However, the imagination can prove useful provided it is guided by 
illumination, the direct intellection of eternal truth(s).  Much like in Plato, Augustine 
does leave a positive account for image making and images in the depiction of his 
theology.  Augustine himself employs metaphor and imaging in his philosophical 
discussion of the Trinity found in his De Trinitate, by likening parts of the Trinity to 
parts of the human soul.
133
  This complicated work introduces series of triads in 
various different aspects of human experience, but its overall theme is to provide a 
working analogy of man made in the image of God—an ironic and provocative 
suggestion for some redemptive use of the imagination.   
Like the Christian divine trinity, Augustine argues that the human soul can be 
divided into three main parts.  The first division, the “outer man” represents the world 
of immediate perceptual experience.  Outer man is “endowed with sensation, and with 
it perceives bodies.”134  “Inner man” is “endowed with understanding” and concerns 
itself with mental representations provided by memory.
135
  The final third of 
Augustine‟s trinity metaphor is found in an extraordinary function of the rational, 
inner man, that of contemplation.  Unlike the outer man or lower, inner man, which 
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both deal with temporal matters and objects, this superior function is “engaged in 
contemplating eternal things and terminates in awareness alone.”136   This tripartite 
structure is equated with sensation, understanding and contemplation, respectively.  
Accompanying each division is a mode of understanding unique to each level.  The 
possible modes of “vision”, as Augustine calls them, further elaborate the distinction 
between these three different levels of human experience.   
The first and lowest level of vision is “composed of the thing visible, the act 
of vision (visio) and the desire for vision” and roughly corresponds to Aristotle‟s 
animalistic imagination or sensus communis—a place for the collation of the 
deliverances of the senses for a unifies “picture” of the environment.137  Augustine, 
however, does not wish to term this lowest level as image or imagination.  Rather, 
Augustine employs the term “visio,” “impressio” or “sensus” to indicate the means by 
which human perception encounters the outward object.  This sense-image is a bodily 
manifestation, in which a body “begets a form as a likeness of itself, which occurs in 
the sense when we sense anything by seeing it.”138  This sense-image will become the 
material of representation for the corporeal image found in memory in the workings 
of the “inner man”, the second level in Augustine‟s hierarchy, wherein we will find 
the imagination proper.   
At this second level of images the movement from outer to inner occurs and 
the imagination proper, the imaginatio, is addressed.  Corporeal images, the objects of 
the imagination proper, are the reproduction of the sense-image of objects no longer 
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present.
139
  At any given stage of his analysis Augustine adheres to an architectonic of 
triples.  At the level of sensation, he describes the object e.g. a stone, the actual 
seeing, and the power that holds the sense of the eyes on the thing being seen, the 
conscious intention.  For sensation and sense-images this triple structure appears non-
controversial, but at the level of inner man the newfound threesome is quite 
informative.  When dealing with the corporeal images of inner man, Augustine 
denotes the image stored in memory, the attention to the objects of thought in the 
mind, and intention of the will that unifies the two.  The production of sense-image at 
the level of “outer man” provides the image stored in memory (or we might think the 
representation or object of representation), but the ability to recall and to use these 
images, one might say the ability to use imagination, is integrally connected with the 
attentiveness to the objects of thought, thus dependant upon the human will to conjure 
the images and hold the attention on the objects.
140
  But the will‟s capacities are not 
merely to capture and hold, but also alter.  As Bundy notes: 
This faculty of internal vision… may only reproduce the pictures 
stored in the memory, and then it differs from memory only in 
function; but, in virtue of the freedom of the will, it may become a 
faculty of „diminution and addition…  By the exercise of this faculty, 
if the image of a crow, for example which is very familiar to the eye, 
be set before the eye of the mind, as it were, it may be brought, by the 
taking away of some features  and the addition of others, to almost any 
image such as never was seen by the eye.‟141 
 
By diminution and addition the inner image, the spiritual image, may be varied to 
produce an object that has no corresponding object in the world.  These phantasies 
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brought about by willing and imagining are one sort of object that finds 
condemnation in Augustine.    
By elaborating the imagination of “inner man” as a tripartite structure of 
image, attention and will, Augustine can discuss the possibility of error entering into 
his system, of which there are many kinds.  In terms of corporeal images and human 
knowledge, the single most egregious error to be made is the “misshapen kind of life” 
a rational soul lives “when it lives according to the trinity of the outer man.”142  As 
rational souls, the worst error we can commit is to concern ourselves with the 
corporeal images of the temporal world.  As being made in the image of God, we 
have, according to Augustine, the capacity to contemplate “eternal things” and, 
possibly, to obtain knowledge of permanence, i.e. the kind of knowledge God enjoys.  
If one spends her entire time concerned with impermanent objects, the corporeal 
images of the objects of this material world, she falls short of actualizing this highest 
potential of a rational being.  Literally, one sins by the willful distraction from the 
contemplation of eternal truths.  
Important as the moral imperative to pursue contemplation may be, Augustine 
does not wish to ignore the many ways of falling into error when dealing with 
corporeal images and knowledge of the temporal world.  Simple mechanical errors 
can account for some mistakes when judging human perception.  Sometimes the 
flame of a candle can seem to be doubled when we stop focusing our eyes.  And 
while there is one object we judge there to be two.
143
  Yet mechanical failure is not 
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the worst of errors for corporeal images.  Because of the power of diminution and 
addition, because we can willfully alter the image employed in representations, we 
can create new corporeal images, that are then stored in memory.  The main force that 
may motivate this kind of recombinant variation is desire, either for knowledge or as 
curiosity.  Often, Augustine suggests, this desire can overwhelm the passive storage 
unit that is memory and we can willfully supplant the sense-image of perception with 
that the created-image of variation.  Furthermore, with the span of time and the 
forgetfulness of our variation, either because of lack of attentiveness or because 
desire assists in forgetting, we often replace sense-images with these newly created 
phantasies.
144
  These phantasies are deemed real, and for Augustine, this is 
tantamount to willful sinning.  It is, very much in the platonic sense, mistaking the 
illusory for the real.   If humans either vary the content of the images found in 
corporeal imagination or attribute permanence to the objects of corporeal 
imagination, they have exceeded the bounds by which they may safely judge their 
experience, and thus may fall into error.
145
    
However, should corporeal images be guided by reason and intellectual 
vision, the possibility for error is removed.  According to Augustine, the inner life of 
humans, as noted above, is divided into two functions.  The lower portion of inner life 
concerns itself with corporeal images, with knowledge of the world of perception.  
The higher function of inner life contemplates eternal being.  While the lower half of 
inner life “is carried on with sensible things and with what the consciousness has 
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imbibed from them through the senses,” it “is nonetheless not without its share of 
reason.”146  Reason guides the cataloguing, variation and experimentation of 
corporeal images.  However, reason finds a higher vocation in examination of “non-
bodily and everlasting meanings.” The use of this reason is to “make judgments on 
these bodily things according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings; and unless 
these were above human mind they would certainly not be unchanging, and unless 
something of ours were subjoined to them we would not be able to make judgments 
according to them about bodily things.” 147  In contemplation, human reason is 
illuminated by divine grace, that we may then see the metaphysical status of bodily 
objects and images.  In intellectual vision one “sees”, much like in Plato, the truth of 
the objects under contemplation.  
In addition, the judgments we pass on the corporeal level are remonstrated and 
corrected by the truth divined in illumination.    The highest level of vision, the 
intellectual, is the very aspect of Augustine‟s trinity that confirms the “top-down” 
model which mitigates against error in human judgment when employing images in 
cognition.  Provided that intellectual vision has provided the content of non-bodily 
and eternal meanin—thus emplooyed, often by use of metaphor, to the level of 
imagistic representation—Augustine will vouchsafe the veracity of images and 
judgments made determining corporeal images.  It is intellectual vision alone and not 
corporeal vision that allows one to see the world in its “essence,” and it is the 
application of the eternal truths to corporeal images that will allow for any knowledge 
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of the material world to be guaranteed.
148
   Augustine‟s version of intellectual vision 
is one that depends upon the grace of a divine creator in allowing, often through a 
retrograde use of discursive/dianoetic thinking, true, corporeal representations to be 
made.
149
 Although, at the highest level of vision, contemplation, Augustine implies 
that no images whatsoever are at work, he does allow for intellectual vision to 
countenance corporeal images and a body of knowledge of the material world.
150
    It 
is at this point that Kearney‟s evaluation of medieval imagination becomes apparent:  
it is the author of the universe alone who can guarantee the veracity of thought.  
Humans are left, once again, to be merely the imitators and supplicants to a higher 
order that determines the truth of their expressions. 
 Augustine‟s understanding of images and imagination presents an early and 
interesting case to characterize the Medieval period.  While prima facie Augustine 
seems to present the “top down” model for understanding where the imagination fits 
into a schema of human understanding, this misrepresents Augustine‟s description of 
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the source of corporeal images.  Images that are found in human cognition inevitably 
have their source in sense perception.  Even those images found in dreams can be 
traced to and are derived from sense perception.
151
  The corporeal imagination is an 
organizing faculty, one necessary to collate sense perception that a transition from 
outer objects of sensation to be evaluation in the inner processes of represenation and 
judging to occur.  Knowledge amounts to organizing the data provided by sensation 
and ordered “in the light of intelligible forms”- form essentially dependent upon a 
divine order.
152
  Upon scrutiny, we find that Augustine‟s understanding and role of 
imagination in human cognition and corporeal knowledge, is fundamentally that 
derived from Aristotle, the “bottom up” model, but with the rider that human 
knowledge, if there is to be any true knowledge, must depend upon superhuman 
intercession in the form of divine illumination.  The mediating capacity of the 
imagination in the generation of corporeal images, Augustine maintains, detracts from 
the process of spiritual light that is the source of true knowledge.  Augustine‟s use of 
an Aristotelian model for sense perception and faculty psychology in combination 
with a Platonic understanding of metaphysical hierarchy, combined with his 
theological commitments represents the difficulties with which the early Church dealt 
in attempting to synthesize classical education and biblical theology. 
  It should be noted that Augustine is not the only early Church father to read 
and analyze Platonic and neo-Platonic writings.  Augustine knew no Greek and had to 
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rely upon the available translations within the Empire for his insight.  Eastern Fathers 
of the Church, those native Greek speakers had privilege access to original text and 
were closer to the sources of the Greek heritage, and exhibited greater influence than 
those of the West, and thus might be considered truer inheritors of Platonism and neo-
Platonism, who integrate Greek philosophy into Christian theology.  However, owing 
to the popularity of Augustine‟s early writing and his devotion to rigorous logical 
argument that consequently always upheld his faith and theological commitments, 
Augustine‟s popularity was unparalleled in the early Medieval period, a legacy that 
proves formative in the subsequent middle and late stages of philosophical 
development in the Medieval period.
153
   
 One such character who is familiar with Augustine‟s philosophical and 
theological writings, along with the traditions of the Eastern Orthodox writings and 
Arabic interpretations is Richard of St. Victor.  Echoing Augustine‟s understanding of 
the need for imagination and highlighting Augustine‟s mistrust, Richard of St. Victor 
continues medieval skepticism of the imagination in his work, Benjamin Minor, 
cautioning his readers against “the corruptive influence which imagination may exert 
on the practices of spiritual contemplation.”154  Richard of St. Victor, a late twelfth 
century mystic (?-1173) and prior of the Augustinian abbey and school St. Victor in 
Paris, presents a further elaboration of Augustine‟s considerations on the 
imagination.
155
  In looking to Richard‟s work, we are provided an exegesis and 
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development of Augustine‟s philosophical themes, demonstrating Augustine‟s 
connection to Plato, while, at the same time, providing a vivid metaphor illustrating 
the paradoxical nature of imagination found in medieval thought. 
Continuing the hierarchy of Augustine, Richard of St. Victor establishes 
spiritual contemplation at the apex of human activities, sense perception at the lowest 
level, and places imagination as a mediator between the two.  Spiritual contemplation 
resembles Augustine‟s intellection or intellectual vision in virtue of contemplation‟s 
absolute separation from the corporeal world.  Sense perception, now properly 
named, is the correlate of Augustine‟s corporeal vision.  Circumscribed by this 
dynamic antithesis is an analogous movement found in Augustine, that of the inner 
versus the outer.   
Contemplation is a wholly internal event, one developed by spirit, perhaps 
with supplication to divine, that is spiritual, aid and enables one to grasp “a Supreme 
Being which exists of necessity in itself.”156 Sense perception, on the other hand, 
deals only with the contingency presented through the transient perceptions given to 
human experience through sensation.  Richard contends that the imagination is the 
means by which sense experience, received from the outer, corporeal world, can be 
translated into a form which can be employed by reason (ratio).  For Richard, 
Augustine‟s tripartite hierarchy appears to be refined into a four tiered system, 
affording contemplation the highest position, in which reason plays a signature role; 
followed by reason itself (often applied to the images and sense perception); then 
                                                          
156
 Kearney, 122. 
 90 
 
imagination; and finally sense perception.
157
  To demonstrate this very position and to 
elaborate the respective role and dignity afforded to each faculty, Richard employs a 
colorful, biblical allegory, the story of Rachel and Bilhah.   
 Rachel, mother of Joseph and the rightful transmitter of the line of Israel, was 
the first and favored wife of Jacob.  In Richard‟s description, she is likened to a 
mistress, “reason illumined by divine revelation,” contemplation, who inhabits the 
holy of holies, and employs reason.
158
  Owing to her exclusive status inside the holy 
of holies, interaction with the unclean is beneath her station, lest the purity of the 
temple become defiled.  Yet as first wife and mistress of the house, Rachel must 
execute her duties in the maintenance of the house, while at the same time separating 
herself from the menial and debasing projects that elicit corruption.  Rachel must 
prevent a servant such as one of the senses from being in the habit of “break[ing] 
irreverently into the inner secret chamber of her mistress,” lest the purity of 
contemplation become sullied.
159
  In order to discharge her duties Rachel hires a 
handmaid, Bilhah, to serve as intermediary between herself and the despoiling outer 
world.  And so Rachel can discharge her duties pertaining to daily maintenance and 
yet secure a privileged position at a distance from the mundanity and contingency of 
the corporeal life.  Bilhah serves as an intermediary to communicate between the 
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higher and lower, while preventing the necessity of any direct contact.
160
  Reason—in 
the form of contemplation—can discharge its duties in maintenance of the individual, 
without sullying itself with the uncertainty and contingency of sense perception, by 
utilizing the imagination as a liaison, thus leaving itself available in the purity of 
inner reason to seek an understanding of God. 
And yet Richard cautions Rachel against placing too much trust in Bilhah, and 
consequently us against trusting too much in the imagination.  By frequenting the 
impure, outer world of the servants, Bilhah‟s loyalty becomes divided, by serving two 
masters simultaneously.  For maintenance of the home, Bilhah is forced to interact 
with the outside world and conform to the demands established by the parameters of 
the servants‟ abilities.  At the same time, Bilhah is expected to convey and enforce 
the desires and recommendations of Rachel in order to best harmonize the structure of 
the home.  By executing the demands of both masters, Bilhah understands the pivotal 
role she occupies, which subsequently results in Bilhah‟s own overestimation of her 
powers.   In Richard‟s words, Bilhah becomes garrulous and loquacious.161 Rachel 
finds herself in a curious predicament:  she cannot command the fortunes of her own 
home by herself, but owing to her dependence on Bilhah “nor can Rachel rule in her 
own house; with such persistence does Bilhah din in the ears of the heart that Rachel 
cannot live without her.”162  The imagination, in its pivotal role as liaison, assumes 
the role of master, determining what information reason receives as well as 
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performing reason‟s dictates in the corporeal world.163  Should such a situation arise, 
reason can be corrupted aware from its primary consideration, contemplation of the 
divine, being forced to return from such lofty pursuits to attempt to regain mastery of 
her house.  Because of the imagination‟s frequenting the corporeal realm, and the 
subsequent contamination, and by restricting and controlling the information reason 
receives, reason can be corrupted away from its primary consideration, contemplation 
of the divine. 
This analysis and caution against trust in and overuse of the imagination 
exemplifies, again, the onto-theological commitments of the medieval period.  
Contemplation of the divine, the execution of reason, remains the single most 
important goal of philosophical reasoning, to justify and illustrate the truth of biblical 
revelation.  The condition of human finitude and the necessity to interact with the 
contingent, and thus less real, world of the corporeal demands a liaison between 
contemplation for truth and sense perception.  Richard claims the imagination as just 
such an intermediary, yet admonishes a strict reservation in the translation of the 
corporeal into contemplation.
164
  In Richard of St. Victor we find, however, an early 
formulation that the imagination plays a two-fold, paradoxical role, one of 
transmitting the outer world of sensation to the inner world of reason, but also an 
inversion, the imagination also communicates the dictates of reason for execution in 
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the outer world of sense experience.  The caution is that the imagination has no 
bearing on truth, just maintenance of our corporeal bodies.  For the purposes of 
transmitting information from sense perception to reason the imagination is 
indispensable, but for contemplation, the imagination is merely a distraction. 
Augustine‟s explanations of the tripartite soul of man in conjunction with the 
analogy provided by Richard of St. Victor provides yet another connection with the 
imagination Kant inherits.  The Augustinian characterization of the human soul into a 
tripartite structure bears striking resemblance to Kant‟s tripartite division of 
sensibility, understanding and reason.  Unlike Augustine, Kant does not describe 
explicitly describe imagination at work at these various levels, rather, he argues for 
the independence of the imagination.  And yet, even with a separate faculty for the 
imagination, Kant manages to import much of the epistemic considerations, most 
saliently the need for a liaison between sensibility and understanding.  One further 
parallel between Kant and Augustine is the role the imagination plays in discharging 
the duties of reason, particularly in the practical domain.   That the imagination is 
garrulous and finds itself at various levels of human cognition, Kant is willing to 
concede, but whether the imagination is subservient to reason or whether it plays an 
active role in reason itself is yet to be determined.   
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St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas is hailed by most as the culmination and apotheosis of 
medieval thinking. He “represents what many consider to be the crowning 
achievement of the medieval synthesis of Greek and biblical learning, rehearsing and 
rearranging the principle stages of Western ontology and theology in a magisterial 
system or summa.”165  
Eva Brann states: 
“In regards to the imagination, as in much else, Thomas presents a 
summation of previous thought in such a way as to revivify subtle 
internal problems and to broach deep ultimate questions.  The subtlest 
and most difficult problem is the function of the imagination‟s 
„phantasm‟ in cognition, and the deepest question concerns the 
significance of the fact that the human being is imaginative.”166  
 
In few words, Brann captures the very spirit of Aquinas‟ project.  Aquinas is not 
merely concerned with a rational explanation, following Augustine, of his theology, 
but also humanity‟s place within the onto-theological framework.  His Summa 
Theologica intends not only to define and defend key issues concerning his religious 
perspective, Aquinas‟ works also reports to explain and defend the workings of 
human activity within this religious perspective. Central to his explanation of 
humanity is a description of human knowing and the elements of cognition necessary 
to accomplish this feat.  Inherently, imagination becomes a central, albeit a still 
ambiguous issue.  In so doing, Aquinas will bring Medieval onto-theology into a 
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systematic whole, describing a hierarchical structure wherein the roles and positions 
of God, angels, humans and animals will find their place.  To satisfy this goal, 
Aquinas must provide exacting divisions and distinctions that explain the descriptions 
he provides. 
 St. Augustine was deeply influenced by Plato and neo-Platonic philosophy.  
Aquinas, on the other hand, was influenced by Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition 
assumed by the catholic Christianity of his time.  Just as an understanding of 
Augustine‟s philosophy depends to a great extent on understanding the Platonic 
themes resonating in his onto-theology, so, too, does an understanding of Aquinas 
depend largely on reference to Aristotle.  Aquinas further refines the hierarchical 
systems developed by his predecessors, eventually concluding a five-part faculty 
psychology: namely intellect, reason, imagination, common sense, and sense 
perception.  The order and epistemic veracity of knowledge acquisition descends, 
from the highest, intellect, to the lowest, sense perception. 
Aquinas‟ philosophy assumes much of Aristotle‟s faculty psychology, only 
further elaborating it.  And, in order to provide divisions among beings, Aquinas 
makes direct appeal to Aristotle‟s explanation of souls.  John Marenboom notes that 
“despite these obvious and admitted debts, Aquinas did far more than merely follow 
Aristotle in his account of the intellect.  The Aristotelian elements in his discussion 
belong to a fuller, theological theory, which depends on a hierarchical view of 
intelligent being.”167   The commitment to Aristotle‟s divisions of vegetative, animal 
and human souls works well for Aquinas to explain objects of empirical experience, 
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but presents trouble when explaining the nature of angels and God.  Yet it is precisely 
these last two that Aquinas‟ theological commitments add to Aristotle‟s already well-
established philosophy. It is precisely along the line discussing intelligence and 
intellectual properties that Aquinas will add God and angels to Aristotle‟s hierarchy 
of beings and provide the distinctions necessary to defend his theology.  It is also in 
this context that Aquinas proves illuminative of human cognition.  One chief 
difficulty in Aquinas‟ explanations is the inconsistency with which he treats human 
cognition.  Because of his commitment to explaining the differences between angels, 
humans and animals, Aquinas‟ treatment is not always linear.  In order to gain insight 
into human cognition in Aquinas, it is necessary to look at those types of souls against 
which Aquinas puts humans in relief.  
Angels and disembodied souls, Aquinas informs us, are created beings 
endowed with the forms that are the sources for their knowledge.
168
  These immaterial 
beings are dependent upon God for the forms that are the objects of knowledge.  But 
what they grasp is the immediate, immaterial forms which comprise intellectual 
knowledge.  Knowledge, according to Aquinas, is always general, as opposed to 
particular; a form, a species, that accounts for all particulars that lay claim to the 
forms.
169
  Intellectual knowledge knows no particulars, only the forms.  And while 
angels or disembodied souls have access to these immaterial forms, embodied human 
souls cannot have direct access to these forms.  Humans, it turns out, experience 
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material particulars and their knowledge is dependant upon the particular experiences 
afforded by the senses.  Yet Aquinas insists that human knowledge is possible.  What 
knowledge humans can possess amounts to intellectual determination of the 
“quiddities” of material things.   
One distinction in currency during the Middle Ages, with which Aquinas was 
familiar, that may prove instructive in distinguishing between the knowledge of  
humans and disembodied beings, is the one made by the twelfth century Dominicus 
Gunisalvi, Archibishop of Segovia, between intellegentia and intellectus.  The former 
is knowledge dependant upon mystical communication; the latter is knowledge 
achieved through “science”.170  The former illustrates the dependency of disembodied 
beings upon their creator to provide objects of knowledge through either innateness 
during creation or mystical transference and constant dependency.  In Aquinas‟ view, 
the former, intelligentia, is the species of knowledge afforded to beings that cannot or 
do not experience material particulars, yet still obtain/possess knowledge.  Whether 
or not humans are bestowed this direct knowledge of immaterial forms is highly 
disputed among Aquinas scholars.
171
  Those that favor immediate, mystical insight 
follow the Augustinian tradition of divine illumination as a possible understanding of 
the process.  Prophecy is often cited as one direct example of this possible 
deliverance of knowledge.
172
  Thus there may still be room for a top-down model of 
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knowledge acquisition in Aquinas, one which affords infallibility to intellectual 
knowledge.
173
  Possible or not, these cases would be extraordinary and rare.  Human 
knowledge typically, if not exclusively, involves sense perception of immediate 
particulars and a transformative process by which these particulars are transformed 
through abstraction into generalities (species in Aquinas) of material forms.  Human 
knowledge, independent of direct mystical intervention, employs a more scientific 
approach, often called reason/reasoning, to determining the intelligible species 
available to human intellectus.  In the fullest sense of intellegentia, angels are 
intellectual, Aquinas tells us.  In comparison, humans are merely rational.
174
  Since 
the nature of a being‟s intellectual knowledge depends upon the nature of the being, 
humans, it would seem, need another explanatory mechanism to determine 
knowledge.
 175
 
Furthermore, human pursuit of quiddity needs parameters in which it operates.  
But first a note about quiddity.  “A thing‟s „quiddity‟ is its whatness,” its essence or 
its being.
176
  This is not, however, to be confused with its form or substance.  It is not 
the single core constituent, such as substance or matter, nor all of its constituents 
together in a single form.  Rather, “quiddity” is the definition or essence of a thing.  
Quiddity cannot be the mere form of something, as form does not contain matter.  
Neither can it be the matter of any object, as matter may change, while form remains.  
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In apprehending what a thing is, humans experience the particular, material object 
and exercise the process of abstraction.  Integral in this process is the material and the 
form of the object perceived.  If one wishes to apprehend the quiddity of man, one 
must abstract from the flesh and bones of any particular human.  But any definition of 
man would be misleading if it suggested a man can exist without flesh and bone.
177
  
Hence what humans apprehend in cognition can be definitive for any 
species/generality, but human knowledge usually (if not always) comes from a 
particular to a generality.  In Aquinas, this is the essence of cognition.  This 
movement from particular to universal and back again, is one that employs 
imagination as a liaison from material particulars to immaterial ideas. 
Following Aristotle‟s empirical model, human cognition necessarily begins 
with sense perception.  Expanding upon Aristotle‟s understanding of sensation, 
Aquinas develops further refinements.  Perception, often cited as outer sense, is 
divisible into the five main modes of sensation i.e. sight, touch, smell etc.  This 
process of receiving information from the object of perception is primarily a passive 
experience.
178
  For each sensation there is a particular organ receptive to the kind of 
stimuli offered.  For color there is sight; for odor, the sense of smell.  “A sense is the 
power to undergo” the change caused by the object of sensation.  This change is not a 
physical one, eyes do not become red when seeing a red object, rather, it is an 
intentional change.  Intentional change is likeness (similitudo) of the sensible object.  
And sensation accomplishes this by taking in the form, not physically but 
                                                          
177
 Ibid. p., 119. 
178
 Mahoney, p. 605.  Primarily passive because Aquinas allows that each sense organ has the power to 
discriminate between objects proper to its domain e.g. sight can discern between green and white. 
 100 
 
intentionally, of the object.  Kenny provides a helpful example to demonstrate the 
meaning of this cryptic doctrine.  He writes: 
The sweetness of a piece of sugar, something which can be tasted, is a 
sensible object; my ability to taste is a sense-faculty; and the operation 
of the sense of taste upon the sensible object is the same thing as the 
action of the sensible object upon my sense.
179
 
 
The sweet of the sugar is the ability to effect the taste faculty in an organism.  The 
intentional awareness of tasting sweet is the quality of sugar that the taste faculty 
affords the tasting organism, the person tasting sugar.  But the tongue does not 
become sweet with the tasting of sugar.  Rather, it transmits the “sweet information” 
to another faculty to be processed and collated with other sensations that might 
accompany other senses in the consumption of sugar.  The five sense faculties are 
discreet and perform an operation to provide particular data from the material object 
to the intentional mind that determines the properties and quiddities of objects. 
 As the five faculties are separate and provide disparate forms of objects to the 
organism, Aquinas, following Aristotle, accounts for the collation and subsequent 
further discrimination to a single faculty, the sensus communis, common sense.  With 
a shift in faculty, a shift in the object also obtains.  Aquinas informs us that “each 
power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its 
object.”180  The sense faculties were defined by their ability to perceive a material 
object and their disparate properties, the common sense is the faculty that directs its 
attention to the intentional forms provided by the separate senses, in order to collate 
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them into a single entity.
181
  This shift in faculties, also solicits a shift in Aquinas‟ 
terminology.  The common sense is not one among the outer senses.  It is, rather, the 
lowest level of a group of faculties Aquinas identifies as “inner sense.”      
 Inner sense might better be described as the imagination complex, a series of 
faculties at work in translating the deliverances of the senses into materials for 
rational thought.  That it is sensorial is suggested because the images produced at this 
stage still resemble the perception afforded by sensation, most specifically in its 
spatial aspect.  But images are not sense perceptions, rather, they resemble the 
deliverances of the senses, and no organ can be determined by which these “senses” 
are received.
182
  Simultaneous with collation and discrimination in the sensus 
communis, the imagination proper in Aquinas, that is the image-making process of the 
imagination complex, forms images, likenesses (similitudo) according to the spatial 
form, quite often the shape, of the sense perceptions.  Aquinas tells us that; 
For the reception of sensible forms the proper and common sense is 
appointed; but for the retention and preservation of these forms, the 
phantasy or imagination (phantasia sive imagination) is appointed, 
which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is, as it were, a 
storehouse of forms received through the senses.
183
 
 
The imagination, in its capacity to create images, gives form to the deliverances of the 
senses, a form usually based upon the spatial shape of the object of sensation, but a 
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form which can be utilized by the mind, an intentional form.
184
  To this special 
function Aquinas gives the name imagination-formalis, and distinguishes it from the 
retentive power, imagination-thesaurus.  The generation of images in the 
imagination-formalis is distinguished from the imagination-thesaurus, the latter being 
merely a storehouse of the images created.   Both apprehension and retention are, at 
this fundamental level of cognition, attributed to the imagination.  Yet the 
imagination complex is not complete even with this mediating function accounted for. 
 Once mentalistic images have been formed and placed in the store-house of 
imagination, Aquinas accounts for reminiscence of these forms by appealing to the 
faculty of memory proper.  The memory, in close conjunction with imagination-
thesaurus, is the ability to recall, to bring forward, to present in human cognition, 
what is no longer present.  Memory is the active process that allows access of the 
forms of past sensation, those stored in the imagination-thesaurus, to be presented in 
the absence of the object of sensation.  At this level of cognition, Aquinas is willing, 
albeit begrudgingly, to admit as much of animals.  Following Aristotle‟s description 
of souls, sensitive souls must have some means by which to engage with their 
environment, a reproductive imagination that permits of basic memory.  Animals do 
seem to have the ability to perceive, react, and even remember aspects of their 
environments.  Under ordinary conditions, animals do not run into walls, find 
nourishment, and even do so based upon a rudimentary memory.  It is not until the 
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cogitative or estimative power, the next element of the imagination complex, that 
Aquinas draws stark demarcation between animals and humans.     
 The cogitative or estimative power in the imagination complex adds feelings 
to images to create something contemporary philosophy calls ideas.  Initially, the 
emotive contribution may be simple as joy or grief, utility or danger.  To a mouth-
foaming canine representation given by the senses, is added the feeling of danger, 
and, thus, an idea of the danger of rabies comes about.  According to Aquinas to this 
emotive attribution the cogitative power provides a general judgment, often the 
product of trial/error and associations.  Once again, Aquinas allows room for animals 
to present something akin to emotive attachment to image presentation, but falls short 
of attributing ideas to animals, describing the estimative power in animals a matter of 
mere instinct.  It is this cogitative power, a general judging, not limited to mere 
visceral reaction, that truly distinguishes animal from human cognition.  Important to 
note at this point in Aquinas‟ hierarchy of faculties is the inability to perform the 
higher without the lower, and yet the supervening importance that each phase has at it 
approaches intellection, intellectus. 
 The final faculty Aquinas attributed to the imagination complex is often called 
phantasy by commentators.  This phantasy is not the reproductive process attributed 
to the imagination proper.  Rather, it is the recombinant capacity solicited by the term 
phantasy in its common usage.  Phantasy resembles what some previous philosophers 
termed discursive-comparative thinking.  By adding, deleting and transforming 
characteristics of images, phantasy compares and contrasts the deliverances of the 
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senses translated into image/idea in order determine the quiddity of objects.  In its 
appropriate measure, phantasy is guided by reason.  Often phantasy is attributed with 
the active intellect engaged in discerning universals in the act of knowing; that is, 
determining the quiddity of any object.
185
  Unlike the passive intellect responsible for 
image production—or, rather, reproduction from the senses—the active intellect 
found in phantasy employs the images of the imagination complex to discern 
essences.  Error production in human cognition is typically attributed to this function 
in Aquinas‟ faculty psychology.  Although the reproductive function of imagination 
proper in Aquinas‟ imagination complex will lead to error production, under normal 
conditions the passive, reproductive image-making faculty is faithful to the 
deliverances of sensation.  It is in the discursive process, by which one begins to 
modify the faithful images, that error is typically found.  Aquinas‟ solution to error 
production is the prescription that phantasy be subservient to reason.  With reason 
guiding recombinant permutations of images, quiddities can be faithfully 
discerned.
186
  But the possibility and commonality of error production or misuse of 
phantasy leads to an inevitable mistrust of this faculty.  While phantasy is necessary, 
the possibility that it can leave the auspices of reason and produce fantastic creations, 
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which leads to misinformation and error in judgment concerning the reality of these 
creations, elicits caution.  But since reason is given the place of privilege in Aquinas‟ 
hierarchy, such concerns he assures us can be ameliorated.  Moreover, it is only under 
the guidance of reason that this creative process in imagination can have legitimate 
use, and hence any extraneous activities ought to be dismissed.  Thus imagination is 
subordinated to reason. 
 In Aquinas, the process by which human cognition and human knowledge 
operates, following Aristotle, is one that involves objects and sensory deliverances.  
Between sense perception of particular, material substances and universal, immaterial 
species (knowledge) the imagination plays an integral role.  “As always, the 
imagination, or rather its images, have a middle status between the being proper to a 
form in matter and the being proper to a form that has come into the intellect through 
abstraction from matter.”187  This is to say, images produced by the imagination 
remain at an ambiguous level of being representative of the form found in matter and 
the form found in intellectual activity.  An image is without matter yet not without 
material conditions.
188
  The imagination and its products, images, are the integral 
liaison necessary for human cognition.  The faculty of the imagination is responsible 
for communication of the so-called “outer” object, delivered by the senses, and its 
apprehension and determination by the mind, intellectus.  Images at the reproductive 
level chararcteristic of the sensus communis and the imagination-formalis and 
thesaurus allows Aquinas to affirm the Aristotelian doctrine that, under normal 
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parameters, the senses represent faithfully.  Images are indeed real and present the 
deliverances of the senses when the object is both immediately before the subject and 
when the object is absent.  Certainly, Aquinas concedes the possibility of error in 
memory, when the storehouse of images is actively called upon in the service of 
reason.  The image that is recalled in phantasy may have certain additions or deletions 
accompanying the process of recall.  Furthermore, in the discursive process of 
phantasy, error often occurs.  Thus Aquinas‟ censure of phantasy and his strict 
prescription that phantasy be regulated by reason.  Without reason‟s guidance 
phantasy may add or delete various qualities of the object presented to create new and 
untoward phantasms e.g. chimera and satyrs.  But, with the guidance of reason, 
knowledge of the “outer” world, science, is possible. 
 It is important to note here that the “outer” world of the objects of sense 
perception is never called into question.  The world in which humans find themselves, 
is not a question of epistemic uncertainty.  This leads Kearney to make the ascription 
that the ancient and medieval conceptualization of the imagination as theocentric.  
Without calling the existence of the world into question, no proof the external world 
is necessary, a proof that will become quite consuming in the modern period.  The 
objects discovered in the experience are indeed real, ensured by the cosmological 
article of faith deus sive natura.  What is deemed philosophically important is to 
explain how it is that humans can have knowledge—that is, general knowledge—of 
the object, the particulars, they perceive.  The imagination, it turns out, is mostly 
reproductive in its capacity.  The function attributed to the imagination is to re-
 107 
 
present the data received by the senses in an attempt to coordinate the “outer” world 
of objects with the inner world of mental representations.  But owing to the ability to 
distort the presentations of the senses by recombinant imagining, Medievals, like 
Aquinas, are forced to subordinate the imagination, lest it create illusions, to reason.  
Hence the imagination, while necessary for scientia, is met with mistrust and 
stigmatized as an often unruly faculty of cognition. 
 From the work of Aquinas Western philosophy is to inherit the formal element 
of images.  In its most mundane form, imagination today produces resemblances 
based upon shape and form.  And yet this formal requirement of explanation is to 
have a deep impact on Kant‟s understanding.  As I argue later, it is upon the forms of 
intuition that we find imagination at work in Kant at its most basic and fundamental 
level.  Furthermore, the guidance of reason that Aquinas suggests, while incomplete, 
also finds resonance in the Kantian formulation.  If one understands the guidance of 
reason to be logical forms, the connection becomes even more pronounced.  As I 
intend to demonstrate later, these elements—form, logic, imagination—are at the very 
heart of Kant‟s critical enterprise and Aquinas‟ characterization is an important 
precedent.  One important innovation of Aquinas, that is to have a lasting impact on 
the history of imagination is the explicit discussion of the intentional nature of image 
and image production.  Improving upon Aristotle, Aquinas‟ intentionality regarding 
images as well as representations in thought will provide endless discussion between 
the connection(s) between representations in thought and objects in the world.  This, 
too, will become a central concern of Kant. 
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Chapter 4: Modern Philosophy 
 
Transition from Medieval to Modern 
 
From the Medieval period through the early Renaissance and into 17
th
 and 18
th
 
Century philosophy, a remarkable transformation in philosophical thinking transpires.  
No longer is philosophy entirely subservient to onto-theological justification (if it 
ever was).  Rather, by the period of Descartes‟ writings, philosophy begins to 
extricate itself from nearly 1500 years of theologically driven inquiry.  Whereas 
philosophy was once a handmaiden to the royalty of theology, with the advent of 
modernity, philosophy resumes its role as an independent organ for inquiry.  While 
this transformation is, in part, attributed to economic improvements, humanistic 
concerns and a resurgence of once-lost philosophical texts;  more importantly, this 
revival owes a debt to the reclamation of scientific observation, once started by 
Aristotle and resumed by figures like Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes.
189
  
Reliance on the deliverances of the senses, and the cataloguing of this data into a 
scientific compendium brings the epistemic question of the reliability of the senses 
and the transition from “outer” objects to the “inner” objects of mental functions to 
the fore once again. 
                                                          
189
 Even though it was never entirely abandoned, as is evidenced in Aquinas, science and philosophy 
did take a back seat the theological inquiry. 
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The spirit of modernity is a resurgence of independently-minded individuals 
who center scientific research and philosophic inquiry on matters answerable by 
human interrogation, not on the speculative dependencies of theology.
190
  Bacon‟s 
celebrated proto-scientific method proves exemplary in re-orienting inquiry away 
from religious concerns to those regarding observable nature.  Accompanying this 
new inquiry is a turn away from Scholasticism and scholastic explanations.  No 
longer will appeals to final causes, implanted by God according to design, suffice to 
answer whether, why and how operations of the terrestrial sphere obtain.  Rather, 
investigations concern themselves with nature and attribute mechanical causes to 
phenomena witnessed by human observers.  Descartes assumes this mantle of 
Enlightenment and modern ideals—he is willing to explore the nature of himself, his 
soul, God, and the world—by appealing only to human reason and returning from the 
lofty dependence upon theologically centered explanations for objects of human 
experience.
191
 
However, as in any change—social, theological, or scientific—new regimes 
inherit the legacies of their former times.  Brann notes that it is impossible to specify 
one peculiarly modern result, except to observe that the old questions re-emerge in 
new contexts, driven by new motives and methods.
192
  In other words, the 
transformation is gradual rather than immediate, and vestiges of medieval thinking 
find their way into much of the thinking of early modern philosophy.  Chief among 
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the remnants of medieval philosophy is the faculty psychology developed by 
scholastic figures such as Aquinas and Augustine and their earlier predecessors Plato 
and Aristotle.  The preeminent philosophers of early modernity retain the semantic 
connotation of terms such as „intellect/intellection”, “understanding”, “sensation” and 
“imagination”.  Theological considerations also still loom large.  The debate, 
however, shifts from the nature, essence and epistemic access humans have to God to 
questions concerning its existence; that is from God‟s comprehensibility or lack 
thereof to whether such a being exists at all.  Atheists like Hobbes unapologetically 
deny the existence of God, while others, like Bacon, leave the question available for 
further inquiry, more appropriately left to theologians than philosophers concerned 
with “natural science”.193  But even this idea, science, springs from medieval and 
ancient sources.  Scientia, the compendium of knowledge as it has long occupied 
philosophers, and even onto-theological philosophers, remains the central concern of 
modernity.  Modern philosophy, like ancient and medieval, concerns itself with 
describing the parameters of human knowledge about the world.  In modernity, 
however, a new consideration is added to the debate.  Figures like Bacon and 
Descartes focus not just on the content of scientia, but also in the manner, the 
methodology, by which it is known.  This preoccupation with methodology 
characterizes not just how humans know, but will also have a profound impact on 
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what is omitted and added to the list.  One further legacy, one that converges on the 
central inquiry in this historical section, is position of the imagination as a liaison 
between sensation and intellection, and the subsequent mistrust bequeathed to a 
servant that serves two masters. 
Rene Descartes finds himself the inheritor of this medieval patrimony.  His 
philosophical inquiry centers around the upsurge of humanistic thinking that marks 
the scientia of early modernity.  In rejecting Scholasticism, most markedly 
Aristotelian metaphysics and the notion of substantial form as well as Aristotelian 
teleological explanations for causation, Descartes breaks with the Jesuit tradition 
imparted to him during his formative schooldays.  In advocating matter in motion as 
the explanation for causal interaction among physical substances, regarding both 
change of form, place and inertial states, Descartes breaks with the entrenched 
philosophy of 1500 years.  This significant breach will inevitably land Descartes 
under the scrutiny of Church censors, and unless protected by anonymity and a 
benevolent patron, he may have found himself in considerably less desirable 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, Descartes did break from the metaphysical tradition, 
yet still maintained many of the concerns of medieval thinking.  In other words, 
Descartes‟ break was, just as his philosophy, radical in spirit, but gradual in 
practice—although it was radical, it was not apparently violently so, the root his 
discord was quite pronounced even if his presentation was gradual.  In order to more 
clearly see the transformation inculcated in modern philosophy, one can turn to the 
understanding of the imagination found in Renaissance thinking.  In Pico della 
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Mirandolla, we find a summary of the Medieval positions out of which modernity 
will emerge.  
 
 
 
 
Renaissance- Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola 
 
 “Renaissance writers do not, by and large, expend the same theoretical 
ingenuity on the imagination as do their predecessors.  Instead they attend to its 
practice.”194  With this glib statement, Brann summarizes the consensus of scholars 
regarding the imagination in Renaissance thought.  Generally, Renaissance thinkers, 
like most, do not address the imagination in direct terms.  They prefer to make 
oblique references and maintain the “missing mystery” while employing its use.  One 
exception to this trend is Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola‟s work On the 
Imagination published in 1500.  Innovative as a single work on the imagination was 
for its time, Pico‟s contribution to literature concerning the imagination is not, 
however, innovative in its treatment of the theme.  Rather, “this text, standing on the 
threshold of modern thought, at the same time gathers up virtually the entire ancient 
and medieval reflection on the imagination.”195  By attending to Pico‟s work, an 
                                                          
194
 Brann, p. 64-65. 
195
 Sallis (1995), p. 4. 
 113 
 
elegant summary of the major themes regarding the imagination and the motivating 
themes entering modernity may be obtained. 
 One immediate benefit of examining Pico‟s work is to clarify the shifting 
terminology that has beleaguered earlier works.  His theme is the power of the soul 
which the Greeks called phantasia and the Latins imaginatio.  He collapses the 
distinction found in works like Aquinas and declares them one and the same.  
Moreover, he favors the Latin terminology because of the resemblance to its activity.
 
196
   This power is responsible for images which it forms, images which are linked to 
likenesses of things that are delivered through the senses.   
The comprehensiveness of Pico‟s treatment combines the themes of both the 
Platonic-Augustinian tradition with that of Aristotle-Aquinas.  John Sallis notes that 
the Platonic understanding of image as eikasia is present in Pico‟s work.197  
According to Sallis, Pico‟s religious views commit him to allocating the original, 
veritative image in God and subsequent images, both objects of the world and in 
human cognition are but replications of the image-original.  Pico suggests a Platonic 
eikastic model, asserting that through the beneficence of God‟s plan humans possess 
the ability to know through senses, imagination and reason, and that ultimately all 
human knowledge is guaranteed and dependant upon this beneficence.  But, just as 
quickly as Pico suggests such Platonic themes, he dismisses them as tangential to his 
purported project of discussing human imagination, imaginatio.
198
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 To address human imagination, Pico appeals, not to Plato, but to Aristotle.  In 
following both Aristotle‟s and Aquinas‟ lead, Pico summarizes the imagination as a 
power of the soul: 
a) that produces forms 
b) that is a motion generated by sensation, but with its own 
productivity 
c) that is a force related to all powers 
d) that fashions likenesses and transmutes impressions 
e) that is a power of assimilating all things 
f) that enables the power of retention 
g) without which no knowledge, not even opinion is possible
199
 
 
A more apt summary of the historical record could not be afforded in a single work.  
It is from such a summary list that the overture of the early modern period may be 
seen.  Image production, power of retention and the transmuting of impressions, takes 
precedence in the early modern period, especially in the Cartesian doctrine that ideas 
must have a cause.  We find in an introspective inventory of our minds an 
overwhelming concern with the sources of our ideas.  Unlike the ancients and 
Medievals, who commonly understand the source of ideas to be the material, 
physical, world, one part of the early moderns‟ project will be to prove the “outer” 
world is the source for many of our ideas rather than taking such a presupposition for 
granted.  As a summary and transitional figure, Pico‟s account of the imagination still 
obtains the purchase of a given natural world, but indicates the transformation that is 
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to take place in the modern period.   However, it is Pico‟s invective against the 
imagination that is his true legacy to much of the modern period. 
 In addition to summarizing the views of his predecessors, Pico admonishes 
caution against trust in the imagination.  That the imagination is necessary for the 
efficacy of all the other powers of the soul is without doubt, Pico affirms, stating; 
“nor could the soul, fettered as it is to the body, opine, know, or comprehend at all, if 
phantasy were not constantly to supply it with the images themselves.”200  But the 
imagination is also the great distorter and is at the origin of most sins and the source 
of heresies.  To this invective against the imagination Pico devotes an entire chapter 
of his work.
201
  To the origin of sin and heresy Pico adds further condemnation by 
identifying imagination as the mother and nurse of ambition.  The imagination 
nourishes wrath, cruelty and passion, and it encourages the insatiable thirst for gold 
and the ardor of lust.
202
  The imagination is even responsible for “all monstrous 
opinions and the defects of all judgment.”  This caution against sin, illusions and 
deceptions in judgment are ultimately cautions against the imagination.   
 For Pico, like much of the ancients and medievals, there is a strong sense of 
the necessity of imagination in cognition, yet also the mistrust of image-making.  
“Since the imagination itself is midway between incorporeal and corporeal nature and 
is the medium thought which they are joined,” it is essential to knowledge of human 
experience. And yet, because the “imagination is for the most part vain and 
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wandering”, one needs be cautious. In Pico, one gains a strong sense of both the 
dependency humans have on imagination, and also the mistrust one must have if one 
is to so dependant upon a single faculty.  In his own words, “since the imagination is 
itself midway between incorporeal and corporeal nature and is the medium through 
which they are joined, it is difficult to grasp its nature.”203  Humans are both 
empowered and corrupted by this curious faculty.  Humans should then both embrace 
and distance themselves from such, a paradoxical doctrine that seems pervasive in 
Medieval and Renaissance thought. 
 This final thought brings into focus one central issue repeatedly mentioned by 
previous authors: to what is the imagination accountable.  The two responses 
available at this point have been reason or the objects themselves.  Despite the 
difficulties, or perhaps owing to the difficulties of these two answers, Kant will be 
forced to address this very issue, and prove central to the his formulation and 
radicalization of the imagination found in the Transcendental Deduction.   The 
position of the imagination becomes transformed along the lines Pico suggests; the 
imagination is necessary for cognition, but to what structures and normative 
responsibilities does it respond? 
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Rene Descartes 
 
 Rene Descartes and his philosophy herald a new era in the methodology and 
concerns of philosophical inquiry.  By distancing himself from the Scholastic 
tradition of his Jesuit education, Descartes ushers in a new era of philosophical 
inquiry, terminology, concerns and, subsequently, problems.  As stated above, 
Descartes was not an innovator who presented a radical break from the established 
mode of philosophy.  Descartes employs much of the vocabulary and begins with a 
chief concern of Medieval philosophy, a compilation of human knowledge, 
scientia.
204
  Descartes is a philosopher of his times and educational background.  
However, once presented with difficulties of the Scholastic tradition, notable amongst 
others, the miracle of the Eucharist and transubstantiation, Descartes rethinks 
philosophical inquiry, according to a new, mechanical understanding of the world of 
material bodies.  Descartes employs the vernacular and cognitive hierarchy of the 
medieval period, but reformulates these standards to accord with a material 
mechanism of corporeal bodies and differentiates the essence of human thinking 
activities from the theological presuppositions of his forebears.  Because of the 
clumsy and often untenable positions set forth by Medieval philosophy—in his own 
words: “a large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood”—
Descartes undertakes a new project that starts “again right from the foundations,” a 
                                                          
204
 For more on the connection between Descartes and the Scholastics, particularly the way Descartes 
shrewdly presented himself as continuing the Scholastic tradition of science while undermining the 
Aristotelian basis for Medieval philosophy cf. Roger Ariew‟s “Descartes and scholasticism: the 
intellectual background to Descartes‟ thought” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes pp. 58-90. 
 118 
 
requirement necessary, he believes, if he wants to “establish anything at all in the 
sciences that [is] stable and likely to last.”205  The goal of human knowledge and a 
compilation of such is still the goal of Descartes‟ aspirations, which may include 
knowledge of God‟s existence, but which is, more chiefly, concerned with the world 
of the natural sciences.  He transforms the medieval inquiry concerning scientia, 
however, when he explicitly occupies himself with a methodology that he claims will 
ensure the accuracy and verity of a newly grounded sciences. 
 In his mature writings, here typified by the Meditations on First Philosophy, 
Descartes proposes a foundational approach to the claims of knowledge.  This 
foundational approach, and the subsequent need for an explicit methodology in order 
to assure the “certificate of believability” for knowledge claims, is one that marks 
Descartes foremost among the early modern philosophers.  Rather than acquiring the 
systems and assumptions of his predecessors, Descartes undergoes a systematic 
destruction of his beliefs, knowledge and judgments, that he may acquire certainty 
that will provide the bedrock for the edifice of human knowledge.  Signal to 
Descartes‟ project is the suggestion that anyone can and should in fact proceed 
through his methodological doubt in order to obtain for themselves certain 
indubitable knowledge that it can provide.  Descartes recognizes the need to pursue 
this radical doubt at least once in his own life, semel in vita, that he may be content 
with sound judgments and be able to construct a compendium of human knowledge, 
and, through the voice of the meditator, Descartes invites the reader to accompany 
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him along a personal quest for certainty, to proceed through the same inquiry for 
themselves. 
 As is well known, in order to most efficiently dispel himself from possible 
illusion, Descartes reminds the reader that so-called knowledge from the senses have 
deceived, sometimes too often, and will, if left unchecked, most likely deceive again.
 
206
    The promise is that, with a proper foundation for knowledge, these can be/are 
dismissed.  But in order to determine this foundation, Descartes finds it incumbent, in 
the meantime, to avoid making knowledge claims based upon the senses.  To 
supplement his argument against the standard illusions of sensation, Descartes 
continues by recounting how dreams often present us with the data of waking life e.g. 
sitting by a fire in a dressing gown.
207
  Ordinarily, we rely upon our sensation to 
provide us with an account of what it is that we are doing, but in the case of dreams 
and correlate activities, we are deceived, because we are in fact not sitting by a fire in 
a dressing gown, but, rather, asleep in our bed, yet are presented with the lively 
images typically provided veraciously by sensation.  Whether awake or dreaming, 
Descartes determines the deliverances of the senses, or the perceptions afforded by 
such, are not to be considered the foundation for knowledge.   
Descartes continues by addressing a more considerable obstacle, those mental 
perceptions, that seemingly are independent of the senses in any way e.g. geometry.  
Yet, Descartes can also dispense with these objects of mental perception by 
presenting two possible arguments against the operations of the mind.  The first 
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amounts to an evolutionary argument against the indubitability of geometric 
perceptions.
208
  Descartes also presents his famous malevolent demon/genie 
argument, his second argument against the seeming certainty of geometric, 
mathematical, knowledge.  Descartes suggests that it could be the case, when one 
doubts the beneficence of a creator, that humans might very well be under the 
misdirected tutelage of an evil creator who has perversely misguided our thinking.
209
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provides reasons to doubt the truth of several types of knowledge claims, those of external objects and 
those mathematics propositions, both these concern objects not identical to the inquiring meditator, 
both types are of objects different than the doubting inquirer herself.  Thus it is only ideas of things not 
identical to the doubter that Descartes has provided reasons to doubt, but he never abandons, never 
doubts rational thinking, identified with the kind of object that inquires after its own epistemic states 
and its own existence.  In short, Descartes abandons many types of ideas by providing demons, dreams 
and non-benevolent gods, but he never abandons reason itself, merely the object of sensation and the 
objects of mathematical reason.    
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In short, what we conceive as necessary truths, not dependent upon sensation but 
upon thinking alone, might not correspond with the truth of reality.   
After such a systematic destruction of the contents of thought Descartes is left 
to ask: “So what remains?  Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.”  
However, from this existential performance of doubt, Descartes does find solace.  
Despite the content of his knowledge and the inability to determine truth and falsity, 
illusion from reality, Descartes‟ process can admit of one thing: that thinking is taking 
place.  Regardless of truth or falsity concerning reliability of senses or a priori 
geometry; regardless of whether he is awake, mad, dreaming or under the influence of 
a deceiving power, Descartes can in this moment of radical doubt affirm that 
some(thing) must indeed be performing this activity.  From this immediate 
understanding Descartes “must conclude that that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”210  This 
certain, essential declaration, cogito sum, provides Descartes the key to continue his 
project.  In short, what Descartes believes himself to be at the foundation of his 
experience, his thinking Cogito, is a thinking subject, a mind. 
To elaborate what a thinking thing, a mind, is, Descartes pauses to take 
inventory of the possible modes of thinking, of which doubt is but one.  Descartes 
concludes that a thinking thing is “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is 
willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.”211  The 
enumeration of the first six modes of thinking are all attributable to Descartes‟ 
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methodology of doubt.  In doubting all that he has previously thought to exist, 
Descartes has denied, and has been unwilling to affirm anything as true that he does 
not know with certainty.  Upon the arrival of the certainty of the cogito, Descartes can 
then make an affirmation of understanding and is willing to affirm the indubitable 
truth of his existence.  Early in his meditations, Descartes has provided examples of 
the first three-quarters of his list.  But, whence the last two, imagining and sensing, on 
his list of characteristics of a thinking thing? 
To answer this question Descartes turns to the contents of thought.  He 
discovers a variety of ideas that are the objects of his thinking.  Concisely 
summarizing these various thoughts, Descartes discovers three species of ideas; 1) 
ideas not sponsored by himself, and seemingly coming from outside of himself, 
adventitious ideas e.g. heat and cold, 2) ideas sponsored by himself by a 
recombination of other ideas, with varying permutations of the contents already 
found, factitious ideas e.g. sirens and hippogriffs, and 3) ideas that he could not 
himself created, but that are not found in the world of sensation outside of himself, 
innate ideas e.g. infinity, the nature of the soul, extension and, perhaps, triangles.
212
  
These types of thought are reminiscent of the modes enumerated by earlier 
philosophers, sense perception and thinking. Of course, at this point of his meditative 
process, Descartes has no “outside” world from which to infer that some of his ideas 
are caused by external relations, and this problem has been duly noted in the 
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literature.
213
  Nevertheless, Descartes postulates that he cannot be the source of innate 
ideas, the single most important of these ideas being the idea of infinity/perfection
214
  
The idea of infinity, Descartes claims, cannot be caused or created by a finite 
subject.
215
  Thus, Descartes concludes, God must exist, apart from finite beings and is 
the cause of the idea of infinity/perfection the meditator finds within herself.
216
  Just 
what these ideas are and what is responsible for these representations is still in 
question. 
Employing the idea of God, infinity and perfection, Descartes then begins to 
rehabilitate the world of the senses and provide exacting measure for the avoidance of 
error in judgments.  Because God is an infinite, perfect being, to which no privation 
can be predicated, Descartes concludes that, as the creator of the universe, God‟s 
beneficence assures that the object of creation itself is indeed a perfect creation.  As 
one of these objects of creation, the meditator concludes the capacities with which she 
has been endowed by the creator must themselves be perfect abilities.  And yet, 
Descartes is faced with his original problem—humans make errors in judgment.  To 
explain the ability to err, Descartes continues his survey of the mind and its abilities, 
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and must separate indubitable ideas from the more specious representations, most of 
which involve some indistinct idea/imagery.   
In addition to ideas and understanding, humans possess the capacity to make 
judgments.  Hence Descartes continues to affirm his original position that affirmation 
and denial, judgments themselves, are essential capacities of human beings.  To this 
capacity Descartes gives the name willing.  At this point Descartes now has in place 
explanatory mechanisms that will allow him to affirm the reliability of the faculties, 
yet provide an explanation for error production.   “It is only the will, or freedom of 
choice,” Descartes writes, “which I experience within me to be so great that the idea 
of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp...”217  Through introspection, Descartes 
finds that humans possess the ability to affirm or deny, an inexhaustible expression of 
volition that contains no boundaries.  Problems in judgment arise whenever this 
boundless capacity affirms or denies without the guidance of understanding.  Judging 
rampantly without reason or methodological considerations proves the greatest source 
of error.   
To correct for error and/or avoid error production, Descartes prescribes that 
one “refrain from making a judgment in cases where [one] does not perceive the truth 
with sufficient clarity and distinctness.”218  In order to understand clarity and 
distinctness of perception, Descartes returns to the first step in his methodological 
consideration.  Clarity and distinctness are exemplified in the indubitable presentation 
that if doubting occurs, thinking occurs and one must exist.  Likewise, Descartes cites 
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the immediacy with which one realizes, upon introspection, a definitive idea of 
perfection not caused by oneself.  To avoid error in judgment, Descartes concludes, 
one must withhold judgment until one can see the simple nature of the object of 
judgment to such a degree that no ambiguity remains.  For this inquiry the 
corresponding question appears to be: must one abstain from judgment provided one 
does not possess a clear and distinct image?    
It is here that Descartes philosophical ingenuity and methodological 
innovation become manifest.  By employing the term “perception” ambiguously, 
Descartes can affirm the traditional model that holds intellection as the arbiter of 
truth, while rehabilitating and emending the physical sciences, delivered by the 
senses, to conform with his mechanical model of the universe.  The ambiguity 
permits Descartes to discuss deliverances of the senses without providing detailed 
exegesis on the connection between them and ideas available to inspection by the 
mind—a question for which he will inevitably be forced to provide some account.  
Perception, properly speaking is under the auspices of mental activity and the 
guidance of understanding.  In other words, the mind is locus proper of perception, 
and thus Descartes continues the dialogue of inner and outer.  That is, he must explain 
how objects of the senses are translated to the mental realm of perception.  To begin 
such an explanation and to describe the proper way to eliminate error, Descartes 
observes that it is only through reflection that one can divest perception from the 
detritus of ordinary experience and determine judgments based upon his criteria of 
clarity and distinctness.  However, Descartes maintains, humans also receive 
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perceptions from the deliverances of the senses.  It would seem that Descartes has 
introduced two concerns of perceptions that need elaboration.  The first concern is the 
issue regarding what a perception is, a metaphysical question.  The second, concerns 
the origins of perceptions, a question of causal source.  For Descartes, the answer to 
the first question lends a partial answer to the second and the remainder of the second 
actually derives from the methodological order and determinations conducted thus far 
in his Meditations.   
Perceptions, as Descartes perceives them, are truly in the domain of the 
intellect/understanding.  The mind, according to Descartes, deals only with ideas, and 
yet, in reflective deliberation, the mind represents first order ideas, the content of 
those ideas being recognized albeit the ideas themselves not being so.  In the 
reflective process Descartes entitles the presentation of ideas to the mind as 
perceptions.  The mind may thus clearly and distinctly perceive the ideas, 
representations, that constitute its objects.  Inspection of the content of the mind, 
perceiving ideas, leads Descartes to determine several different types of ideas e.g. 
simple, complex, clear, confused, distinct etc.
219
  Perceptions are ultimately ideas, the 
only object with which the intellect can work/operate/deal. 
This answer leads to the second question, the question regarding the source of 
perceptions.  One half of the answer to this question is the mind itself- perceptions are 
material and thus the product of reflection.  According to Descartes, when we inspect 
the contents of our mind, we simply find ideas already there.  The function of the 
understanding is to evaluate the degree of clarity and distinctness these perceptions 
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possess, and to make judgments accordingly.  This answer seems to explain factitious 
ideas (those recombinant ideas/images found in earlier philosophers) we find in the 
examination of the contents of reflective perception.  However, this answer will 
inevitably prove unsatisfactory, for ideas we have innate ideas and ideas of corporeal 
objects, the source of which we can claim no credit.  When Descartes simply affirms 
that we have innate and adventitious ideas, it does little in the way of explaining their 
source(s).  
Descartes, however, does have one recourse to provide an explanation for and 
the verity of other sources of our ideas; he has provided one perception, one idea, of 
which he is certain.  The perception of his existing and the necessity of his existence 
from his ability to doubt provides the paradigm by which he can determine other 
sources of ideas.  Descartes will employ the criterion of clarity and distinctness to 
determine the other sources of his ideas.  One objection may immediately arise: the 
certainty of one‟s existence, it might be claimed, appears to be generated from oneself 
and the activities of one‟s own thinking.  But one thing is of extreme importance 
here—with this particular example, the generation of the clear and distinct idea that 
we find with the Cogito is not the generation alluded to in factitious ideas, we do not 
create the idea of the Cogito by recombining other ideas.  The recombinant ideas we 
label factitious do not have the foundational grounds attributed to the Cogito.  The 
point of importance Descartes finds in the perception of the Cogito, also called the 
intuition of the perception of the Cogito, according to Descartes, is the source and 
criterion for judging the perception, that is the self and the “natural light” of reason.  
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The Cogito presents one type of perception, the certain perception which bases its 
truth upon a logical, simple idea, although its criteria for truth will continue into all 
forms, both simple and complex ideas.  The mind as the source of the perception that 
it inspects demands an answer regarding the objective validity of the judgment.  But 
the concern with objective validity will take us too broadly afield at this point.  
Suffice it to say that the logical rigor and the objective validity attributed to the 
Cogito depends upon the clarity and distinctness of the perception, and ultimately, on 
a veracious God as guarantor of the clear and distinct ideas—a concern Kant will take 
up while providing a different answer. 
Other sources for perceptions, those that can represent both innate and 
adventitious ideas, are those that come from outside ourselves.  Using the criteria 
established in the Cogito, Descartes can analyze the innate idea of infinity/God and 
determine the truth of its content as well as the source for its idea, a God existing and 
external to the meditator herself—another clear, distinct, simple idea.  The final 
genera of perception, adventitious ideas, is employed when the mind meditates upon 
the nature of body.  Perceptions, properly speaking, are the objects of minds, and 
adventitious ideas, represent ideas not caused by either the self, the activity of self-
reflection or by an infinite and perfect being.  In order to present how the mind deals 
with perception from so foreign a source, bodily substance, Descartes will have to 
appeal to the mediating faculty of the imagination and its role in the conversion of 
sense data into ideas that can then be perceived by the mind.  It is at this juncture that 
Descartes‟ theory of imagination and images becomes operative.  What are we to 
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make of images in relation to perception, and to what degree of veracity do they 
obtain? 
 Throughout the Meditations, Descartes discusses perception, assuming his 
audience conforms to his ideation of perception.  Perceptions are after all properly the 
ideas one finds in the theatre of the mind for Descartes.  After determining the Cogito 
to be the ground for and exemplar by which we may judge human experience, 
Descartes affirms that with due conscientiousness and fastidious adherence to the 
criteria asserted to arrive at indubitable truths, any further ideas that obtain clarity and 
distinctness may also be affirmed as unshakeable knowledge.  Coupling these criteria 
with the assurance of a benevolent deity who created the universe, humans included, 
and the perfection of His creation, Descartes determines, with clarity and distinctness, 
the ability for humans to rely upon sense data to make knowledge claims about the 
world around them.
220
  The deliverances of the senses, both in immediate perception 
and memory, however, must still conform to the criteria of clarity and distinctness. 
 Without deviating from Scholastic traditions too greatly, Descartes is willing 
to affirm that, when surveying the theatre of the mind, one finds not only ideas, but 
also images caused by the external world via the deliverances of the senses; that is 
images that are ideas that can be perceived by the mind.
221
  Furthermore, memory 
itself is an integral function that permits cataloguing and judging the world of the 
senses.  To determine the role of the imagination in veritative cognition and also to 
properly subordinate the imagination to intellection-reason, Descartes compares 
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imagining with understanding.  Descartes qualifies the imagination as a faculty “of 
which I am aware when I turn my mind to material objects” and as “nothing else but 
an application of the cognitive faculty to a body which is intimately present to it”222  
Just what intimate presence involves and how one can ascertain intimacy as opposed 
to simple familiarity, Descartes leaves to the reader‟s imagination.  But Descartes 
does provide examples to help discern how the imagination differs from 
understanding.  When imagining a triangle, Descartes claims, one literally presents a 
figure bounded by three lines the mind‟s eye for inspection “as if they were present 
before me.”  Here we must assume the “me” to which Descartes refers is only the 
mind, and presentation of images corresponds to the perception of images by the 
understanding.  The understanding can utilize the image of a triangle in determining 
the properties of three-sided objects.  Moreover, the imagination presents a specific 
image, scalene, right, obtuse acute etc. for inspection by the understanding, often 
presenting an image of a particular figure encountered before and recalled through 
memory.  The understanding, however, does not require any particular image in order 
to understand clearly and distinctly the properties of geometric figures we call 
triangles.  To highlight the difference between employing images as a propaedeutic 
for the understanding‟s clear and distinct perceptions of triangles and the 
understanding‟s function itself, Descartes presents the case of the chiliagon.  The 
imagination cannot present a clear image of a thousand-sided figure.  In this instance 
the imagination presents not a clear image but, rather, a “confused representation of 
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some figure.”223  It is true, Descartes continues, that we are in the habit of presenting 
images to the mind for inspection, but, it would seem, image presentation has its 
limitations.  The understanding, on the other hand, can clearly and distinctly perceive 
the properties of a chiliagon.
224
  This in turn leads Descartes to claim that although 
the understanding very often employs images, the imagination “is not a necessary 
constituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my mind.”225  It is rather one 
mode, among many, of the intellect/understanding. 
 This distinction between understanding, the proper activity of mind, and 
imagination, an often useful tool, but inessential to the mind, is reminiscent of the 
cognitive hierarchy of the medieval period.  The imagination is clearly not one of the 
five basic senses as enumerated by Descartes,
226
 but also is not an essential part of the 
mind itself.  Descartes writes: “when the mind understands, it in some way turns 
towards itself and inspects one of the ideas which are within it; but when it imagines, 
it turns towards the body and looks at something in the body which conforms to an 
idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses.”227  The imagination is not a 
part of the world of material bodies, and yet it also does not belong essentially to the 
world of the mind.  The mind turns to the body through the imagination when the 
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mind contemplates material bodies, but the objects proper for consideration of the 
mind are not the images themselves.  Descartes‟ account here becomes somewhat 
confused, for, while he makes assertions about the mind‟s use of the imagination to 
mediate between understanding and sensible bodies, he does not properly describe the 
contents of the understanding‟s contemplation/intuition other than referring to them 
as “ideas”.  Just what is the ontology of Descartes‟ imagination? if it is neither 
material-body nor mental-mind? 
 In terms of Descartes‟ programmatic, his use of the imagination at such a 
stage in his meditations is in fact to prove the external world, and not to delineate the 
proper use of the imagination in cognition.
228
  In reference to the argument that the 
mind understands ideas and the imagination deals with images not caused by the 
mind, Descartes is led to affirm the existence of external objects that cause sensation 
and collation/image production by the imagination.
229
  Descartes continues to argue 
for the existence of an external, material world, citing the vividness and distinctness 
of the images produced by the perception of sensation in imagination, claiming this 
ensures that the images could not be caused the understanding alone and that the “use 
of the senses had come first, while the use of my reason came only later.”  In addition 
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Descartes notes the “the ideas which I formed myself, were less vivid than those 
which I perceived with the senses and were, for the most part, made up of elements of 
sensory ideas.”230  Our natural attitude regarding the objects of sensation as real and 
the images and/or ideas of them as less real led Descartes to affirm common sense, 
but doing so by establishing a hierarchy of the mind employing clear and distinct 
ideas as the arbiter/determiner of truth. 
At this point in his argument Descartes‟ locution plays, once again, on the 
ambiguity of the term „perception‟.  Descartes, it would seem, employs the use of 
sensory ideas without describing what a “sensory idea” is or what perception of 
sensory ideas amounts to.  The vividness of these ideas implies that the presentation 
of these data for inspection by the mind be of such a kind that the corporeal nature of 
sensation is manifest, and yet not be corporeal, as they are ideas.  These “ideas” as 
Descartes often calls the deliverances of the senses in their use by understanding are 
precisely the images afforded by imagination.  By image production and the 
employment of particular figures by the mind, the extension of corporeal bodies is 
mitigated to a level at which point in time the understanding can intuit the nature of 
corporeal bodies, as pure extension.  Descartes‟ celebrated wax example demonstrates 
how the particularities of the many manifestations of a body, through physical 
change, and presentation of each particular image of the changing body is used 
discursively by the understanding to intuit the singular nature of physical bodies 
according to Descartes. The movement from particular(s) to general understanding of 
objects, say physical bodies, brings suspicion of his claim that imagination is not 
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essential to the understanding.  It is most certainly essential when dealing with the 
presentation material objects, even if it is not required to determine the clear and 
distinct perception of them to determine qualities.  Thus Descartes, like the Medievals 
before him, wants to present a clear separation of understanding as an activity that 
needs no involvement of the senses, from understanding of the material world, the so-
called sciences and human experience. 
The imaginative variation employed by Descartes—to move from particular 
instances and the images afforded through the imagination‟s collation of the 
deliverances of the senses to clearly and distinctly intuiting by the understanding 
about the nature of bodies generally and to any specific field of natural philosophy, 
the physical sciences—has led to contentious debate among commentators regarding 
the role, importance and use of imagination in Descartes‟ methodology.  It even leads, 
as Descartes himself notes, to a belief “that I had nothing at all in the intellect which I 
had not previously had in sensation”231—a position assumed and vigorously argued 
for by empiricists, most notably John Locke and David Hume.  Certainly, Descartes 
does not believe this tenet of empiricism, as it runs counter to his doctrine of innate 
ideas.  He merely cites this as a common conception considered plausible by the 
argument he mounts to distinguish between imagination and understanding and what 
is afforded by sensation, but one that needs to be dispelled. 
Among commentators one divisive issue, one that cites the centrality, or lack 
thereof, of the imagination in Descartes, is whether Descartes maintains a certain 
mathematical project established by Descartes in his earliest writings, the Regulae, 
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and whether he abandons such ambitions in his mature writings of the Meditations, 
Principles and Passions.  In short, this divisive issue concerns whether Descartes‟ 
project is inherently epistemological or metaphysical. 
In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae), an early and unpublished 
work (abandoned by 1629), Descartes presents a methodology to determine the 
simple truths upon which any physical science depends.  This clearly epistemological 
treatise concerns itself with decomposing complex ideas to the simples at which time 
the mind can intuit the basic principles upon which any particular problem of physical 
science deductively depends.  Dennis Sepper, in his work Descartes’ Imagination, 
advocates an interpretation of Descartes‟ corpus that places the Regulae at the heart 
of Descartes‟ philosophical project and cites the explicit references to methodology in 
the Discourse on Method and the implicit considerations of methodology in the 
Meditations as proof that Descartes‟ chief concern is with the compendium of 
knowledge humans can obtain, scientia.  Because the physical sciences are the 
concern of the Regulae and the bulk of knowledge that may obtain for humans 
concerns the world of material objects, Sepper concludes that Descartes struggles 
with the role the imagination plays mediating between the world of material objects 
and the perception of the idea of bodies as extension, that is knowledge of the world 
of material objects, and that this concern pervades his entire lifetime and published 
works.  Boldly, Sepper claims, the  
imagination can indeed serve as an index of Descartes‟ deeper 
concerns and of the transformations of his thought—not because there 
are remote and obscure connections between them, but rather, because 
imagination was at the heart of his earliest philosophizing, and because 
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his prolonged effort to establish the practical relevance and cognitive 
importance of imagination led him into a network of problems that 
defeated his initial hopes.
232
 
 
What Sepper concedes in this affirmation is that Descartes‟ philosophical 
considerations do seem to change over the course of his writings.  The explicit 
methodological considerations of the Regulae, one in which the “primacy of 
imaginative techniques in the process of knowing” is apparent, are abbreviated in 
Discourse in Method and only implicit in the metaphysical treatise Meditations, in 
which Descartes appears “to teach the near-irrelevance of the imagination to the most 
profound philosophical tasks.”233  In his estimation, Sepper is even willing to concede 
the general consensus among Descartes scholars, that imagination plays little role in 
the Meditations.  The imagination is necessary for the translation of the deliverances 
of the senses into perceptions, but insufficient to provide any judgment regarding 
those objects of the senses.  Sepper‟s claim amounts to an emphasis on the early (and 
unpublished)
234
 writings of Descartes and an insistence that Descartes‟ main project is 
a compendium of human knowledge, knowledge of the natural sciences.   
While Sepper‟s claim appears plausible—Descartes himself discusses the 
limitations and proper topics of human knowledge—his thesis oversimplifies 
Descartes‟ growing awareness that even his system of intuition and deduction, as laid 
out in the Regulae, and continued in attenuated form through the Discourse, 
Meditations, and even into Principles of Philosophy and On the Passions of the Soul, 
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itself needs a metaphysical justification, the one Descartes provides in the 
Meditations and continues restating in all the subsequent works.  In short, Sepper 
relies too much attributing a single project to Descartes‟ corpus—the compilation of 
empirical knowledge.  Certainly, Descartes is an early modern philosopher concerned 
with supplanting Aristotelian metaphysics with one that emphasizes matter and 
motion, thus eliminating final causality, and the subsequent reworking of natural 
sciences according to this model, but this is just what Sepper misses in his analysis.  
Descartes must provide a metaphysical justification for his new system before work 
in the physical sciences can begin properly.  This metaphysical justification places 
priority on the nature and workings of the mind and the veracity one can claim of 
clear and distinct ideas assured of truth by a veracious God.  The imagination, as a 
faculty that presents confused and obscure images for scrutiny by a thinking 
substance that demands clarity and distinctness in order to affirm with certainty any 
science, will inevitably prove insufficient as the motivating force behind Descartes‟ 
philosophizing.  Descartes is concerned with the physical sciences and implicitly the 
faculties that attend to corporeal bodies and images, but this consideration is only 
secondary to establishing a firm foundation, one devoid of imagistic thinking, in order 
to ensure that investigations of these sciences are secure. 
 The standard interpretation of Descartes‟ corpus, represented by Dan Garber 
and Martial Gueroult, approaches the issue historically and developmentally.  Garber 
references the importance of Descartes‟ concern with physical sciences, notably 
physics, optics and harmonics, but emphasizes the possibility of such sciences upon a 
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firm metaphysical basis.  Garber determines that the methodology of the Reguale is 
not present in the Meditations because the epistemic instruction provided in the early 
work needed a metaphysical foundation.  In fact, while clear and distinct ideas may 
appear to be the same as intuitions found in the Regulae, this is where the 
methodological similarities cease.  In the Meditations, Descartes is looking for simple 
ideas known immediately by the mind, much like Descartes affirms the truth of 
simple intuitions of the Regulae, but the difference is that the work of the Meditations 
does not apply itself to the concrete problems of physics or optics, but to the 
foundation from which the solution to concrete, that is, material, problems can be 
resolved.  
 Martial Gueroult, in his work Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted According to 
the Order of Reasons, is unapologetic in affirming the lack of a role of imagination in 
the first five meditations.  The concern in this portion of the Meditations focuses on 
answering basic questions; that something is (quod) and what it might be (quid).  
These questions are limited in the first five meditations, Gueroult claims, to the nature 
of the self, both body and mind, and the existence of God.  Existence of any external 
object of meditation is secondary to these central questions and is only properly 
addressed in the last, the sixth, meditation.  Without determining that the mind is and 
what the nature of the mind amounts to along with the distinction between mind and 
body, discussion of material objects is moot.  Once Descartes determines that he is a 
thinking thing, and what the essence of this thinking thing is, he can determine the 
difference between mind and body to determine the essence of body.  Determination 
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of the existence of material bodies can only obtain with the guarantee of faithful 
faculties achieved by a veracious God.  Hence the questions concerning imagination 
as the mediator between existing, external, material bodies and the inner world of 
ideas can only be addressed after the metaphysical foundations are in place.  How the 
imagination transforms the deliverances of the senses into images that can then be 
perceived, thus enabling natural sciences, is merely the last consideration in 
Descartes‟ order of reasoning.  In his final analysis, Gueroult determines that the 
imagination is, by and large, a faculty that presents confused and obscure images for 
inspection (perception) by the mind.  
 Gueroult continues, claiming that when dealing the specific treatment of the 
imagination in Descartes‟ Meditations one needs to remember that  
Descartes understands two very different things by imagination: 
imagination as mental faculty, which is the soul exercising an action 
on the brain, and corporeal imagination, which consists of the capacity 
of the body to preserve the traces of actions exercised on it, either from 
within or without.  This capacity resides in the pineal gland, but also in 
each organ of the body, and finally in the body as a whole.
235
 
 
Thus it would seem that there are two imaginations at work in the Meditations, one 
which is operative in the translation of sensibility into perception, and a second 
species that concerns itself with the manipulation of ideas themselves.  This two-fold 
imagination parallels the ambiguous use of perception found in Descartes, one which 
applies to the objects of sensation in translation to ideas, the other which applies to 
the ideas themselves.   
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Moreover, with this dual split of imagination, the passage betrays that there 
are not only two types of imagination, but rather five.  The first four imaginations, 
merely reproductive in their functions, are present as either intellectual or sensible, 
not residing in the body, or residing therein.  Thus there is an 1) intellectual 
imagination responsible for memory of the activities of the mind located nowhere in 
the body, 2) a sensible memory that catalogues the traces of sense perception, but also 
not located in the body (what we might call images proper) 3) a corporeal imagination 
that is responsible for memory located in the brain, and 4) a corporeal imagination 
that provides for the memory of muscle.  The fifth species of imagination is presented 
as the creative force that is responsible for the recombinant productions, given to the 
interplay of any of these memories, which produces factitious, or better yet fictitious, 
ideas.  This last species of imagination is simply a mental faculty, one that provides 
for the allowances of imaginative interplay with ideas, either mental or 
representations of the sensible, found in speculative or creative thinking.  The first 
four species enumerated here, highlight the role the imagination inherently plays in 
memory production and storage.   
 By reconnoitering the Scholastic tradition, it becomes apparent that, while 
Descartes‟ epistemologically oriented methodology and concluding metaphysics of 
substance deviates from his medieval predecessors, when it comes to the imagination, 
Descartes closely inherits the cognitive hierarchy found in Aquinas.  Descartes‟ 
corporeal imaginations are reminiscent of the image collation and production found in 
the “common sense” of Aquinas.  Just as Aquinas had before him, Descartes locates 
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this faculty in the brain.  Descartes does, however, provide and emendation to the 
Scholastic tradition by allowing for a “memory” of muscle not located in the brain, 
but, rather, as some residual trace found in the body at large.  Also, Descartes‟ mental 
images, and the storehouse of these images coincides with Aquinas doctrine of the 
intentional shift, from sensation to intellection, found in his explication of the 
imagination proper, both imagination formalis and thesaurus.  Even the creative 
power of the recombinant imagination has precedence in Aquinas‟ phantasy.   
 Also inherited from his scholastic upbringing is Descartes‟ clear mistrust for 
the imagination.  The imagination provides not only confused and obscure images 
from sensation for inspection by the intellect, thus privileging the intellect, 
understanding, over either imagination or sensation.  But, also, Descartes‟ entire 
metaphysical foundation, as he presents it in the Meditations, bespeaks the priority 
given to the pure intellect, untrammeled by traces of sensation given through images.  
The imagination is still subordinate to the single faculty, pure intellect, that can 
determine the foundation for subsequent claims pertaining to images delivered from 
sensation. 
 There are, however, two major innovations concerning the imagination 
intertwined in Descartes‟ foundationalist enterprise.  The first concerns a need to 
prove the external world and its relation to the ideas humans may possess of it, which 
follows from the inherently imaginative enterprise of Descartes‟ methodology.  
Descartes‟ method of radical doubt solicits a need to prove the existence of the 
external world, a concern with which Scholastic philosophy did not need to deal 
 142 
 
directly.  Because of the hypothesis of the evil demon, and its employment to discard 
both sensible objects as well as the a priori truths of mathematics in order to ground 
knowledge claims, Descartes believes that once the groundwork of the Cogito is 
accomplished there is still an outstanding debt to prove the existence of an external 
world, the one which sensations delivers.  In the course of his proof, Descartes will 
argue for the existence of a veracious creator, one who cannot deceive, thus refuting 
the evil demon hypothesis.  In order to prove the existence of the external world, 
Descartes cannot rely exclusively on the contents of pure thinking.  In order to prove 
the external world, Descartes has recourse to both the imagination, which only proves 
the external world‟s possibility, and finally and definitively to the deliverances of the 
senses.  There is, however, one obstacle to Descartes‟ argument for the existence of 
the external world by proof of the perceptions of sensation, and that obstacle is how 
the deliverances of the senses, explicitly bodily, can be transformed to an object of 
thought, explicitly and exclusively mental.  Descartes‟ only recourse is to employ the 
imagination as the faculty that produces images and which, in the production of 
images, transforms the bodily nature of sensation into the mental nature of ideas.  
Unfortunately, however, Descartes provides no clear explanation of how this process 
unfolds.   
In summary, the use and nature of imagination is subtly transformed in 
Descartes‟ philosophy: the imagination is an organ for use in creative, speculative and 
scientific thinking, and, moreover, the imagination is slowly conceded a place in the 
process of world generation/constitution, or for Descartes, proof of the world.  The 
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change in theories of imagination does not extend explicitly to the function of 
imagination itself; after all, the imagination is still a mediating faculty between the 
“outer” world of the senses and the “inner” world of understanding.  But the use of 
the imagination in justifying an external world and the subsequent orientation we as 
humans find in relation to the world is transformed into a quasi-creative mould.  In 
Descartes‟ philosophy, much like in antiquity and the medieval period, the 
imagination is found to be a real and necessary faculty for 
coordination/comprehension of an external world.  We also find that the veracity of 
the images presented by imagination is ultimately under the auspices of the 
understanding.  The metaphysical question concerning whether the products of the 
imagination are real, is still answered in the affirmative, provided the epistemological 
caveat concerning its veracity still emends the process.  Images produced by the 
imagination from the deliverances of the senses are indeed real, but the truth 
contained in them is still under the guidance of image free understanding, a function 
which can determine the veracity of the image based upon Descartes newfound 
criteria. 
With this step into modernity one gains a clearer picture of the issues and 
concerns Kant will have about the imagination.  At first glance, Descartes appears to 
affirm the Platonic doctrine that imagination is not required for knowledge—only the 
powers of the mind ensured by God‟s benevolence.  One also finds Descartes‟ 
prescription for reason, in his words clarity and distinctness, to govern any 
presentation of empirical knowledge.  However, Descartes‟ ambiguity concerning 
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perception and just what faculties are at work in perceiving empirical objects also 
belies his dependence upon a faculty to mediate between sensation and thought.  The 
question concerning where perception belongs, and just what role the imagination 
plays in perception will become a pressing matter for Kant.  Descartes appears to 
leave the question open, something Kant will find inherently unsatisfying, thus he 
will attempt to provide an explanation for this Cartesian aporia.  Just as Descartes 
does with perception, Kant will find an ambiguous tension of the imagination, being 
unable to definitively locate just where the imagination belongs, in sensibility or 
understanding.  Kant will begin to unravel this question by distinguishing between a 
pure and applied imagination, just as commentators have for Descartes‟ use of 
perception. 
 
 
 
 
John Locke/David Hume 
 
 I would like to treat in this last historical section the philosophies of John 
Locke and David Hume together.  These two thinkers can justifiably be treated 
together, I believe, as representative of the empiricist development of modern 
philosophy following Descartes‟ innovations.  These empiricist philosophers continue 
the modern programmatic and concern themselves with the nature of ideas and 
 145 
 
cognitive faculty psychology, despite presenting refutations of specific doctrines of 
Descartes.  Because of their focus on subjective conditions of perception and 
knowledge, both Locke and Hume are considered Cartesian in their outlook and 
approach, despite the British/Scottish distancing from the tenets advanced by 
Descartes himself.  Locke presents a concerted effort to refute the doctrine of innate 
ideas found in Descartes, and Hume assumes the empiricist framework, punctuating it 
with his skeptical philosophy, thereby undermining Descartes‟ promotion of 
foundational epistemology and metaphysics. 
 John Locke begins his work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by 
drawing an analogy between the “seeing eye” and the functioning understanding.  
Both, he suggests, allow us to “see and perceive all other things” while taking “no 
notice of itself.”236  Locke‟s proposed project is to pursue the “art and pains” required 
“to set it [the understanding] at a distance and make it its own object” of inquiry.237  
In doing so, Locke hopes to discover the contents of the mind and determine whether 
the Cartesian legacy of innate ideas obtains by inquiring about the “original of those 
ideas, notions or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is 
conscious of to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding 
comes to be furnished with them.”238  In addition, Locke wishes to determine the 
veracity with which one can know the contents of the mind, “to shew what 
knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and 
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extent of it.”239  Locke endeavors to enumerate the contents of the human mind, its 
source(s) and the role they place in knowledge claims.  By pursuing such an inquiry, 
Locke proposes to delimit the bounds of human knowledge, that we can “discover the 
powers thereof; how far they reach and… to be more cautious in meddling with 
things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its 
tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, 
are found beyond the reach of our capacities.”240  This critical enterprise delimiting 
the scope of human knowledge and placing limitations on those ideas of inquiry to be 
found outside the parameter of human cognition, a tradition begun by Descartes, will 
find its apogee in Kant‟s “critical” philosophy.  Such an enterprise is beneficial to the 
conduct of human action because, as Locke states, “we can find those measures, 
whereby a rational creature,  put in that state in which man is in this world, may and 
ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon” and “we need not to be 
troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.”241  By discovering the 
contents, source(s) and justification of the contents of the mind, humans can govern 
their thoughts and actions effectively to the improvement of themselves and 
humankind. 
 Locke continues in the Cartesian tradition by suggesting that we should avoid 
judgment about those items in the index of human ideas that are not clear or distinct 
perceptions.  By idea, Locke means, “whatever is meant by phantasms (Aristotle), 
notions, species (Aquinas) or whatever it is which can be employed about in 
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thinking.”242 Upon reviewing the contents of mental perceptions, ideas, Locke decries 
the theory of innate ideas stating “men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, 
may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate ideas” and 
declaring how “unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths the impressions of 
nature,
243
 and innate ideas, when we may observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain 
as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the 
mind” by experience. 244 
 Developmentally, Locke speculates the mind to be entirely void of content at 
the moment of birth.  In his words, if we consider “the mind to be, as we say, white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas” we must entertain the question; 
“Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?”245  To this Locke answers 
“in one word, from experience.”246  Elaborating this one word answer, Locke 
continues noting “our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or 
about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is 
that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking.”247  From the 
tabula rasa state of infancy, we have only two sources to account for our ideas, 
sensible perceptions and the operations of the mind, and these two alone, account for 
all the material from which we draw when surveying the content of our minds. 
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 The source for “most of the ideas we have” depend on the deliverances of the 
senses and by this Locke names sensation as the chief source of our ideas.
248
  The 
second source Locke names under the appellation of internal senses, elaborated as 
“perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the 
different acts of our own minds.”249  Summarizing his account, Locke writes;  
The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmer of any 
ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two.  External 
objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are 
different from perceptions they produce in us: And the mind furnishes 
the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
250
 
 
 Unfortunately, this is where Locke‟s analysis ends.  Certainly, he does 
continue to discuss memory and “images” lodged in the “great mass of knowledge” 
humans report.  However, his analysis of memory merely repeats the earlier claim 
that the material of one of the two sources “imprint” themselves on the mind, some to 
such an extent that they remain as memories.  Also conspicuously lacking is any 
explanation about the process by which either source of knowledge is transformed 
into ideas available by inspection of the mind.  At this point in his analysis Locke 
turns to a developmental narrative to explain how memory is often not the object of 
explicit awareness and he employs this heuristic to aid in arguing against the innate 
ideas of Descartes.  But just how sensation, or even the operations of our own mind, 
can become ideas for employment by the mind is unaccounted.  This conspicuous 
lack of explanation Kant will find an egregious error in the empirical position, and 
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will work to explain the means by which the deliverances of the senses are first 
collated and then transformed for application with the concepts of the understanding.  
Locke is not, however without a successor, who defends the empirical model.  To 
assist in determining how the empiricist position explains this process we must turn to 
the philosophy of Hume. 
 David Hume assumes the mantle of empiricist philosophy, elaborating and 
narrowing the role of experience in concept/idea formation, while carrying the 
empiricists‟ doctrine of experience as the sole sponsor of concepts to its logical and 
skeptical conclusion.
251
  In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and 
Treatise on Human Nature, Hume, following Locke, concedes the ordinary 
distinction between awareness of X in perception (sensation) and awareness of Y in 
thought, but denies any actual difference between the two.  The difference between 
these two representations is a matter of degree and not of kind.  Both forms of 
representation are attending to the objects of consciousness, thus sense perception is 
really no immediate sensation, but, rather, attending to the representation presented 
by sensation for scrutiny by the mind.  Hume‟s concession to the perceived difference 
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regards the force and vivacity that typifies either kind of perception.
252
   “The less 
forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.”253  The more 
forceful and lively representations want for a name, but Hume proposes we call them 
impressions.  “By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, 
when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, will.”254  According to his 
groupings, Hume affords both “internal” as well as “external” perceptions, objects of 
consciousness like emotion and pain, or sensations, respectively, to the status of 
perception.  But, moreover, ideas, presumably the objects of “internal” perceptions, 
must also be included in the set of objects designated as perception, as humans can 
attend to either lively internal/external states as well as insensible ideas.  Hume agrees 
with Locke‟s affirmation that: “To ask at what time a man first has any ideas is to ask 
when he begins to perceive; having ideas and perception being the same thing.”255 
 The unification of these two seemingly different objects of consciousness, 
however, is not limited to merely the difference of degree.  In his opening discussion 
of impressions and ideas, Hume remarks that, “there is another division of our 
perceptions which it will be convenient to observe,” the division is into simple and 
complex [perceptions].
256
  Explaining this distinction, Hume continues stating; 
“Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such that admit of no distinction or 
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separation.  The complex are contrary to these, and may be distinguished into 
parts.”257  Historically, we have already experienced this distinction with the 
medieval doctrine of discreet sensibles and common sensibles.  If one where to focus 
on only the color of sugar, one encounters a simple impression—the white of refined, 
the brown of unrefined sugar.  But if one attends to the various qualities that make up 
sugar, color, granularity, sweetness—sugar with its multivarious qualities attributed 
to such—one receives a complex impression.  Simple impressions are the 
deliverances of a single sense datum through the medium of a particular sense faculty, 
complex impressions are the combination/collation of multiple sense data through 
multiple sense faculties.  Ideas, will likewise follow this characterization.  When one 
is aware of one‟s perception of the color of sugar (especially if sugar is not 
immediately present) one will attend to a simple idea, and so for the combination of 
qualities that one attributes to the idea of sugar, a complex idea.  Furthermore, Hume 
claims that “all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other.”258  Complex ideas 
and impressions, however, seem to vary considerably in resemblance.  While it is 
possible for impressions and ideas to resemble one another, often other faculties 
intercede to prevent perfect correspondence.  Faculties such as memory, imagination, 
attentiveness and abstract conceptualization (discursive thinking) may prevent the 
translation of complex impressions into representative ideas with the veracity found 
at the level of simples.  This observation leads Hume to consider the connection 
between the two.   
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Because every impression, simple or complex, has a correspondent idea, and 
not every idea has a correspondent impression e.g. gold mountains, Hume concludes 
that “impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.”259  In 
another formulation, Hume states: Ideas are “derived either from our outward or 
inward sentiment.”260  And the source for these outward or inward sentiments is 
experience.
261
 The terminological difference allows Hume to discuss not merely ideas 
of “outer” objects, but, also, passions and moral sentiments one may experience.  The 
work Hume‟s distinctions, a difference of degree yet similarity in kind, perform is to 
note the similarity and connection as well as the source for all impressions and ideas.   
Regardless of the force or vivacity found in any impression or idea, experience is the 
true source, foundation in Hume‟s words, for either species of representation.  If one 
gains impressions from sense experience and then form ideas based upon 
impressions, Hume must consider the difference between impressions and ideas, and 
elaborate just what he means by the term idea.  Moreover, because “all our ideas or 
more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones,”262 Hume 
must be able to explain the process by which ideas are generated, as well as the way 
by which one can distinguish between faithful and unreliable copies of impressions.  
These two questions intertwine, and, as it turns out, his answer to the first question 
renders any answer to the second impotent.  
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Hume‟s answer to the first question resembles the empiricist approach found 
in Aristotle.  The suggestion of that the deliverances of the senses impress upon the 
mind some particular, employable through modified means, results from the 
metaphorical sense of impression found in Hume. Mary Warnock observes that 
“perhaps, in Hume‟s case, the word „impression‟ itself, with its metaphorical sense of 
pressing one seal onto one piece of wax, made it easier to overlook all such possible 
ambiguities.” 263  Following Aristotle and empiricist philosophy, Hume‟s answer 
appears to be the imagination.  The deliverances of the senses are taken up by the 
imagination which impresses the form/shape of the deliverances of the senses in the 
form of an image, thus founding a storehouse of impressions, memory, by which 
these impressions are then susceptible to evaluation by human intellect as image-idea.  
Warnock continues with the metaphor of impressions in wax, stating that, at this 
initial stage of explanation, Hume “defines ideas as images. From the outset, then, 
[Hume] regards imagination, the image-making faculty, as playing a crucial role in 
our thinking.”264 
One perceives, Hume suggests, the representations of these immediate 
deliverances, impressions, and moreover, humans have the ability to recall 
impressions of deliverances past by means of memory.  Thus Hume replies to 
questions regarding impressions and ideas, the representation of impressions and the 
source of ideas by citing the imagination as the mediator between the deliverances of 
the senses and the impressions subsequently formed, and also originator of the ideas 
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which we recall through the use of memory; thereby affirming his original argument 
that impressions cause ideas and ideas are mere copies.  These ideas stored as 
memories, however, are not the forceful and lively impressions delivered by the 
senses, thus affirming Hume‟s claim of difference in degree.  They are, rather, ideas 
stored in the memory, less forceful and less lively owing to the debt of time and the 
copied nature of ideas no longer immediately present for evaluation.   
This response, however, presents an ambiguity between the impressions made 
upon/by the imagination and the ideas generated by the mimetic function of the 
imagination in the translation of impressions to ideas.  If it is the case that the 
impressions are transformed by the imagination into a form susceptible to evaluation 
of the mind, are these impressions ideas or still merely impressions?  Hume would 
have the deliverances of the senses be impressions available for inspection of the 
mind in all their immediate force and violence.  Whereas this copying process, 
necessary to support his argument for ideas, would suggest that all transformation, 
copying, of impressions immediately alter the impression into an idea.  It would seem 
that all we have are ideas available for evaluation by the mind, and that the 
representations afforded by impressions can never be accessed directly by thinking.
265
  
This answer, should it prove tenable, may in fact be mitigated somewhat by citing the 
differences in immediacy and also difference between particular and abstract ideas.  
Indeed, that is what Hume‟s distinction between impressions and ideas implies.  
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Impressions are the immediate presentation of the deliverances of the senses, and 
ideas are removed, although “caused”, from immediate experience.  Impressions of 
sensation are always particular and immediate; ideas of sensation are always the 
presentation of the absent object. But impressions and ideas of sensible objects do not 
exhaust Hume‟s inventory of the human mind.  Beyond impressions and ideas of 
sensation, Hume also delineates impressions and ideas of reflection from those of 
sense experience.  The latter describe the connection of the “outer” with the “inner”, 
the former describe the operations of the inner life of the mind.  
Regarding the connection between ideas and imagination in reflection, Hume 
observes that that “nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought 
of man.  To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the 
imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar 
objects.”266  The imagination, in this pejorative sense, may provide enumerable ideas 
which may have their basis in experience, yet have no corresponding impression.  
And yet, Hume continues, the imagination in its ordinary, non-fantastic, employment 
“is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the 
mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, 
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.”267  The 
imagination, according to Hume, even in the activity of idea generation, is merely 
reproductive, employing the materials afforded by experience and sensation.  At 
times the imagination may combine simple ideas to produce monstrosities, but, more 
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often, the imagination is employed in the generation of ideas that appear to serve 
faithfully the process of translating impressions into ideas. 
Ideas are copies of impressions, losing the force and vivacity of immediate 
representation, and stored in memory for later use.  But Hume is not satisfied with 
merely observing the nature of ideas and their connection with impressions.  To 
determine how human understanding operates, he also elaborates the use of ideas and 
the trends we find when observing how ideas are connected.  To determine these 
operations, Hume will rely, once again, on the imagination.  
Hume begins Book 1, Part 1, Section 4of his Treatise with the declaration:  
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be 
united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more 
unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by 
some universal principles, which render it in some measure, uniform 
with itself in all times and places.
268
 
 
Because of the imagination‟s ability to unify, separate, add, and delete simple ideas 
from complex ideas, Hume finds it necessary to determine the rules by which the 
imagination associates ideas.  If the production of complex ideas were left to chance, 
the imagination is an unruly faculty that produces monstrosities.  But, Hume 
contends, we seem to find regularity with the associations of ideas found in reflection.  
Simply stated, there are three manners by which one idea is conveyed from one to 
another; resemblance, contiguity in time of place, and cause and effect.
269
  Hume does 
not deem it necessary to prove these three manners, believing them to be evident in 
what amounts to a de facto explanation of human psychology.  He cites common 
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examples demonstrating that if one idea resembles another it will bring forward from 
memory a similar idea, or that when thinking of a particular image from an event at a 
specific time and place one will naturally summon other images from a proximal 
period.  Hume does not even deem controversial that humans reason according to 
cause and effect.  What he does, however, is to call into question the metaphysical 
claims of cause and effect, thereby showing that even the associations of ideas are 
governed by beliefs, feelings and custom, which themselves are founded on creative 
attachments afforded by the imagination.  To determine actual necessary connection 
between any two ideas representing events is impossible.  According to Hume, “every 
effect is a distinct event from its cause”270 and as such it is impossible to determine a 
priori, by necessity, the cause of any effect.  “In vain, therefore should we pretend to 
determine any single event, or infer any cause from any effect, without the assistance 
of observation and experience.”271  But, it turns out, humans do think according to 
cause and effect, even when considering the other ways ideas relate
272
 to one another; 
that is, we often believe the resemblance of one idea to another to be the cause of its 
recollection.  The ways ideas relate together are in some way connected to the idea of 
cause and effect.  But, because we cannot determine the causes of effects, we are left 
with no stable principle by which to determine how we associate ideas.  Hume‟s 
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is apparent, and he proceeds to describe the 
assignation of causal relations based upon belief and feeling. 
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 That we make causal connections, Hume takes as phenomenologically 
evident.  What happens in the process of causal ascription is fundamentally connected 
with the projection of the belief that the regularity we find in experience is causal.  
Belief “is produced by a number of past impressions and conjunctions.”273  Repetition 
and the attendant feeling of regularity are the sources for belief, and to this operation, 
Hume gives the name custom.
274
  Custom, it turns out, is the source for our ascription 
for the associations of ideas, impressions and the so-called knowledge that is 
subsequent on these operations.  But just how beliefs and attendant feelings are 
attributed to regularity falls upon the imagination.  The imagination, broadly 
construed, is the means by which we project causal connections onto either a series of 
impressions or ideas, in the absence of any proof for a connection between antecedent 
and consequent.  We are led to believe in a connection of the two by resemblance and 
contiguity and determine the connection to be causal.  Connecting two events 
causally, is the product of the imaginative connection based on these two basic 
principles of idea relations. 
 At this point it is pertinent to separate Hume‟s narrow definition of 
imagination from the imaginative process involved in the projection of causal 
relations.  Hume chiefly describes the imagination and it products as fancy, that 
unreliable and dubious faculty that provides ideas with only the slightest force and 
vivacity, which we characteristically stigmatize with epistemic doubt.  Objects of 
fancy, those monstrosities the blatantly recombinant imagination can conjure, have 
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little bearing on our impressions, other than their derivative and creative nature 
dependant upon those original data of experience.  Hume will grant that one can 
“experience” ideas of fancy as reflective ideas, but they do not carry the epistemic 
weight of simple impressions, those supposedly connecting the “inner” mental realm 
with the “external” world of objects in sensible experience.  Imagination in the larger 
sense I am indicating here is the way we draw connections between any ideas or 
impressions.  In one of his most classic examples, Hume addresses the epistemic 
problem such dependency on the imagination elicits, the question of personal identity.   
 Hume expends some energy in describing the difficulties of attributing 
identity to a single impression experienced successively.  Simple sense impression 
may have a simple idea corresponding, one which is then available to flights of fancy.  
The connection of impression to idea is, for Hume, imagistic, and thus imaginative.  
But, more importantly, the connection of one impression, translated to an idea, with 
another impression, even of the same object, then translated into another idea, and the 
determination that the object of these impressions is the same—that is, the judgment 
in the realm of ideas, of identity—must also be imaginative.  The association of ideas, 
even as identical, is a process of resemblance, contiguity and causal connection, and 
is immanently under the auspices of imaginative connections.  All the functions of 
associations are products of imaginative projection.  Hume is unwilling to concede 
the identity of an external object given discreet impressions, no matter how alike they 
may seem in resemblance and contiguity.  This being the case, he should be and also 
is unwilling to determine identity even in the mental sphere alone.  The tenuous 
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connections of ideas leads Hume to the radical skepticism that marks his philosophy 
as the logical conclusion of the empirical tradition.  Interesting to note here is that, 
according to Hume, all the determinations humans make, all judgments we pass, are 
the product of an uncritical feeling, from which arises a belief, and thus the custom or 
habit we have of making inferences.
275
  All human knowledge it would seem, is the 
product of imaginative connections being drawn between discreet sense impressions 
and their subsequent translation, manipulation and association in the activities of 
human mental life.  Ideas themselves it would seem, while real, may have little 
connection with the world, and we are left with little epistemic verity and the specter 
of idealism.  We have only what we project onto the world, and this is little 
consolation for the Scottish empiricist.   
 Kant, on the other hand, will accept this conceptualization of human 
projection onto the world.  In fact, human projection of ideas provided by the 
understanding will characterize his philosophy.  Kant, however, will attempt to 
distance himself from the charges of a vicious idealism, citing the difference between 
empirical and transcendental idealism.  Moreover, the thought conceived by Hume, 
that causal connections are the product of human imagination and the projection of 
uncritical belief onto the world of objects, will have resonance in Kant as well.  Kant 
acknowledges the difficulty in determining causal connections between empirical 
objects, but he will affirm the power of human projection concerning beliefs about 
purposiveness found in nature.  This Kantian formulation of causal connections with 
purposes found in nature takes the form of teleological ideas, projected from the 
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creative purposiveness found in human conceptualization.   What we find in Hume‟s 
associationist psychology is a prelude to the dependence of human thinking on 
imagination found in Kant philosophy.   Hume proposes and fails to provide the rules 
of the imagination, opting to explain such a mechanism according to the de facto 
explanations of contiguity, constant conjunction and cause and effect found in 
associationist psychology.  Kant will push the question further, looking for a de jure 
explanation for the powers, rules, and application of the categories.  He inevitably 
answers these questions in terms of the imagination, while noting and approving of 
the reproductive capacity of the imagination found in Hume.   
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Chapter 5: Imagination in Kant‟s Architectonic 
 
Kantian Concerns 
 
 As I stated at the opening of this work, the chief topic for discussion is the 
imagination in the works of Immanuel Kant, and it is to this topic I now wish to turn.  
The programmatic at this point is to draw several of the themes encountered in the 
aforementioned history of the imagination and to trace the ways in which they inform 
Kant‟s philosophy and to understand how Kant transforms the philosophical tradition 
that came before him.  One tenet that has underwritten and perhaps justified the 
history is that Kant‟s use of the imagination is well-informed and radical.  I have 
chosen to introduce the imagination as the liaison between the understanding and the 
sensibility, of the worlds of mental representations and the world of objects as 
delivered by the senses, respectively.  I have pursued this course to demonstrate the 
precedence found in the history of philosophy that informs Kant‟s dualism between 
sensibility and understanding.  Whether or not this is representative of Kant‟s 
understanding is yet to be determined, but, for now, I wish to affirm the connection.   
For Kant, the connection between the two stems of human knowledge, must 
be determined.  How are concepts and intuitions brought together to form 
knowledge?  This, in turn, will elicit a discussion of the objective reality and 
objective validity of Kant‟s categories, among other issues, and will demand 
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justification for judgments that claim epistemic verity.  This in turn will elicit 
questions concerning the status, function and rules of operation by which the 
imagination exercises its task.  This reported intent might imply a narrow confine to 
the 1
st
 Critique, but, I believe, such an approach is short-sighted.  Kant‟s employment 
of the imagination is not merely limited to epistemic claims concerning the 
connection of human thinking/judging to objects.  The imagination figures 
prominently in all aspects of connecting sensibility with the understanding in 
judgments, whether of metaphysical, epistemic, moral or aesthetic.  When it comes to 
determining the appropriateness of applying a priori categories to the deliverances of 
the senses, judgment is the central issue, and in the 3
rd
 Critique judgment is the focus 
of concern. Therefore, concern with the 3
rd
 Critique and its explicit treatment of the 
imagination is also in order.  Furthermore, a look to the 2
nd
 Critique is in store to 
determine the role of imagination, if any, in moral judgments.  This integrationist 
approach, which focuses on the “critical” Kant while attending to the “pre-critical” 
and “post-critical” works is fraught with difficulties, some of which I would like to 
list and briefly explain here, in order to orient the interpretive strategy as well as 
demonstrate the often protracted fight in Kant scholarship. 
 
a)  The first, and perhaps most disconcerting, problem with this proposed study is the 
possibility to present an inaccurate, superficial and incomplete account of Kant‟s 
imagination, thus misrepresenting what such a faculty plays in his thought.  Because I 
am attempting to trace the employment of imagination in Kant‟s philosophy, 
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attending to the use, modification, and perhaps even, development of such a theme in 
Kant‟s corpus, the materials available are numerous and often seemingly 
contradictory.  The purpose of this study is not to overlook, dismiss, marginalize or 
explain away what might appear as conflicts or contradictions.  The purpose is to 
attempt a unifying theme that can ground Kant‟s philosophical use of imagination and 
to see its place in the overarching issues of his work.  Addressing the seeming 
inconsistencies and attempting to find a grounding by which Kant can maintain his 
arguments is the task I set before myself.  The task is admittedly a large one, but one 
which I believe attainable, if one attends to the over-riding concern of elaborating the 
role of imagination in judgments, that is, in the origins of the categories of the 
understanding and their connection with the deliverances of the senses in the several 
types of judgments Kant enumerates.  
This approach finds sympathy, not only with the pre-critical Kant and his 
metaphysical inquiries, but with the post-critical period and Kant‟s concerns with 
unifying his system.  The former, albeit the more rationalist approach of the Leibniz-
Wolffian school, does concern itself with the origins of the contents of the “inner” 
realm.  In these works, Kant explores the basic principles that govern human thinking 
e.g. the principles of non-contradiction, succession and simultaneity such as those 
found in the New Elucidations.  The post-critical period, cited as Kant‟s works in the 
years following 1792, finds an attempted summary in the Opus Postumum and this 
work attempts to bring together the insight of the Critiques and scientific exploration 
of the empirical world; that is, practical application of the insights found in the 
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critical period and the deliverances of the senses found in scientific inquiry.  The 
critical period, it would seem, is book-ended by the very concerns of the Critiques 
themselves. The work accomplished here is to establish a core doctrine of the 
imagination in the Critiques, that further research into the connectivity of Kant‟s 
works may find traction. 
 
b) A second concern with such a study is the terminological shifts we find throughout 
Kant‟s lifetime.  Kant‟s use of imagination found in the pre-critical period are in 
alignment with the typical use found in the history of philosophy.  In Dreams of a 
Spirit Seeker, Kant employs the Latinate focus imaginarius to describe the process by 
which impressions of external bodies produce spatial images available to judgments 
by the understanding.
276
  And while this process is necessary to coordinate “inner” 
representations with “outer” objects, the opportunity for figments of the fantastical 
imagination arises.  Kant claims it is quite necessary that one “cannot, as long as 
[one] is awake, fail to distinguish my imaginings, as the figments of my own 
imagination, from the impressions of the senses.”277  In Kant‟s own employment of 
imagination in this work, he subscribes to the general tendency in the history of 
philosophy to concede the necessity of the imagination, while cautioning his audience 
to the pernicious nature of fantastical imagination.
278
  At this point Kant does glimpse 
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the necessity of imagination, without providing much detail in the role it will play in 
connecting sensibility with understanding.  At this early stage in his development, 
Kant continues the standard historical use of the imagination, one that concedes its 
employment, but condemns the imagination in its misapplied use.  Kant will never 
truly deviate from this basic position, hence his connection with the history of the 
imagination.  What Kant will develop in his mature writings, however, is insight into 
the means by which the imagination will perform its role as liaison, giving the 
imagination its proper due, while cautioning against its overuse, into inquiries that 
human reason “is not able to ignore,” but which “it also not able to answer.”279 
 In the critical period Kant will discuss several different imaginations; the 
reproductive imagination, the productive imagination, the transcendental imagination, 
and, it has been argued, even replaces the faculty of sensibility in the 3
rd
 Critique with 
the term “imagination” itself.  In this effort to discuss the imagination, these various 
uses must be brought into relief, providing distinctions as Kant presents them, but 
also uniting them under a general use of imagination.  The insights found in the 
critical period are also marked by a shift in linguistic usage.  Kant does employ the 
Latinate “imaginatio”, but more commonly employs the German term 
“Einbildungskraft.”  The shift from Latin to German in his writing coincides with a 
deeper insight into the formative power of imagination.  The shift to his native 
language and his subsequent philosophical insights may be attributed in part to his 
newfound critical programmatic, but may also be a shift from the image centered 
imaginatio to a power of creating, building and culture,  Einbildungskraft.  While 
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keeping the image-making function of the historical reproductive imagination, Kant 
gains new respect for the formative and creative powers of imagination.  And even 
though Kant finds new respect for the imagination in the critical period, he still 
cautions against overuse of imagination in speculative metaphysics.  
Imagination does not figure into Kant‟s post-critical thought too largely.  One 
explanation for this is that much of his published works are re-figurations of lectures 
and previously written manuscripts.  The attention of these works are often to 
“scientific” inquiries, notably his Anthropology and Opus Postumum.  What we find 
in these works is rare mention of the imagination, often in a derogatory tone.  
However, what insight we find into the imagination is its application in empirical 
pursuits.  After the critical work is accomplished in the three Critiques, Kant finds no 
need to discuss the imagination, but attends to the application of the processes 
discovered earlier.  Following Manfred Kuehn, I would like to argue that Kant may 
develop many of his ideas, but does not deviate too greatly from his overall quest to 
establish metaphysics as a secure science and to explore the appropriate realms for 
human inquiry, both scientific and moral. 
 
c)  A third and deep concern for any study is the interpretation of the major thinker 
the author brings to his analysis.  The question of concern is: Just what Kant are you 
reading?  This particular issue has become one aspect of the cottage industry that is 
Kant scholarship.  For authors with overriding epistemic concerns, the 1
st
 Critique is 
the primary focus and support for argumentation is drawn chiefly from this text.  For 
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those interested in moral or aesthetic issues, the texts primarily sought are the 2
nd
 
Critique and Groundwork, and 3
rd
 Critique, respectively.  Typically, one finds these 
divisions demarcated by an ocean or channel.  Anglo-American interpretations, with 
their main focus on epistemology, often attempt to separate “the analytic argument” 
from Kant‟s transcendental idealism.280  More European interpretations that focus on 
aesthetic and moral dimensions often separate themselves from Kant‟s 1st Critique 
emphasizing a development or change in Kant‟s position.281  When comparing Anglo-
American interpretations with those more European, one often finds a sharp contrast 
between strict analytic approaches that attempt to reconstruct Kant‟s arguments and 
evaluate them accordingly and more historical approach that attempts to contextualize 
the arguments found in Kant‟s work. Recently, however, we find overtures to bridge 
the gap between these two Kants, notably in the works of Beatrice Longuenesse and 
Hannah Ginsborg. 
 These two branches of Kant scholarship, while geographically significant, 
find their radical division in the immediate reaction to Kant‟s critical works.  The 
European group finds itself charting the historical progression of Kant‟s ideas through 
German Idealism and the Southwest school of interpretation.  The Anglo-American 
trend follows a more logical trajectory through the works of Frege and the neo-
Kantianism that arose in the early 20
th
 Century through the Marburg school of 
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interpretation.
282
  Moreover, at the heart of the division between interpretive 
strategies is a conflict concerning which version of the 1
st
 Critique is Kant‟s more 
considered view.  Noting Kant completely revised several sections, provided an 
entirely new preface, introduction, and transcendental deduction, along with additions 
to his refutation of idealism and a, perhaps, radical and contradictory reformulation of 
his analogies of experience, the B-edition contains what some consider to be 
considerable differences from the A-edition.  The most significant of these changes, 
so the debate contends, is Kant‟s rewriting of the transcendental deduction. This 
question appears to have become one of the most divisive, if not the most, among 
Kant scholarship.  The Anglo-American tradition argues that Kant‟s considered view 
is the B-edition.  After its initial publication, subsequent criticism in the literature, 
notably the Garve-Feder review, and reaction, Kant reformulates the heart of his 
philosophical enterprise, the transcendental deduction, in order to more clearly 
distinguish himself from antecedent forms of idealism.  In order to distance his 
transcendental idealism from the metaphysical or naïve idealism of Berkeley, Kant 
rewrites the transcendental deduction and adds a refutation of idealism.  The 
Southwest school of interpretation, broadly the more European interpretation, 
countenances this argument, but cites the originality and insightfulness found in the 
A-edition transcendental deduction.  Such an interpretation argues that the original 
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formulation is the truer expression of Kant‟s philosophical position, and that the 
reformulation is merely an attempt to allay critics who misunderstood the original, 
and thus is Kantian, but not Kant‟s considered view.  The B-edition, they contend, is 
a reaction to criticism, and perhaps an attempt at popularization, not the advancement 
of his ground-breaking philosophical insight.  The protracted debate is typically 
resolved by favoring one edition over the other and explaining away the discrepancies 
found between the two by subsuming one under the other.   
 Such interpretive strategies appear to be a plausible way to resolve the 
differences between the different versions.  But to overlook the insight of one edition 
in favor of the other is to tacitly concede that Kant changes his position between 1781 
and 1787.  This is not the approach I favor in my interpretation of Kant.  Certainly the 
A-edition of the transcendental deduction has advantages over the B-edition.  The 
attention to detail, the continuity of terminology and the detailed connection and 
progression from the Transcendental Aesthetic is more pronounced.  And yet, the B-
edition appears to enlarge the scope, while omitting some of the details found in A-
edition.  By locating the insights and elaborating the continuity and coherence 
between the two editions, one can, I believe, not only determine the role of 
imagination in cognition, but also provide insight into the different ways one can 
putatively employ such a faculty.  In addition to the synthetic function of imagination 
in apprehension, reproduction and recognition of the deliverances of the senses, as 
found in the A-edition, Kant will also distinguish between intellectual and figurative 
syntheses in the B-edition.  Both versions of the transcendental deduction must be 
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taken into account in order to elaborate the comprehensive scope of imagination in 
Kant‟s philosophy.  Thus, while I favor the A-edition for its insight and originality, I 
also concede the advancements made in the B-edition and its attempt to bring the 
radical insight from the earlier version into discussion with the philosophical 
conceptualizations of Kant‟s time.   
 By pursuing this approach I consider myself aligned more with the Southwest 
school of Kantian interpretation, highlighted and developed in philosophers such as 
Martin Heidegger, George Sherover, Martin Weatherston and Dieter Henrich, but 
also admit the benefit of exploring bracing examinations of Kant‟s arguments as 
found in the Anglo-American tradition.  Such is the spirit I find in Henry Allison‟s 
work Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Longuenesse‟s Kant and the Capacity to 
Judge, a commitment to an explanation and defense of Kant‟s work, but a 
commitment to examining Kant‟s arguments and a willingness to point out when they 
do not achieve what he believed them have accomplished.
283
  Perhaps, the core of the 
argument for the radical use of the imagination in Kant‟s philosophy is just such a 
critique.  Heidegger has pointed out (and the claim has been much discussed) that 
Kant may have glimpsed the truly remarkable place the imagination occupies in 
Kant‟s transcendental arguments, but that he shrank back from the abyss—and I wish 
to assume just such a stance.
284
  But rather than accepting Heidegger‟s often 
confusing analysis of imagination, I would like to offer my own: the imagination does 
occupy a central place in Kant‟s critical philosophy, in fact, it can even be employed 
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to provide a transcendental deduction of the pure concepts, categories, of the 
understanding.  Kant‟s own transcendental deduction does not provide such an 
explanation for the pure concepts and, this has been argued, presents a failure of the 
most critical portion of Kant‟s work.  I concede that what the transcendental 
deduction provides is not exactly what the name implies, but the work provided in 
this section is also necessary in order to complete Kant‟s task in providing such a 
more straightforward deduction of pure concepts themselves.  Kant‟s deduction is not 
a failure, as most Anglo-American scholarship suggests, but also does not go far 
enough, as Heidegger claims. 
 In light of these difficulties in scope and interpretation, I propose to recognize 
them here at the outset and to address such concerns as they arise.  Within the 
analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason alone, this last interpretive concern looms 
large.  In attempting to draw connections between Kant‟s works, terminological and 
continuity issues arise.  These concerns cannot be ameliorated at one single 
insistence, but only by being faithful and charitable to Kant‟s own writings, while 
attempting to critique, develop and draw the connections implicit in his works. 
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Kant’s Concern: Objective Validity 
 
 As we have seen from the history, there is an overriding concern with the 
nature of our objects of thought and their purported connection with the objects these 
appearances claim to represent.  Beginning with Plato, we find the epistemic issue, 
whether representations faithfully present the objects of experience, central to 
concerns regarding judgments of our experience.  The question appears to be: can we 
claim that the concepts employed in judgment “map on” to objects we experience 
through sensation?  This issue arises from concerns with the source of our concepts.  
Kant himself attempts to combat rationalist speculation in the guise of idealism by 
bringing this very question to light.  He asks: “how subjective conditions of thought” 
(read concepts, for Kant pure concepts) “can have objective validity, that is, can 
furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects.”285  In other words, 
Kant wonders how it is possible that concepts, those representations found in 
distinctly human-rational cognition, can provide a legitimate ground for all 
judgments, especially judgments concerning objects of experience.   
What is central to this question is at the very heart of traditional criticisms of 
idealism and the historical concern with the legitimacy of the concepts we employ to 
describe our world.  This concern highlights the difficulty of claiming veracity in our 
conceptualization if there are indeed subjective elements in the concepts themselves.  
For Plato, the process by which we form images, representations, is derivative from 
objects more real than the images themselves, thus representations lack the standing 
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required to be called true judgments of objects.  For the broadly empirical outlook, all 
our concepts are derivative from the objects of experience, and empiricism blindly 
puts faith in veritative representation, concepts, that present objects.  The former 
situation leaves human judgments about the world in an inferior position and the 
inability to form true judgments about anything whatsoever.  The latter situation 
leaves no tribunal by which we can justify that the concepts are indeed faithful to the 
objects of experience.  Kant will point out that neither position accurately accounts 
for the subjective conditions to which all human cognition must conform.  Hence they 
both fall short of providing a solution to the dilemma concerning objective validity.  
If the rationalist approach concedes the distinctly human orientation to judgments, 
Kant will object, all judgments face the prospect of being ideal constructs with no 
connection to objects of experience.  If the empirical approach contends that all 
concepts are derived from experience, there is no guarantee that concepts are faithful 
to the objects.  By assuming a middle ground between the two positions, Kant 
concedes the subjective conditions that determine conceptualization while affirming a 
connection with objects of experience.  Kant can and will claim transcendental 
ideality while simultaneously affirming empirical reality.   However, by pursuing 
such a middle path, Kant produces for himself the added difficulty required by such a 
strategy.  Kant must argue for the necessity and a priori nature of the subjective 
conditions of human cognition as well as provide an explanation for how the concepts 
connect with objects of experience.  Objective validity, for Kant, will be the source of 
his greatest labor. 
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 To put the issue in perspective for Kant‟s philosophy, a few reminders about 
certain elements of his Copernican position need to be elaborated.  For Kant, 
cognition is comprised of two elements, a passive and active component—the 
deliverances of the senses, through the sensibility, by means of intuitions, and the 
organization of the deliverances by an a priori conceptual framework found in the 
understanding, the categories.
286
  According to Kant‟s picture, all knowledge, that is, 
all judgments,
287
 are comprised of these two elements, subjective conditions and 
objective conditions.  But this distinction may lead to confusion.  Subjective 
conditions for Kant are not personal, perspectival concepts dependent upon the 
subject‟s emotional or historical situation.  They are, rather, a priori conditions, both 
as forms of intuitions and as pure categories, necessary for the possibility of 
knowledge or experience at all.  In Kant‟s words, “they relate of necessity and a priori 
to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any objects 
whatsoever of experience be thought.”288  With this formulation, Kant can address the 
concerns of an illusory speculative idealism; the structural framework, the pure 
concepts, categories, are necessary for an object to appear (to be represented in 
thinking) at all and any further concerns between the object as it appears in 
experience and what the object truly is is moot.  Because of the dual components that 
comprise human experience, there can be no connection to the so-called truly real 
object—that is, understood as a transcendental reality.  What humans have is a 
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phenomenal representation, not the object or thing in itself.
289
  By answering the 
Platonic/speculative question in this way—that is, by arguing that all experience is 
distinctly human-rational experience and there is no access to a transcendent reality to 
which humans may aspire—Kant can settle the historical question raised by Plato, 
Augustine and Aquinas concerning reality and faithful judgments of such.  Reality, 
for Kant, is the experience that humans have, and the answerability of epistemic 
faithfulness to transcendent being is thereby nullified.  The fictive nature of human 
representation as presented by these historical authors is answered by delimiting what 
can be called knowledge concerning our experience.  In so doing, the epistemic 
question about illusion and phantasy employed by conceptualization in contrast to the 
ultimate nature of reality is no longer as grave an issue. 
 By answering this first question in such a way, Kant exposes himself to the 
second, the empirical, concern.  If experience is the source of human knowledge, 
what guarantees do we have that the concepts employed in cognition are indeed a 
priori concepts and not merely derived from experience?  Kant answers this question 
by asserting and subsequently arguing for the a priori nature of the categories based 
upon “the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of 
thought.”290  This claim leads Kant to formulate the question in terms of a quaestio 
jure, a legal question, demanding a deduction to explain by what right we can claim 
the categories are a priori and how we can justify the claim that they are the necessary 
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elements afforded by the understanding in all judgments.
291
  In other words, Kant 
wishes to combat the empiricist claim that all concepts are derived from experience 
by demonstrating the a priori, non-empirical, nature of the categories and proving 
them necessary for all experience.  Such a strategy allows Kant to concede certain 
concepts we have are indeed products of experience i.e. empirical concepts, but also 
to affirm the necessary building blocks out of which such empirical concepts arise.  
By framing the question in this way, Kant can argue effectively against the 
empiricists‟ claim that all concepts are derived from experience, as well as illustrate 
the means (and constraints) by which we encounter, that is, judge, all experience.  
Furthermore, Kant believes that this course of argumentation will demonstrate the 
necessity of the categories and their applicability to experience, thus providing the 
objective necessity, in regards to the universality of the categories for rational beings, 
as well as the justification for their application to objects of experience.  In other 
words, this line of argumentation will provide the objective validity of the pure 
concepts of the understanding, the necessity and appropriateness of the application, 
objective reality, in the synthesis that is human cognition.  The argument that 
provides such a grounding for the necessity of the subjective conditions, the pure 
concepts, and their connection with the deliverances of the senses is found in the 
transcendental deduction(s). 
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Chapter 6: Imagination in the Transcendental Deduction 
 
The A-edition 
 
 Kant‟s transcendental deduction in the A-edition begins with a reminder to the 
reader that all our representations “whether they are due to the influence of outer 
things, or are produced by inner causes,
292
 whether they arise a priori, or being 
appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, 
belong to inner sense.”293  Thus time, as the formal condition of inner sense, is “quite 
fundamental” to all knowledge.  To elaborate, Kant proceeds to provide an analysis of 
the three ecstasies of time—present, past, and future—and their role in knowledge 
acquisition.
294
  Moreover, in describing the temporal sequence necessary to acquire 
any representation (pure or empirical), Kant illustrates the way in which the 
deliverances of the senses are synthesized, both in themselves and with the concepts 
of the understanding in order to arrive at judgment. 
 The most immediate ec-stase of time, the present, is found in the 
instantaneous apprehension of an object as an impression “insofar as it is contained 
in a single moment.”295  As it is a single moment, this impression is given as an 
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immediate unity, an appearance.  Because an appearance, according to Kant, is the 
product of the two stems of knowledge, to call such an impression an appearance 
might elicit some confusion. 
296
 What Kant ascribes to apprehension might better be 
described as a first glance, or, alternatively, as the immediate presentation of a field.  
Such a field most likely is comprised of distinguishable components e.g. looking out 
over a classroom contains a number of students, desks, walls, floor ceiling, objects 
delineable as foreground and background etc.  Yet the immediate impression of any 
such glance is originally presented as a unity, a whole; it is only subsequent analysis 
of the scene which may provide the opportunity to distinguish discrete parts.  But 
such an analysis is only possible on the grounds that the scene was first given as a 
unified field, which may be then be divided.  This original unity Kant names the 
“synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which 
does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a 
manifold, and as contained in a single representation save through such a 
synthesis.”297   
Without the unity of apprehension, we can provide no representation of the 
object of experience and could not even begin to analyze the whole in terms of its 
constituent parts.  Such analysis would be the completion of the process by which we 
first receive a synthesis of apprehension and then subsequently articulate what the 
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 Appearance is a term Kant employs with several seeming ambiguities.  Appearance most often is 
employed as a term to describe the object that is present in apprehension—quite literally, that which 
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apprehension, but one Kant employs on various occasions.  
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deliverances of the senses provide.  Analysis of this sort is, however, a quite 
advanced stage of representation and judgment.  Prior to analysis of this sort, one 
must be presented with a unified field, and subsequently apply concepts to this field 
and articulate, that is, represent, what is received.  Kant will maintain that, in order to 
have an appearance, we must unite the field of vision with our conceptual architecture 
so as to judge it as an experience—that is to truly have it present as an appearance 
about which we make claims.  The product, an appearance, however, presupposes 
receptivity of a unified field, and this is the formative process Kant is attempting to 
elaborate.
298
  These immediate appearances, or perceptions, are the beginning element 
in the process of knowledge acquisition.  Once the passive, yet surprisingly synthetic, 
element of apprehension obtains, categories are applied and we are able to represent 
what is apprehended and to articulate it as an object of immediate apprehension. 
 But because the whole is comprised of parts and sensibility cannot be fixed 
upon a unified field for any calculable duration; that is, because an appearance may 
contain several components, because our sense perceptions are constantly shifting, 
moving and exploring
299
 and because we possess several different means by which 
we receive deliverances, the five senses, we cannot attend to the immediacy of 
apprehension for longer than the instant.  With the collation of several manifolds of 
singular impressions, another manifold arises, a successive, more explicitly temporal, 
manifold.  Each immediate and successive appearance must be synthesized together, 
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 Saccades and microsaccades provide a biological demonstration of constant attentive movement 
even within a single sense organ. 
 181 
 
Kant argues.  But, in order to coordinate successive appearances, “experience as such 
necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances” so that previous 
appearances may be synthesized in the present for comparative and coordinative 
purposes.
300
 This capacity Kant entitles the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, 
and claims that “the synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the 
synthesis of reproduction.”301  What Kant is attempting to describe here is the 
possibility of connecting each successive immediate apprehension together to form a 
broader notion of experience and knowledge.  If left with immediate sensation and the 
unified field found in the single representation, no knowledge seems likely to obtain.  
From each successive moment our attention will shift and without the ability to 
reproduce, recall, the previous apprehensions, there could be no compilation and 
comparison, no knowledge other than that of each immediate unity and such 
knowledge would be evanescent and fleeting upon a following apprehension—a 
problem recognized by Hume.  Kant demonstrates the necessity of reproduction in the 
example of drawing a line: 
When I seek to draw a line in thought… obviously the various 
manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me 
in thought one after another.  But if I were always to drop out of 
thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line…), and 
did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a 
complete representation would never be obtained…not even the purest 
and most elementary representations of space and time could arise.
302
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operative. 
 182 
 
 
This reproductive capacity of the imagination is the ability to represent an appearance 
of apprehension when the object is no longer present, one from which the moment of 
apprehension has passed.  The synthesis of reproduction in imagination is thus an 
orientation to and synthesis of both past and present.  That we must reproduce and 
synthesize past apprehensions in the present or with a present apprehension is the a 
priori principle that governs this fundamental aspect of experience.  Without 
performing this act of synthesis in such a way, no experience and no knowledge is 
possible.  Important to note here is the use Kant makes of the imagination.  In this 
formulation, Kant does not deviate from the use we find of the imagination in the 
historical record.  The reproduction of intuitions no longer present, we might say 
through memory, finds its precedent in the figures like Aristotle, Aquinas and Hume.  
This function of imagination is not yet the radical formulation, but stays within the 
parameters of the well-defined history, a role that permits the recollection of past 
intuitions for use in the present.  
 And yet, with these two ec-stasies and faculties Kant‟s account of experience 
is not complete.  One further aspect, the synthesis of recognition in a concept, must be 
delineated.  Without recognition of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and 
synthesis of reproduction in imagination, that is, without an explicit formulation and 
articulation from the understanding, these acts would pass unknown.  In Kant‟s 
words:  
If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we 
thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of 
representations would be useless.  For it would in its present state be a 
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new representation which would not in any way belong to the act 
whereby it was to be gradually generalized.  The manifold of the 
representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would 
lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it.
303
 
 
Without the consciousness of this unity of synthesis, no concept is available by which 
we can represent experience, and experience would not obtain.  And yet, 
consciousness itself is not the goal, but is merely the transcendental requirement, of 
this third synthesis.  This third synthesis is the combining and articulation of the 
former two syntheses—a syntheses of syntheses, if you will—one which is brought 
under the heading of a single concept.  Synthesizing the apprehensions and 
reproductions under a single concept, that is, bringing the various elements at work in 
apprehension together in the awareness that they belong together, is precisely the 
recognition Kant is attempting to demonstrate as the third elemental requirement in 
cognition.
304
  In a rare moment, Kant offers a promising example to explain what he 
means by recognition of a concept.  He suggests that when perceiving a house, unless 
one stands at a perfect distance that enables you to see the entirety of the house in 
detail, one could, and most likely does “begin with the apprehension of the roof and 
end with the basement.”305  The limited scope of our perceptions cannot yield the 
single entity „house‟ without a synthesis that brings the discrete perceptions together.  
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there is a consciousness in which such recognition takes place is necessary.  Whether or not an explicit 
awareness is required is questionable.  What must obtain is identification of the two in a single 
consciousness, and to do so one requires recognition afforded by concepts. 
304
 It is always at work in the appearance and cognition of a manifold, be it the singular manifold of 
apprehension or the successive manifold of reproduction. 
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Regardless of the order, unless one is in perfect position to intuit a house as singular field, you 
apprehend several appearances that must be coordinated. 
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But, even should we have a synthesis that brings them together, we still stand in need 
of a concept that can represent this collocation.  By synthesizing the reproduced past 
apprehensions together with present apprehension under the aegis of a single, 
articulable concept, Kant believes we now have the ability to represent objects of 
experience.
306
  However, in order to articulate a single concept by which we name the 
phenomenon appearing, we must employ certain conceptual building blocks that 
establish the concept we are naming.  Such building blocks are the pure concepts of 
the understanding.  Kant‟s argument about recognition in a concept remains the final 
stage in the temporal development of empirical concepts and leads him to claim that 
without this final synthesis and its product, concepts (typically empirical), the process 
would be incomplete, for consciousness would not be able to represent, judge,  what 
intuition is supplying.  Moreover, once the concept has been articulated in 
consciousness, it is then available for future use.  When one receives similar 
intuitions, one must run through the synthetic processes again, but, more importantly, 
one can articulate the deliverances of the senses again as „house‟ and explore further 
comparisons between the present and former occurrences.  This comparison, essential 
for empirical, scientific knowledge, is afforded by the ability to cognize and re-
cognize different particular experiences under general concepts.  This recognition in 
concepts is one futural orientation that the synthesis of recognition permits.  Kant, 
however, will pursue the futural orientation of this final act of synthesis through 
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 Even should we find ourselves in position to intuit the house as singularity, we must subsume the 
apprehension under a concept in order for us to represent the intuition in thought.  The example of 
several apprehensions highlights, more dramatically, the need to bring apprehension(s) under a concept 
that the representation of an object may obtain. 
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another, a transcendental, argument concerning the consciousness in which these 
processes obtain. 
  Kant presents the articulation of an object by means of concepts in 
consciousness as the final requirement of the syntheses that are the processes that 
combine intuitions of sensibility and categories of the understanding.  What Kant fails 
to provide his audience here is the means by which the categories are actually joined 
to the intuitions.  For this Kant will add another section entitled the Schematism.  For 
Kant‟s purposes at this point, he does not wish to describe how pure concepts are 
combined with intuitions, but, rather, to describe the fundamental processes necessary 
in order for judgments to obtain.  With the delineation of the three types of syntheses, 
and the three ecstasies, Kant believes himself to have exhaustively described the 
possible modes of experiencing an object through immediate intuition, the collating 
of intuitions through memory, and the articulation of the experience as a concept, and 
these processes are universal and necessary for any knowledge whatsoever (either 
pure or empirical).  But Kant is not satisfied with merely describing these processes.  
Such a strategy would only present a de facto explanation based on psychological 
principles, but would not provide an answer to the quaestio jure with which he begins 
the deduction.  His critical programmatic demands that he ask: what must necessarily 
be in place for these processes to occur?  For Kant, a transcendental deduction must 
look further, into the conditions for the possibility of representation at all, rather than 
merely describe the temporal conditions necessary to join concepts with intuitions.  
According to Kant, only consciousness can impart the unity needed to bring together 
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past and present as a representation under a single concept.
307
  And so Kant must turn 
his attention to consciousness as the ground that provides the possibility of these 
syntheses in the first place.   
 Kant admits that these syntheses often occur rather quickly and faintly, so 
much so that we do not realize the processes at work.  For Kant, the consciousness 
necessary for these activities is not an explicit or transparent theatre of the mind.  It is, 
rather, a unified consciousness through which these several elements and processes 
are unified.  Boldly, Kant claims that “without it [consciousness], concepts, and 
therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible.”  Moreover all concepts, 
“even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and 
time), [are] possible through relation of the intuitions to such a unity of 
consciousness.”308  This is to say, all judgments require this transcendental necessity.   
In order to justify this claim, Kant seeks “a transcendental ground of the unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently 
also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground 
without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions.”309  The a 
priori ground that permits such syntheses is “no other than transcendental 
apperception” or, as Kant sometimes formulates it, the transcendental unity of 
apperception.
310
   Because any empirical awareness of our inner states must run 
through the syntheses described above, empirical consciousness cannot satisfy the 
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requirement for a single, universal ground.  It is only an a priori, that is, 
transcendental, apperception, that will do.  That this consciousness must be a single 
entity is obvious, for if there were several consciousnesses, or conscious states, a 
synthesis must be effected in order for the processes above to obtain.  “The numerical 
unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts.”311  Because of 
the quaestio juris mode of interrogation for objective validity, posited at the 
beginning of the transcendental deduction, a question concerning the legitimacy and 
origins of these categories, Kant can claim to have satisfied at least part of the 
inquiry.  It is because consciousness is a unity, through which all the ec-stasies of 
time are brought to bear that Kant can claim by what right we conjoin intuitions and 
concepts—the right belongs to the very being that employs the three-fold synthesis. 
This is to say, having achieved this fundamental ground, Kant believes that the 
programmatic set out at the beginning of the deduction, the search for objective 
validity, is complete.    The necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception is a 
priori and can establish the ground from which all syntheses are possible.  Important 
to note here is that Kant has not established the a priority of the categories, and so his 
deduction seems incomplete.  What he has established is the a priori nature of human 
cognition, and he will employ this precedent to provide further rules by which the 
categories are employed i.e. the schemata. 
 Furthermore, apart from providing a transcendental argument for a unified 
consciousness, which is enough to argue against Hume‟s skepticism regarding 
personal identity, the theme of the transcendental unity of apperception, and its 
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necessity in order to perform the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and 
recognition, permits Kant to discuss the ability to cognize, according to rules, in order 
to produce knowledge claims, judgments.  “The transcendental unity of apperception 
forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one 
experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws.”312  Because 
the “original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self” is a necessary 
and antecedent condition for the determination of any object, it provides a singular 
requirement to establish the precedent of rule governed cognition.  In order for 
objects to appear, there must necessarily be a unity of consciousness.
313
  Furthermore, 
in order for objects to appear, there must be “an equally necessary unity of the 
synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is according to rule, which 
not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object 
for their intuition, that is the concept of something wherein they are necessarily 
interconnected.”314 What Kant achieves is a formalized sense of self and the broadest 
prescriptions by which manifolds are connected together to form an appearance, that 
is by apprehension, reproduction and recognition in a single consciousness.  That 
these appearances must be connected in this way in order for knowledge to obtain are 
the rules to which Kant refers at this time.  Moreover, if the appearances are 
connected by these rules time and again, the potential for duplication of experience, 
that is, the possibility for replication and comparison of concepts is possible.  But 
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even if duplication, replication and comparison are not available just yet for empirical 
concepts, we are, according to Kant, “in a position to determine more adequately our 
concept of an object in general.”315  
The phrase “object in general” cannot be taken too lightly at this point in 
Kant‟s argument.  Kant is trying to establish the validity of his pure concepts—by his 
claim, he is trying to “furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of 
objects”—and he has done so by describing the necessary processes by which any 
object must be thought.  The lack of particularity in these processes guarantees Kant 
that he has only described the processes for objects in general and thus for any 
possible judgment.  Because Kant has determined the question of the deduction in 
terms of the conditions by which pure concepts can “serve solely as a priori 
conditions of a possible experience,” he needs to keep the discussion in his deduction 
at the level of general objects and not the particularities of applying pure concepts to 
any particular intuition, but, rather, to any possible intuition.  Kant continues to argue 
that because of the necessity of the processes described, they are rules that govern 
thought and this rule can be formulated as a principle, “the transcendental principle of 
the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and consequently also in 
intuition.”316  
But, for Kant, arguing for this transcendental ground and subsequent principle 
is not the final task of his deduction.  In order to complete his exegesis of the unity of 
apperception, he explores how it is that such a consciousness is actually unified.  That 
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it is a requirement has been established, but Kant wishes to elaborate the means by 
which such a transcendental requirement is unified.  It is at this point that Kant‟s 
radical use of the imagination, and the futural orientation of the synthesis of 
recognition in concepts comes to the fore.  A faculty and principle to govern the unity 
of apperception is the final step Kant explicates in order to complete his deduction 
and demonstrate how all the syntheses described may transpire and are 
interconnected.  As the unity of apperception is required for the various syntheses 
enumerated above to obtain, Kant finds a transcendental principle and faculty that 
produces the very grounds from which all other syntheses arise.  In Kant‟s words: 
“this synthetic unity [apperception] presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the 
former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis [the fundamental synthesis] must also 
be a priori.”317  Because an a priori synthesis—that is, a transcendental synthesis—is 
necessary in order to have a unified subject that performs the specialized, temporal 
syntheses of representation, the principle that governs the synthesis of apperception 
into a singular unity must also be a priori.  To this “blind but indispensable function 
of the soul,” Kant gives the name the transcendental synthesis of imagination.318 
For Kant, this imagination cannot be the reproductive faculty described earlier 
during his exposition of successive appearances, for the reproductive imagination 
rests upon empirical conditions, the presentation of intuition or manifolds of 
intuitions.  This fundamental imagination is the pure, productive imagination that 
enables a synthesis that is necessary for cognition.  This productive capacity of the 
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imagination explains the possibility of the unity of apperception.  The reproductive 
imagination which is dependent upon empirical conditions, although necessary, 
accords itself to the connection of intuitions along associationist lines delineated by 
Hume‟s psychology.  The productive imagination, on the other hand, does not 
concern itself with the connection of given intuitions, but, rather, with providing an 
explanation for a unified self that is necessary for any experience whatsoever, not the 
particular experiences found in the reproduction and association of empirical 
representations.  The productive imagination‟s function is merely to explain the 
means by which apperception can be unified.  “Thus the principle of the necessary 
unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the 
ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.”319 
This formulation of imagination explains the earlier, rather cryptic, phrase 
Kant writes during his discussion and enumeration of the table of categories.  At this 
point in the Critique he writes: “Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the 
mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the 
soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are 
scarcely ever conscious.”320  During the discussion of synthesis in the table of 
categories, Kant is attempting to express how the synthesis between intuitions of 
sensibility and the concepts of the understanding obtain.  After the deduction, we can 
see that Kant is not merely suggesting the historical imagination as the image-making 
faculty that translates intuitions into representations via image-making, thereby 
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connecting objects of sensibility with the ideas we find in thought.  Rather, Kant 
advances the imagination beyond the established historical record by noting the 
function that the imagination plays in reproduction of intuitions or manifolds of 
intuitions in order to collate experiences, by arguing further for the conditions that are 
necessary for such a reproductive imagination to perform such a function.  The 
productive imagination is responsible for the very grounds that permit such a 
reproductive capacity.  In order for reproduced representations to inhere in a single 
being, an explanation for a single consciousness within which we find these 
representations is necessary.  In order to have a unity of apperception that guarantees 
the numerical identity of thinker/representor, the imagination must synthesize 
possible apperception, necessarily and transcendentally.  Moreover, for all possible 
experiences of objects (perceptions) there must be this unity of consciousness.  In 
order to conceive of possible future perceptions, we must posit ourselves as the 
perceiver in the future.
321
  And to do so, one must have a sense of the unity of the self 
required to imagine future states.  The productive imagination provides the 
explanation for this sense of self as well as the projection of ourselves into the future 
to enable further cognition and any system of knowledge.  Although this function of 
the productive imagination goes unnoticed, it must be the case that in order to have 
any cognition, past, present or future, there must be a sense of the self provided by the 
productive imagination as well as a projection into the future of the self that will be 
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the future experiencer of objects.  “Since this unity of apperception underlies the 
possibility of all knowledge, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination 
is the pure form of all possible knowledge, and by means of it all objects of possible 
experience must be represented a priori.”322  The a priori principle found in such a 
synthesis will inform and guide all other modes of synthesis.  Hence the synthesis that 
we find in the productive imagination enables all other forms of syntheses found in 
Kant‟s A-deduction.  In short, synthesis in general and in its various instantiations is 
the activity and product of the imagination but seen in different uses.  This places 
imagination at the level of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.  The 
productive imagination, which produces a self through which the world is cognized, 
as well as a future self through which the world may be cognized, is the sine qua non 
for all human experience—the function may be blind, but is certainly indispensable 
for all judgment. 
To recapitulate and to demonstrate the connection “in which understanding, 
by means of the categories, stands to appearances,” and the fundamentality of the 
imagination, Kant provides a summary and bottom-up model to demonstrate that 
either approach finds the same conclusion.  In the so-called objective deduction, Kant 
writes:  
What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with 
consciousness, it is called perception.  Now since every appearance 
contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in 
the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they 
cannot have in sense itself is demanded.  There must therefore exist in 
us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold.  To this faculty I 
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give the title, imagination.  Its action, when immediately directed upon 
perceptions, I entitle apprehension.  Since imagination has to bring the 
manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously 
have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have 
apprehended them.
323
   
  
In this formulation, Kant is explicitly identifying the imagination as the faculty that is 
responsible for synthesis in apprehension.  But, importantly, it is activity following 
the precedence of the productive imagination.  Presupposed by this passage is the 
continuity and unity of consciousness that must be a priori, in order for a being to 
have perception.  This original subjective synthesis is then transferred to 
apprehension in order to execute another original synthesis, but this time on behalf of 
perception(s).  This transferred power of imagination is to have profound and lasting 
ramifications for our understanding of receptivity and perception.
324
 
Because appearances come to us through the various senses and because any 
given field is comprised of distinct parts, an original synthesis on behalf of 
appearance that occurs in immediate apprehension is necessary.  The imagination thus 
produces a single image in an original objective synthesis, one that allows for a single 
representation of the manifold of perception as an appearance.  This original 
production of an object oriented and objective synthesis employs the same faculty as 
that which provides the unity of consciousness.  Roughly, in order for a perceiving 
consciousness to obtain, there are two fundamental components, both brought about 
by the transcendental power of the imagination.  The unity of consciousness is 
necessary on behalf of the perceiving subject; the unity of perception is required on 
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behalf of the object intuited.  The productive imagination synthesizes the manifold of 
consciousness, even to the degree of synthesizing outstanding conscious states in the 
projection of self into the future, to present a single being in which experience of an 
object takes place.  For the object, the productive imagination affects a synthesis that 
enables apprehension to receive a given field as an image, that is, as a unified 
representation.  It might be tempting to say that this image-making capacity is a 
reproduction of deliverances of the senses, but the issue Kant raises is that this 
presentation of a field in apprehension is a necessary synthesis that allows for objects 
to appear in apprehension, it is an original, creative synthesis that allows for objects 
to appear at all.  It is the original unification of a field found in immediate 
apprehension prior to conceptual application.  Moreover, there is no transcendent 
object that this imagination is copying, rather, the imagination is creating the very 
object about which we can make judgments.  Without such a synthesis one of the two 
necessary elements of cognition, receptivity, has no object. 
 Continuing, from this original apprehension, Kant notes that there must be a 
“subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside 
the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of 
perceptions.”325  These reproductions, or memories,326 are the product of the 
reproductive imagination.  This empirical imagination is precisely the association of 
representations that follows the established patterns that Hume so diligently describes 
in his associations of ideas through the use of the imagination in the Treatise. 
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 The final step in recapitulating the conditions for the possibility of experience 
is the formation of the multiplicity of apprehensions and memories in a unified 
consciousness.  “For even though we should have the power of associating 
perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they 
would themselves be associable; and should they not be associable, there might exist 
a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical 
consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without 
belonging to a consciousness of myself.”327  Without some objective ground our 
associations would be separate and accidental.  This ground is the unity of 
apperception, and all appearances “must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that 
they conform to the unity of apperception.”328 
 According to Kant‟s analysis, “the two extremes, namely sensibility and 
understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the 
mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the 
former, though yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical 
knowledge, and consequently no experience.”329  This is to say, that although we may 
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imagination is merely a function of the understanding.  The “separatists”, however, suggest that Kant, 
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have qualitative experience, some appearance, there would be no cognizing agent to 
which we could attribute this experience, nor could we articulate through concepts 
what this experience is.  The latter needs a unified being which can receive the 
deliverances of the senses and the conceptual framework that accompanies such a 
unity, in order for articulation and, subsequently, compilation of these concepts as 
judgments in a corpus of knowledge.   
From this line of argumentation several questions seem to arise.  If Kant‟s 
purpose in the deduction is to prove objective validity and objective validity concerns 
only those conditions which furnish the possibility of objects of experience, Kant 
does not seem to have proven that his list of categories can be deemed objectively 
valid.  Apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in a 
concept, along with the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental 
power of the imagination, appear to be the conditions that permit cognition and thus 
may be esteemed as objectively valid.  But where are the categories in all this 
discussion?  Are there any a priori rules or conditions that will permit their 
application to intuition, either empirical or pure?  This portion of a deduction, one 
that seems requisite in order to complete the enterprise is wholly missing, but is one 
which might possibly be duplicated.  Kant himself suggests this, but recuses himself 
from performing this work by suggesting that doing so will merely detract and 
distract from the general purposes of a critique of pure reason.
330
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in this personal emendation, employs “understanding” to mean something like the “mind”, and 
understanding in its broadest sense.  For further discussion of passage A77/B103 see Llewelyn, 
Hypocritical Imagination, pp. 33-34. 
330
 A83/B109. 
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Reactions to the Deduction 
 
 The reactions to Kant‟s table of categories and his purported deduction of 
them are as variable as they are numerous.  An exhaustive account here might take us 
too far afield from the discussion of the imagination in Kant, but we can elucidate 
general trends and objections authors have noted over the years.  The most general 
trend we find in these authors is a harsh critique leveled at what Kant has claimed to 
achieve in the transcendental deduction.  Commonly, Kant is charged with having 
provided a faculty psychology that explains what processes are in play in judgments, 
even the a priori grounds by which cognition obtains, but a faculty psychology does 
not account for the list of the categories Kant has seen fit to provide as the pure 
concepts of the understanding nor does it answer the quaestio jure of category 
application.  Briefly, the suggestion is that Kant‟s work in the deduction is good, but 
falls short of proving what is necessary about the categories themselves and their 
application.  The following are a few responses and criticisms regarding Kant‟s 
deduction. 
Hermann Cohen
331
 rejects the deduction of the table of categories, instead 
preferring to read the Transcendental Analytic in reverse order.  Cohen begins with 
the Analytic of Principles and interprets them as an epistemology of Newtonian 
physics.  By claiming Newtonian physics as an a priori science of the principles of 
experience, Cohen argues that the Kant‟s elucidation of the Analytic of Principles 
                                                          
331
 Founder of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism circa 1902, whose adherents include Paul 
Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and eventually many logical positivists through the influence of Rudolph 
Carnap.  For further discussion see Michael Friedman‟s The Parting of the Ways pp. 25-26.  
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provides the principles applied in cognition and believes the table of categories can be 
deduced therefrom.
332
  By demonstrating how knowledge is possible, i.e. the 
principles applied in judgment, Cohen believes we can deduce the categories.  In 
brief, Cohen argues that by knowing what it is that we call knowledge and how we 
come to these claims, we can deduce the constituent half of knowledge found in the 
understanding.  This strategy may be the way Kant actually conceived his critique of 
reason.  It is plausible that Kant presupposed Euclidean geometry as an a priori 
science, and proceeded to provide a faculty psychology and the principles necessary 
to affirm this assumption.  His presentation, however, proceeds in a very different 
manner.  What Cohen fails to realize is that Newtonian physics cannot be an a priori 
natural science, because the principles found in Newton are derived from experience, 
hence have an empirical condition and cannot be pure a priori, although they may be 
a priori.
333
  Laws of gravitation and momentum may seem to be universal and 
necessary for the objects of experience, but the legitimacy they boast always has its 
sources in abstraction from empirical examples.  Indeed, they may govern empirical 
objects as far as we have seen them demonstrated, but they are proven inductively 
and hence do not possess the a priority necessary to be a pure natural science. 
                                                          
332
 Cf. Cohen, Erfahrung, pp. 345-346. 
333
 In the introduction to CPR Kant makes a distinction between pure a priori and a priori.  The former 
indicates the universality and necessity required prior to any experience.  The latter can be construed as 
universal and necessary, but are dependent upon empirical conditions.  As an example of the latter, 
Kant cites that with proper understanding of structural engineering, one need not undermine the 
foundations of a house to know that if one does, the roof collapses.  One can know a priori that what 
will happen, but this a priori knowledge is dependent upon the empirical conditions set forward by 
engineering.  The former indicates knowledge prior to any empirical conditions.  Cf A8/B12 Cp. 
A21/B35 
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P.F. Strawson continues in the neo-Kantian, analytic tradition by arguing for a 
failure of the transcendental deduction.
334
  Strawson interprets the purpose of the 
deduction to be a more modern use of the term “deduction”, a deduction of the 
categories in a sense that Kant does not himself seem to endorse.  For Strawson a 
deduction needs to provide a genesis for the categories themselves from axiomatic 
principles.  According to  
Strawwon, objective validity is not uncovering the necessary conditions for cognition 
in the manner pursued by Kant.  Strawson argues that objective validity can only be 
achieved if the very conceptual architecture, the categories themselves, can be 
demonstrated in their universality and necessity and their employment illustrated.  
This most certainly is not what Kant provides, and Strawson deems Kant‟s exercise as 
a complete failure. 
In a more sympathetic vein, Henry Allison attempts to redress Strawson‟s 
accusations and to defend Kant against undue interpretation.
335
  He points out what 
Kant means by objective validity, noting Strawson‟s misunderstanding, and he 
attempts to ward off the pronouncement of complete failure.  However, Allison 
himself admits Kant‟s lack when it comes to an explanation of the table of 
categories.
336
  And while Allison admits the conspicuous lack of a deduction in terms 
of the origin and genesis of the categories, he mitigates Strawson‟s critique further by 
citing the Schematism as the illustration of the application of the categories to 
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 Strawson, p. 117. 
335
 Strawson here exemplifies the mid-20
th
 century analytic approach to the deduction.  Other authors 
include H.A. Prichard, Jonathan Bennett and might be characterized as trying to purge the idealism 
from Kant in an effort to uphold the Copernican insight Kant displayed, but to save Kant from himself.  
336
 Allison, p. 170. 
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intuition.  While Allison attempts to present a defense of Kant‟s transcendental 
idealism, he continues the tradition of reading the 1
st
 Critique primarily as a treatise 
on epistemology.  The defense of transcendental idealism is made by distinguishing 
between empirical and transcendental idealisms and focuses on the epistemic 
conditions that Kant offers to argue for the latter.  
Martin Heidegger will oppose the trend to read Kant‟s work exclusively as 
epistemology, claiming Kant has performed an invaluable service explicating the 
regional ontology of human knowledge.
337
  He interprets the doctrine of the 
transcendental power of imagination as an illustration of Dasein‟s finitude and 
fundamental orientation to time.  The source of pure concepts of human cognition are 
to be found in this very orientation to time.  Yet, a Heideggerian reading of Kant 
presents its own difficulties.  His analysis of Kant‟s use of time in structuring the 
categories and their application remains faithful to Kant‟s intended explicit 
statements, but space appears to have been lost in Heidegger‟s analysis.  Furthermore, 
Heidegger accuses Kant of not having gone far enough.  According to this reading, 
Kant may have seen the ontological implications of his own work, implications 
Heidegger will make explicit in terms of his own fundamental ontology; but, 
Heidegger accuses, Kant failed to move beyond delimitations of human cognition, 
and by not doing so failed to draw the philosophical connection between his 
epistemology and fundamental ontology.  Yet Kant was neither concerned with nor 
                                                          
337
 Heidegger represents the competing school of neo-Kantianism in early 20
th
 Century Germany.  In 
contrast to the logico-epistemic reading found in Cohen‟s Marburg school, Heidegger and the so-called 
Southwest school, founded by Wilhelm Windelband in Heidelberg and continued by Heinrich Rickert 
in Freiburg, insist on the distinction between math, logic and the table of categories.  Within the 
Southwest school, Heidegger‟s particular approach is to interpret Kant‟s work as a pre-formulation of 
Heidegger‟s own project of fundamental ontology.  Cf. Friedman, p. 26-33.  
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familiar with this subsequent development of fundamental ontology and thus 
Heidegger has been accused of reading too much into Kant‟s employment of time.  
That is to say, Heidegger reads too much of his own philosophy into that of Kant.    
Recently, Beatrice Longuenesse attempts to reformulate the question of the 
source of the categories.  Rather than looking exclusively to the Deduction of the 
Principles, she follows Kant‟s own suggestion that the table of categories finds its 
sources in the transcendental table of logical judgments.
338
 In the so-called 
metaphysical deduction of the categories, Kant himself makes explicit the connection 
between the table of judgments and the table of categories, but what he fails to 
provide is what this connection might be. By exploring the table of judgments and the 
arrived body of logic during Kant‟s time, namely Aristotelian syllogistic logic, 
Longuenesse attempts 1) to recreate how logic and subsumption work in this logical 
system, in order to demonstrate the a priority of the categories, 2) to demonstrate their 
necessity in order to make judgments and 3) their origin itself.  What remains unclear 
is the origin of the categories.  Her line of argumentation achieves the first and second 
of the three stated goals, but remains questionable whether she achieves the final task.  
Longuenesse demonstrates how syllogistic judgments work, and even illustrates how 
the categories are employed in the categorical premises of syllogisms, thus 
connecting major and minor premises and showing how universal concepts are 
necessary in order to make particular judgments.  The categories can be proven 
necessary for judgments and their role in doing so can even be illustrated, but what 
Longuenesse does not seem to describe is how the categories are supposed to arise 
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 Longuenesse, p. 5. 
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from the judgments themselves.  One suggestion is that the table of logical judgments 
themselves represent the necessary means by which any judgment can be made.  And 
if we must judge according to these forms, there must be some concept employed in 
order to make the possibility of general predication possible in a categorical, 
hypothetical or disjunctive statement.  Thus she believes that from the necessity of 
judgments arise the need and list of the categories Kant has provided.  One difficulty 
with the interpretation centers around what Kant considers to be the origin of the 
categories.  Such an explanation may indeed demonstrate how they are employed in 
judgment and the necessity of them in use, but it speaks very little toward the source 
from which categories arise, that is, prior to application in use. 
Common to all these interpretations, except Heidegger‟s, is a focus on the B-
edition deduction.  In contrast, my own interpretation of the deduction focuses on the 
A-edition and attempts to show that Kant achieves what he purportedly sets out to in 
his deduction.  To his critics that deem the deduction a failure, I wish to suggest a 
misinterpretation of the goals he has set out for himself.  Kant has shown the 
conditions for the possibility of human cognition, typical to his style, not by asking 
how judgments occur per se, but what judgment is and what elements are necessary in 
order to achieve them.  His demonstration of the conditions presupposed by cognition 
are indeed a priori.  And yet, I also agree with the general consensus that Kant fails to 
provide any in depth description of the categories and their origin—in either A or B 
editions.  Faculties, principles, and schemata are all important for a coherent account 
of cognition, but without explaining the origin of the categories themselves, Kant 
 204 
 
leaves open the question about the basic concepts employed in his enumerated 
processes in the deduction.  Without providing a deduction of the categories that 
demonstrates the completeness and a priority of Kant‟s enumerated list, his work 
seems incomplete.  It is just such a task that I would now like to pursue and would 
like to do so along similar lines of Longuenesse‟s main contention—that the 
metaphysical deduction provides the clue (or guiding thread) to a satisfactory 
deduction of the categories and the subsequent sections i.e. the transcendental 
deduction and the system of principles cannot be understood unless a metaphysical 
deduction of the categories is provided.  Unlike Longuenesse‟s approach that centers 
around the table of logical judgments to the exclusion of the transcendental aesthetic, 
I pursue a deduction according to Kant‟s suggestion:  
The same function which gives unity to the various representations in 
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various 
representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general 
expression, we entitle the pure concepts of the understanding.  The 
same understanding, through the same operations by which in 
concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produced a logical form of a 
judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its 
representation, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general.
339
 
 
By introducing a transcendental content to the forms of judgment, I hope to 
demonstrate how the categories arise and the completeness of Kant‟s list.  Likewise, I 
believe that in providing a deduction that will satisfy the general clamor for origins, 
we will see, once again, the imagination at work in the very deepest recesses of 
Kant‟s philosophy.  The function of the understanding that provides the a priority of 
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the categories by connecting logical judgments with the transcendental content of the 
forms of intuition is the imagination.   
 If a deduction of the categories, a search about their origins, is to be found in 
Kant, it must be sought from a different section than the transcendental deduction.  In 
the Analytic of Concepts and the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding we find an abbreviated attempt by Kant to attempt a metaphysical 
deduction of the categories.  Opposed to the transcendental deduction, which reports 
to demonstrate the conditions for the possibility of cognition, in the metaphysical 
deduction Kant purports to show the origins of the table of logical judgments and 
consequently the categories as well.  As with the transcendental deduction, the 
reported success of the metaphysical deduction has as many variations as it does 
interpretations.  For the time being, I would like to follow Longuenesse in affirming 
the success of the metaphysical deduction, but through different means than she 
herself provides. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 206 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven: An Integrative Proposal for a New Deduction 
 
A New Deduction: objective validity 
 
 
A new metaphysical deduction is in order to assist Kant in satisfying the 
quaestio jure with which he concerns himself at the heart of the Critique of Pure 
Reason.  This new deduction is intended to present a supplementary to Kant‟s own, 
by addressing the origins of the categories themselves.  Kant does provide an answer 
to this question, citing the transcendental unity of apperception as the necessary 
origin of any cognition.  But this sense of origin does not provide his reader with a 
satisfying deduction of the categories.  What Kant‟s critics have pointed out is the 
need for a more explicit description of the transcendental table of judgments and its 
connection to the table of categories.  It is now to this task I wish to turn. 
 Before beginning this new deduction, one must be reminded again of the 
distinction between sensibility and understanding.  Kant claims that the division 
between the two is that “[c]oncepts are based upon the spontaneity of thought, 
sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions.”340  According to Kant, the realm 
of the understanding is concepts and thinking (judgment), that of sensibility is 
receptivity and intuitions.  By this juxtaposition, Kant delineates the understanding as 
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an active faculty and sensibility as passive.  This is of primary importance in tracing 
the origin of both the tables of judgments and the categories, for with these 
transcendental tables Kant is dealing here not with empirical judgments or objects 
(although we will find them in connection with empirical objects) but with a priori 
modes of thinking, the modes and concepts that are necessary for rational beings.  
Kant is dealing exclusively with the forms of thinking, the forms by which thinking 
occurs and the rules that thinking obeys.  It is my contention, and Kant‟s I believe, 
that the table of logical judgments leads directly to the table of categories, but not 
merely through analysis of syllogisms, as Longuenesse pursues, but through the 
delineation of rules of judgment through an exhaustive account of a priori intuition. 
As the transcendental table of logical judgments is the product of the logical 
employment of the understanding, a brief examination of Kant‟s logic will prove 
insightful regarding the origins of such a table.  Kant‟s own words are helpful: 
General logic… abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from 
all relation of knowledge to the objects and considers only the logical 
form in relation of any knowledge to other knowledge, that is, it treats 
of the form of thought in general.
341
 
 
The domain of logic, as Kant formulates it, is the form of thinking—the ways by 
which we order information and concepts.  Kant, in his thoroughness, allows for two 
applications of this logic, as it is employed with empirical objects but also removed 
from empirical content, that is, in pure thought.  In this discussion, Kant excludes 
logic as it is applied to empirical objects in order to ensure empirical skeptics that the 
judgments and concepts he provides are not mere abstractions from experience.  
                                                          
341
 A55/B80. 
 208 
 
According to Kant, pure, or general, logic has nothing to do with empirical objects.  
The application of general logic can only follow upon having demonstrated the a 
priority of the rules of thinking.  According to Kant, the rules of thought with which 
we are dealing should “contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object.”342  
Furthermore, a pure logic which determines “the origin, the scope and the objective 
validity of such knowledge [of the pure understanding], would have to be called 
transcendental logic.”343  This pure, transcendental logic “concerns itself with the 
laws of the understanding and reason.”344  By separating this transcendental logic 
from general logic, Kant can emphasize the rules that govern thinking itself and 
maintain that the list he provides remains free from any empirical content.  The laws 
will thus be universal, as they pertain to no particular objects of experience.  Rather, 
they will govern how objects of experience can be judged.  The transcendental table 
of logical judgments concerns itself with the rules by which the understanding orders 
its concepts, and thus will govern how an object can make an appearance at all.  At 
this point, it is clear what the table of logical judgment concerns, but the question of 
its origins is not so. 
 The origin of the table, I would like to suggest, is the interplay of the 
imagination with the forms of pure intuition.  This seemingly odd declaration is the 
final product of exposing presuppositions about judgments themselves and the 
requirements Kant holds to maintain their transcendental status.  As transcendental 
logic is not empirical, no experiential content, that is, no objects of empirical 
                                                          
342
 A55/B80. 
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experience can be permitted.  As this is Kant‟s position, about what then is such a 
logic forming laws?  In order of his analysis, Kant has not even admitted the pure 
concepts of the understanding, thus they cannot be the content of transcendental logic.  
Yet, Kant has permitted the pure forms of intuitions as the content of meditation.  As 
pure intuitions are merely the form of sensibility, devoid of particular content, they 
meet the requirement of general logic, that is, they are abstract and not of particular 
objects.  It now remains to be seen how he can employ the forms of sensibility in a 
transcendental logic. 
Following Kant, there are two forms of pure intuition, space and time.  Time, as 
the form of inner sense, manifests itself in the form of simultaneity and succession.  
Space, as the form of outer sense, manifests itself in terms of proximal location, 
position.  Understanding space and time in this abstract, formal, sense, the 
imagination employs these universal, formal “concepts” in a discursive manner.  That 
this is merely formal thought allows Kant to maintain that any logical determinations 
employing these “concepts” will be able to provide a table of judgments, one that 
regulates all judgments generally, but in its first formulation as purely transcendental.  
The table of logical judgments is the product of an exhaustive projection of the pure 
forms of intuition by a power well used but little documented in the history of 
philosophy, imaginative variation.
345
  Using the power of imagination, the possible 
permutations of space and time can be elaborated as follows: 
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1) one „object‟ in one place at one time; local identity and temporal simultaneity 
2) one „object‟ in one place at two different times; local identity and temporal 
succession 
3) one „object‟ in two different places at one time; local proximity and temporal 
simultaneity* 
4) one „object‟ in two different places at two different times; local proximity and 
temporal succession 
5) two „objects‟ in one place at one time; local identity and temporal 
simultaneity* 
6) two „objects‟ in one place at two different times; local identity and temporal 
succession 
7) two „objects‟ in two different places at one time; local proximity and temporal 
simultaneity 
8) two „objects‟ in two different places at two different times; local proximity 
and temporal succession
346
 
 
The imagination, working with the pure intuitions of space and time, devoid of any 
content,
347
 generates these permutations to create this list of possible scenarios.  
Furthermore, this task can be done repeatedly and the same list of eight will be 
produced—these are the only possible combinations of two variables with two 
possibilities- any further elaboration will fall under one of these headings.  The list is 
exhaustive of the possible permutations of the concepts of space and time.  Thus 
imagination will enforce a rule in ascribing any permutation to one of the above 
listed, that is the imagination will synthesize any further elaboration into one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
apparatus, but this need not imply the elaboration is already under the conceptual constraint of the 
categories. 
* logical impossibilities 
346
 The list could continue indefinitely, but the fundamental relationships of objects to one another and 
the judgments to be drawn do not increase.  Hence the addition of further „objects‟ will not increase the 
possible judgments to be determined.   
347
 It is important here to note that Kant never prohibits “material for the concepts of the 
understanding.”  Rather, he cites a specific kind of material, a “manifold of a priori sensibility, 
presented by the transcendental aesthetic” as the proper content for pure concepts.  He suggests that “in 
the absence of this material the concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty.” 
A77/B102. 
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already listed possibilities.
348
  Hence, this table can be considered complete.  This list 
of possibilities of the combinations of space and time, is not yet the transcendental 
table of logical judgments Kant provides.  But with further exploration of the 
imagination‟s use of this list, the table of judgments can be derived.349 
 Stipulating one „object‟ as the entirety of the domain and imagining one 
„object‟ in one place at one time yields the judgments; universal, affirmative, 
categorical and assertoric—this one „object‟ is, it is all that exists in the domain, for 
all things in the domain it holds.  Stipulating two „objects‟ in a domain and imagining 
two „objects‟ in one place at one time yields the judgments; universal, negative, 
categorical and apodeictic—for all things in the domain, it is necessary that two 
„objects‟ cannot occupy the same space.  Stipulating two „objects‟ in a domain and 
imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one time yields the judgments; particular, 
hypothetical, disjunctive, affirmative, assertoric and apodeictic—it is, and is 
necessarily so, if two, individual „objects‟ occupy two separate spaces at the same 
time, they bear some relation to each other in proximal location.  As separate and 
distinct objects in the domain, one must attend to one or the other.  Moreover, Kant 
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 The understanding will recognize by the content of the imaginative permutation that it is a 
reproduction of a former, original permutation. 
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 In his exegesis of the transcendental table of categories, Kant suggests that we also rely upon 
“general logical concepts” and the “technical distinctions ordinarily recognized by logicians.” 
A71/B96.  I interpret this to mean that we rely upon the general forms of syllogisms including the 
AEIO propositions of Aristotelian logic i.e. universal, particular, affirmative and negative propositions. 
Schwyzer and Longuenesse argue for the necessity of this more formalized system, but without 
realizing the source for the basic propositions of the syllogistic system.  Cf. Schwyzer p.12.  Reinhard 
Brandt, in his work The Table of Judgments, suggests Kant also presupposes other logical principles; 
the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason and the law of excluded middle. 
Cf. Brandt, p. 96.  What I am attempting to demonstrate is the origin for these additional principles, at 
least for identity and excluded middle. 
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insists that provided we have the first two judgments in any heading, we can deduce 
the third, hence all the judgments he lists may obtain from this simple list.   
 The transcendental table of logical judgments is hereby shown to be drawn 
directly from the power of imagination and its variations on pure intuitions.  What is 
of special significance here is that, while administering the permutations of 
imaginative play, the imagination itself is producing the possible forms of judgments.  
This productive function of the imagination is creating the rule by which all syntheses 
must operate; every act of judgment, that is, all conjoining—whether empirical or 
transcendental—must operate according to the specified rule of synthesis that the 
productive imagination lays out in this earliest enterprise of joining pure intuitions of 
space and time.
350
  The completeness of the permutations and the corresponding rules 
allow for all possible forms of synthesis, that is, all judgments. 
 By undergoing this labored analysis of the content of logical judgments, I 
hope to have shown the direct deduction of the table of judgments from the only 
possible content available at this point in Kant‟s analysis, the pure intuitions, by 
means of the imagination. Additionally, I have shown how Kant can maintain that all 
knowledge does begin with experience, the experience of thinking through pure 
intuitions, but it does not necessarily arise from experience.  The fundamental 
judgments by which we judge experience begins with the experience of the pure 
forms of intuition, but arises through the productive imagination‟s use of them.  
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 Another important note here, one that Kant makes explicit in the A-deduction, is that whenever we 
have multiple „objects‟ in the domain or multiple times, the syntheses of apprehension and, more 
specifically, reproduction are at work according to the principles Kant lays out only later in 1
st
 
Critique. 
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Knowledge, logical and pure at this stage, does begin with experience, the activity 
and exercise of the imagination, but its origin is elsewhere—in the power of the 
imagination to synthesize experience in such a way that provides the rules for the 
understanding.  In Kant‟s words, this originative synthesis occurs simultaneously at 
the levels of “apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in 
intuition, their reproduction in imagination and recognition in a concept.”351  Kant 
here suggests, as we have seen, that the above permutations require the immediate 
apprehension of pure intuitions, variability and reproduction of these intuitions 
according to the play of reproductive imagination, and are codified, conceptualized, 
as an exhaustive list of possible judgments.  The judgments, as immediate acts of 
joining, are thus the first employment of such rules, and the enumeration of a table of 
judgments provides Kant occasion to demonstrate just such synthesizing. 
 While the transcendental table of logical judgments affords the opportunity to 
see the employment of the imagination in an originary way, the content of such 
judgments does not yield any scientific knowledge—it does not directly relate us to 
the world of possible (empirical) experience; it only creates a barren world of 
syllogistic rules.  The next step in Kant‟s illustration of cognition, the categories, does 
not provide us with the rich world of possible experience either, but it does provide us 
with the fundamental categories employed by the imagination
352
 to create the venue 
for possible application of concepts with empirical intuitions.  Little further work 
needs be done to show the deduction of the table of categories from the table of 
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judgments.  Like the judgments, the categories employ the manifold of pure intuition 
and the imagination to synthesize this manifold.  But, unlike the judgments, which 
employ general logical concepts, the categories are available by use of the judgments 
themselves.  Again, the statement from A97/B105 provides us with insight into how 
categories may be formed by the power of the imagination; Kant writes: 
The same function which gives unity to the representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various 
representations in an intuition, and this unity, in its most general 
expression, we entitle the pure concepts of understanding.  The same 
understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by 
means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of judgment, 
also introduces a transcendental content into its representation, by 
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.  
On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure 
concepts of the understanding…”353 
 
Unlike the acts of judging by which we enact syntheses, the categories are 
representations of these syntheses, representations of the logical judgments.  Kant 
claims a “given category is the corresponding logical function, conceived now as 
ranging over whatever might be presented as an object of thought.”354  By 
representing the act of judging as categories, the understanding provides itself with 
the conceptual architecture by means of which it can begin to evaluate possible 
experience.  Following Kant‟s suggestion, the activity creating the categories is, once 
again, left to the power of the imagination. 
 Analogously to the imaginative variation involved in deducing the judgments, 
the categories can be deduced by following the imaginative variations of the possible 
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permutations of space and time listed above.  Imagining one „object‟ in one place at 
one time in conjunction with imagining two „objects‟ in one place at one time yields 
the category of unity—two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, 
unless they are one; imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one time yields the 
category of plurality; imagining one object, whether in two places or one, at two 
different times yields the category of inherence and subsistence, provided we 
represent them as identical „objects‟; imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one 
time yields the category of community, etc.  According to this account, the categories 
are a combination of the pure intuitions and judgments brought to representation by 
the power of the imagination.  The categories are thus deduced from the table of 
judgments according to the same activity by which the table of judgments was 
deduced, the productive power of imagination.  Such a deduction adds the missing 
exegesis that permits Kant to answer the quaestio jure he sets out as the question to 
answer regarding the legitimacy of the categories.  The right by which Kant can claim 
objective validity is the exhaustive account of the forms of intuition and the 
complementary judgments determined.  That this exercise is pure a priori satisfies 
Kant‟s prerequisite that such a deduction is not merely the exercise of empirical 
concept acquisition, but neither is it solely a rational logico-discursive presentation.  
By employing formal judgment and forms of intuitions, Kant can claim the a priority, 
universality, necessity and exhaustiveness required to affirm objective validity of the 
categories. The categories can thus be seen as the necessary rules by which human 
cognition obtains. 
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 This deduction of the categories is not, however, elaborated as a replacement 
of the transcendental deduction as found in the Critique of Pure Reason.  What I hope 
to have shown is how the faculty of the imagination makes possible both judgments 
and categories, as well as the explicit deduction of the categories themselves.  In so 
doing, we can deem Kant‟s list of categories as a priori, universal and necessary.  
Furthermore, it is an exhaustive list, and these categories must necessarily be 
employed in order for a rational being to represent any object of experience, that is, 
they must be operative in making judgments concerning actual objects of experience. 
Of course, this deduction will not be successful unless there is some 
“vestibule” to which this compilation of pure, a priori judgments and categories 
adheres.  Yet this is precisely what Kant does provide in his transcendental deduction.  
The synthetic unity of apperception is the single consciousness in which these 
operations of imagination transpire.  As Kant states, representation “and consequently 
all objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and all in me.”355  This much 
Kant has shown successful in his argument from the transcendental deduction.  It is 
my contention that the above examination is an attempt to elaborate the activities that 
transpire in what Kant so circumspectly describes as necessary for “the transcendental 
principle of the unity that is manifold in our representation, and consequently also in 
intuition,” that is, apperception.  The power of the imagination, described above in 
deducing the judgments and categories, is the same productive power that Kant 
employs in his deduction to prove, de jure, the self required for cognition and the 
basic synthetic functions of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.  
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Furthermore, we can now see the lawfulness of judgments Kant mentions in the 
processes of pure cognition and the connection between the categories one employs in 
cognition, both pure and empirical.  The allusions to principles in the transcendental 
deduction are indeed the necessary requisites of apprehension, reproduction and 
recognition, but it is now possible to see the full extent to which all experience is 
governed by such.  Pure cognition, like those many imaginative permutations listed 
above, must also obey these enumerated processes in the transcendental deduction.  
But now we can justify the recognition process, for the concepts used in recognizing 
have been properly deduced.  As the program listed above shows the act of judging 
and the representation of such an act as a conceptual primitive for the understanding, 
so too does the imagination by providing the originative synthesis, apperception, 
show “the inner ground of this connection for the representations to the point upon 
which they all have to converge.”356  By performing its productive function, by 
producing judgments and representations of judgments, the categories, the 
imagination creates a consciousness “which must be capable of accompanying all 
other representations, and which in all consciousness in one and the same.”357  Thus 
Kant‟s deduction and my own are not exclusive enterprises, but, rather, my own 
deduction is supplementary and assists in discovering the constituents of elemental 
representation. 
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Schematism: Objective Reality 
 
Having sketched such a deduction and coupling it with the one Kant himself 
provided, we are in position to respond to several of the complaints leveled at Kant 
and his claims to objective validity.  Contra Cohen and Strawson, Kant can now claim 
to have provided not only a transcendental deduction of the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of cognition (Kant‟s stated purpose), but he can also claim to have 
provided a metaphysical deduction of judgments and categories themselves.  The 
chief complaint regarding Kant‟s transcendental deduction is that it rarely mentions 
the categories and when doing so presupposes a metaphysical deduction, which Kant 
does not provide.  And while Kant does not provide a compendium of the possible 
judgments available to human cognition by thinking through the permutations of 
space and time, Kant does provide the insight and the overture to such a metaphysical 
deduction.  Thus when Kant references the categories in the transcendental deduction, 
he does so with assurance that the pure concepts are indeed exhaustive and a priori.   
However, a second objection still applies.  Given the accomplishments of both 
the metaphysical and transcendental deductions, Kant still is not in a position to boast 
that the listed categories are indeed the ones employed in empirical experience.  One 
facile objection could question how often we really use the category of limitation in 
judging an object of empirical experience.  An equally quick response is that even 
though we are not explicitly aware of doing so, we still may employ the category of 
limitation when organizing the deliverances of the senses.  However, instead of taking 
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this approach Kant will provide an illustration of how the categories are actually 
connected with the deliverances of the senses.  The chief difficulty for Kant arises in 
the act of joining categories to empirical intuitions.  What has been deduced so far are 
pure, a priori, categories that bear little resemblance to empirical intuitions of 
sensibility.  The categories, as we have them now, are not fit for direct application to 
intuitions of possible experience.  Recognizing this difficulty, Kant provides the 
Schematism to explain how these pure, a priori concepts may be related to empirical 
intuition.  In other words, he will pursue the mechanism(s) by which the categories 
may actually be and are applied to objects of experience. 
To elaborate the difficulty of this task, Kant admits that “in all subsumptions 
of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be homogenous 
with the concept.”358  This is to say, in order to bridge the gap between the active, 
organizing architecture of the understanding and the passive, receptive deliverances 
of sensibility, for Kant, there must be some common denominator, or else any 
synthesis would be impossible.  Yet, the pure concepts of understanding, categories, 
are “quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions.”359  It would appear that Kant is at 
an impasse; having argued for the completeness, necessity, universality and a priority 
of the categories has left him with little recourse to demonstrate how such concepts 
can be joined with contingent, particular deliverances of the senses.  Kant is left to 
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ask “how, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application 
of a category to appearance, possible?”  Provided we examine the exegesis of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, the admonition Kant delivers at the beginning of the 
transcendental deduction and the deduction I have provided above, the answer will 
become apparent. 
Kant‟s admonition at the beginning of his transcendental deduction was to 
remember that all our representations (either pure or empirical) must all, as 
modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense.  All our knowledge is thus finally 
subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense.”360   In the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, Kant asserts that space and time are the “forms of intuition.”  Every 
empirical intuition comes to the understanding through the forms of space and time.  
Moreover, even the pure intuitions used above to deduce the categories, being pure as 
such, were merely the permutations of objects in general as conceived through the 
forms of space and time.  Empirical or pure, intuitions necessarily are delivered by 
sensibility through the forms of space and time.
361
  Furthermore, in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that, of the two forms of intuition, time is the 
“a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever.”362  In brief, Kant‟s argument is that 
objects of outer intuition, or intuitions we perceive as coming from the outside, those 
that present shape, form and proximal relation are limited.  All intuitions, either 
considered as coming from outer sources or those from inner, all must be represented 
as inner intuitions.  Because time is the condition of inner appearances, and all outer 
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intuitions must be represented through inner sense, time is the form of sensibility that 
informs all appearances.  Since the metaphysical deduction of judgments and 
categories also relies upon the form of time as conceived as a pure form of intuition, 
an answer to Kant‟s demand for homogeneity now presents itself.  Time is the one 
constituent factor inherently involved with all aspects of cognition—time as the 
condition of all intuition, pure intuitions as integral to the process of deducing 
judgments, and the categories themselves.  Kant argues that schemata, defined in 
terms of time, will present “the third thing, which homogeneous one the one hand 
with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance.”363  Thus, Kant 
suggests, schemata make “the application of the former to the latter” possible.364  In 
his exegesis of the schemata, one for each category, Kant explains each in terms of 
time.  Time it would seem is the homogeneous element that can bridge the gap 
between the seemingly disparate elements of cognition. Time, Kant reports, is the 
common ground for categories, intuitions and schemata. 
  One need only glance briefly at Kant‟s listed schemata themselves to 
understand how time figures in his listing e.g. the schema of substance is permanence 
of the real in time, the schema of actuality is existence in some determinate time.  
Kant‟s account is, I believe, clear and to the point.  On the empirical side, the 
reproductive imagination incorporates the manifold of intuition, given in 
apprehension, and thereby creates an image to represent that which sensation has 
given, utilizing the features it finds outstanding and salient to represent the 
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intuition.
365
  This is to say, the reproductive imagination creates an image out of the 
manifold of empirical experience.  Kant leaves open the question as to whether this is 
entirely adequate—indeed it is ordered by the sense organs we, as humans, have.  
Undoubtedly, this is not a flawless enterprise; if our sense faculties were any 
different, the image produced would vary accordingly.  Indeed we need only to look 
to the errors and mistakes made in everyday judgment to realize misgivings in our 
own ordinarily working sense apparatus.  Yet, regardless of whether our sense organs 
are functioning under normal operating parameters, or whether we are producing an 
image that accounts for all salient features, we organize the image under the auspices 
of space and time.  On the pure side, the productive imagination has generated the 
categories under which we subsume the particular image as it is delineated according 
to time. On the empirical side, images are formed according to time from the 
deliverances of the senses.  The final act of the productive imagination is to create the 
schema by which images are made possible.  
Kant states that the productive imagination “produces schemata that make 
images possible, but cannot themselves be images or be drawn from images.”366  
Because, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at a unity 
in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the 
image.”367  The schemata do provide this unity by representing what an image can be 
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according to the possible permutations of the pure intuition of time.
368
  Admittedly, 
“[the schema] are never entirely congruent with the concept, and yet somehow they 
fit into the category.”369   The schemata are not a perfect fit, for the categories are a 
representation of both space and time, as the representation of a judgment, whereas 
the schemata are depicted solely in temporal terms.  Hence schemata are neither 
categories nor intuitions, but, rather, a mediation between the two.  The combination 
of empirical intuitions and categories is executed by the power of imagination by 
matching correlating images to schema and the schema to correlating concepts.  Kant 
sums up this explanation by saying that any schema “is simply the pure synthesis, 
determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance to the concepts, to which the 
category gives expression.”370 
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intuitions.  In so doing, the schemata bridge the gap between categories, devoid of content, and 
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 This mediating function of the schemata is attributed exclusively to the 
imagination.  According to Kant, “the schema itself is always a product of 
imagination.”371   It is in the formulation of the schematism that we find the standard 
interpretation of Kant‟s imagination at it clearest.  Synthesis, as the product of the 
imagination, comes to fruition.  By creating schema and images, and by incorporating 
the temporal aspect of intuitions and categories via judgments, the imagination is the 
general liaison between sensibility and understanding.  And while correct, the 
standard interpretation overlooks the fundamental role of the imagination in all 
aspects of the  processes whereby we find categories given a priori, intuitions as 
representations, often images, and the schema that connect the two.  This new 
elaboration demonstrates the fundamentality of what is typically considered an 
obscure faculty. 
 
 
 
 
From A to B 
 
The above analysis is based upon an interpretation of Kant‟s 1st Critique from 
the perspective of the A-edition deduction, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Analytic of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
intuitions, which are content rich; schemata being neither the rule, the judgment, nor the representation 
of the rule, the category. 
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Concepts, the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding
372
 and 
the Schematism.  Kant further complicates the matter by rewriting the entirety of the 
transcendental deduction for the second publication of his book in 1787.  The B-
edition deduction varies considerably from the original edition of 1781, but in doing 
so it proves illustrative of the major themes found in the A-edition.  Before 
addressing Kant‟s critics, defenders and their particular interpretations of objective 
validity and reality in the Critique of Pure Reason, I propose to examine the 
significant differences between the two versions. 
 One of the most startling differences from the A-deduction to the B version is 
a shift of vocabulary and focus, almost to the complete exclusion of the imagination.  
Imagination only makes an appearance towards the end of the B-version, but in a 
pivotal passage.  Rather than beginning with an enumeration and description of the 
three ec-stasies of time and the associative processes involved to represent objects 
through them, Kant instead takes up a description of the transcendental unity of 
apperception that underlies all representation.  Kant glosses these seminal passages by 
reminding his audience that combination of a manifold in general can never come to 
us through the senses, for combination is an act of spontaneity, and spontaneity 
belongs not to the faculty of sensibility, but to the understanding.
373
  In fact, “all 
combination—be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of 
intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the 
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understanding.”374  Kant rarely makes his position more clear than in this passage.  
But also provocative, and perhaps supporting my thesis from the A-edition, is the 
suggestion that we may possess combination of a manifold of intuition in some way 
that is not empirical.  From this, albeit brief, passage delineating the faculty 
responsible for synthesis, Kant seems willing to allow for some synthesis of a 
manifold of pure intuition, for Kant implies that we can have a combination of a non-
empirical manifold.  For Kant, the larger issue remains the one central to his first 
deduction, demonstrating how several such syntheses can obtain coherency and can 
be further employed to create a corpus of knowledge.   
Once again, Kant points out that the synthesizing activity of the understanding 
(in this version of the deduction) presents a manifold as a single representation, a 
unity.  But, for Kant, there remains another unity, a unity “which precedes a priori all 
concepts of combination” and which itself  
is not the category of unity, for all categories are grounded in logical 
functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and 
therefore unity of given concepts, is already thought.  Thus the 
category presupposes combination.
375
 
 
Therefore, Kant determines, we must 
  
look yet higher for this unity, namely in that which itself contains the 
ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of 
the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical 
employment.
376
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With these two compact phrases, Kant achieves several things.  Kant has established, 
more concisely, several positions from the A-edition, namely that need for a 
transcendental deduction to elaborate the personal-individualizing condition for the 
possibility of cognition, the unity of apperception; but Kant has also made explicit the 
connection between judgments and categories.   
Kant discharges the first task, of elaborating the transcendental unity of 
apperception, in much the same fashion as he does in the A-edition.  He does, 
however, contribute new insight into the relationship between synthesis, analysis and 
the identity of apperception.  Along with the transcendental need for a unified 
consciousness that ensures a subject in which representation inheres, Kant points out 
that this identity comes about “not simply through my accompanying each 
representation with a consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation 
with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them.”377  It is only by uniting a 
“manifold of given representations in one consciousness” that it is “possible for me to 
represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations.”378  
Kant continues by suggesting that “the analytic unity of apperception is possible only 
under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity.”  The transcendental unity of 
consciousness is not only a formal requirement, as argued in the A-deduction, but is 
also a performative act necessary in order to provide the analysis of such a necessary 
unity.  At the bottom of all representation, both in transcendental argument and the 
performance thereof, a unity of consciousness must obtain.  But, importantly, a 
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reciprocity between the unity of apperception and the synthesis of a manifold of 
intuition arises; in order for one to know the necessity of the unity of apperception, 
one must be synthesizing a manifold.  In Kant‟s words, the “principle of the necessary 
unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic, 
proposition; nevertheless it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given 
in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be 
thought.”379 Curious to note here is that Kant does not draw a connection between the 
productive power of imagination and the transcendental unity of apperception.  
Conspicuously lacking in this B-deduction is any explanation concerning the means 
by which this originative synthesis occurs.  According to Kant, this original synthesis 
takes place in the understanding, to the exclusion of imagination in this foundational 
process. 
As to the second task, connecting the categories to logical judgments, Kant is 
more explicit in his second deduction.  In order to do so, Kant must revisit the idea of 
judgment and of what such a process consists.  Kant states; “a judgment is nothing 
but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity 
of apperception.”380  This cryptic phrase presents difficulties when trying to expound 
Kant‟s understanding.  According to Kant, whether or not any given judgment 
possesses objective validity is not the issue.  What a judgment does is to present a 
proposition, typically by employing the copula „is‟, to the unity of apperception.  The 
content of the judgment at this point is irrelevant; the necessary presentation to the 
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unity of apperception is what grounds judgment and prescribes its objective 
validity.
381
  This process of presentation is necessarily at work in all judgment, and as 
such Kant deems the process of judging itself objectively valid, not in the necessity of 
its content, but in the necessity of such a presentation.   
At this point Kant wishes to make a distinction between two types of 
judgments, the same distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of 
experience found in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.  He does so to 
illustrate the difference between objective and subjective validity in regard to 
judgments.  If one were to state „If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight‟ 
one is merely making a judgment of perception.  Kant determines that when one 
states, „It, the body, is heavy,” one is making a judgment of experience.  The former 
is a representation that has always been conjoined in my perception; in the latter 
“what we are asserting is combined in the object, no matter what the state of the 
subject may be.”382  In the former, we are relating the state of an object to an 
empirical consciousness, the presentation of ourselves to ourselves as undergoing 
experience.  In the latter the proposition is connected with the fundamental unity of 
apperception, and hence is not dependent upon the state of the subject. The use of the 
copular verb determines the presentation of a possible empirical fact to apperception 
in the case of judgments of experience.  In the case of judgments of perception, a 
hypothetical is employed to determine reference to a particular subject asserting the 
claim. Empirical apperceptions possess only subjective validity owing to its 
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presentation of a self in a manifold of intuition, and this self is only another such 
presentation, that is an empirical representation.  Because the representation of an 
empirical self and the content rich activities of such a being, such judgments in 
themselves are objects of empirical knowledge and hence are not about the object 
perceived but the experience the subject undergoes when interacting with objects.  
The judgment concerns our states, not the states of the objects.  Transcendental 
apperception, as the a priori condition of all experience, is no such presentation, and 
eludes the subjectivity of self-presentation.  A judgment such as „Bodies are heavy‟ is 
never presented in reference to the self, although it is grounded in the unity and 
identity of the self.  Rather, the judgment is made in reference to the object, which is 
only possible by means of the synthetic unity of consciousness (even as it is 
unreferenced).  A reminder of objective validity may be in order to clarify these 
puzzling remarks.  Objective validity is not the absolute confidence in the truth of the 
content of any given proposition.  It is, rather, disclosing the conditions for the 
possibility of experience.  By keeping to Kant‟s stated purpose in the deduction, 
judgments of experience demonstrate the necessary connection between presentations 
of intuition and judgments through the unity of apperception in order for an object to 
appear at all.  Thus Kant believes that when he describes, “bodies are heavy,” he is 
describing a judgment concerning the appearance of an object as such, and not the 
appearance of an object in reference to any specific subject, rather to any subjectivity 
whatsoever.  Understandably, one might object that all judgments of perception must 
also be related to the transcendental unity of apperception, thus connecting it with the 
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fundamental grounds for objective validity.  But this is where Kant makes the 
differentiation between the actual objects about which the judgments are being made.  
In a judgment of perception, the judgment actually regards the being that perceives 
e.g. I feel weight when supporting a body, and although this might then be considered 
a judgment of experience, one that suggests that all perceiving agents supporting 
bodies must feel weight when doing so, this is not the reported judgment in a 
judgment of experience.  It is, rather, a qualitative, hypothetical description of an 
individual‟s experience.  Judgments of experience, on the other hand, are not about 
the perceiving being‟s states, but are, rather, predications about the object of 
experience e.g. Bodies are heavy.  This distinction allows Kant to delve more deeply 
in to possible types of judgments and to differentiate between the so-called subjective 
judgments from objective ones.  Kant‟s chief concern in the B-deduction, as it was in 
the A version, is to focus on objective judgments and to qualify how such judgments 
may be deemed truly objective, and by making this distinction, he believes he might 
more easily delineate how such judgments are possible. 
It is by narrowing his focus to logical functions of judgment that Kant will 
able to clarify more readily how judgments can be objective, and, Kant believes, 
demonstrate how categories necessarily factor into making judgments of experience.   
The means by which “a manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or 
concepts) is brought under one apperception” is the act of the understanding Kant 
describes as “the logical function of judgment.”383  A logical function of judgment is 
the determination of a manifold as a single representation and the presentation of such 
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to apperception.  The means by which these representations are presented to 
apperception is through the categories, which “are just these functions of judgment in 
so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of given intuition.”384  
Unfortunately, this is Kant at his clearest regarding the relationship between the 
categories and judgments in the B-deduction.  Of note here is that Kant‟s explanation 
reinforces the A-deduction and the need for a deduction of the table of judgments as 
well as the table of categories in relation to judgments.  Simply describing categories 
as representations of judgment to apperception still allows Kant‟s critics to demand 
some explanation of the completeness and a priority of both tables.  Kant promises to 
give more in the observation for §20, but only manages to recapitulate what the A-
deduction already informed us, namely, that one “must abstract from the mode in 
which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely 
to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, 
enters into the intuition… its unity is no other than that which the category prescribes 
to the manifold of a given intuition in general.”385  Even in the B-edition, Kant still 
seems in need of an explanation of what these general unities consist and from 
whence they are drawn. 
The B-deduction, despite its lack of demonstrating the connection between the 
table of judgments and table of categories—precisely the same lack we find in the A-
deduction, and markedly pointed out by Kant‟s critics—continues the need for a 
metaphysical deduction of the categories.  Moreover, Kant‟s revision presents some 
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disturbing differences, differences that might appear as inconsistent with his original 
position. Two such differences between the A and B editions are 1) the change in 
Kant‟s terminology regarding the imagination, which involves glossing over 
seemingly pivotal remarks from the A-edition and 2) the addition of further roles e.g. 
figurative and intellectual syntheses.  And yet, I would like to contend that the 
editions are complementary.  Both editions admit and argue the need for a 
transcendental unity of apperception and the correlation between experience and this 
signal requirement.  Having entered his revised deduction by different means, and 
establishing this key doctrine, Kant revisits the three-fold synthesis enumerated in the 
A-deduction, but in abbreviated form.  Rather than recount the three associative 
processes necessary for cognition, Kant summarizes them under the heading of 
figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa).  Figurative synthesis is the “synthesis of the 
manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and a priori.”386   
To put into relief this newly dubbed synthesis, Kant contraposes figurative 
synthesis with intellectual synthesis.  The latter “is thought in the mere category in 
respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination 
through the understanding alone.”387  Prima facie, figurative synthesis appears to be 
the combinatory process responsible for the liaison between concepts and intuitions, 
of the sort that Kant described in the three processes listed at the opening of the A-
deduction.  Additionally, intellectual synthesis appears to be the power of judgment 
as it concerns merely the forms of thought i.e. the logical forms of judgment.  The 
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former concerns itself with knowledge, the latter with thinking.  This distinction 
between knowability and thinkability is one sometimes overlooked in this discussion, 
but for the purposes of drawing distinctions between these two forms of synthesis it 
proves helpful (and it will have profound implications for the transcendental 
dialectic).  For knowledge to obtain, Kant is adamant, two factors are involved, “first, 
the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and 
secondly, the intuition, through which it is given.”388  Yet, if no intuition can be given 
that corresponds to the concept, “the concept would still indeed be a thought.”389  
Figurative synthesis is the process(es) by which intuition(s) are given to the 
understanding, which has its own synthesis responsible for the production of the 
categories, which can be thought, but never given as an intuition.  Figurative 
synthesis corresponds to the production of a synthetically unified manifold in the 
form of an image for representation to the understanding from the A-edition through 
associative processes and hence is a modified explanation of various uses of 
imagination.  
Kant concedes that  both species of synthesis are transcendental, that is, 
necessary in order for knowledge to obtain, figurative synthesis responsible for 
providing the content of knowledge, intellectual synthesis responsible for providing 
the forms necessary to organize the content of knowledge claims.  We could 
approximate the functions of figurative synthesis as providing a presentation of 
intuition and intellectual synthesis as providing the logical forms of judgment as we 
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have found the imagination described in the A-edition.  “Both are transcendental, not 
merely as taking place a priori (as we found in his principled argument of the A-
deduction of the necessity of the three syntheses in determination of the three 
ecstasies of time and the necessity of logical forms of judgment provided by the 
original deduction provided above), but also as conditioning the possibility of other a 
priori knowledge.”390    And yet, Kant interposes between these two syntheses a third, 
one in which “the figurative synthesis is directed merely to the synthetic unity of 
apperception.”391  Such attentiveness Kant describes as the “transcendental synthesis 
of imagination.”  In this capacity, “imagination is the faculty of representing in 
intuition an object that is not itself present.”392  Just what the figurative synthesis as 
imagination is representing that is not present is entirely unclear.  According to my 
interpretation, it is precisely the novel deduction above and by providing an 
explanation for how the categories are presented, although no object of experience is 
present, the imagination takes center stage as a necessary, productive process for 
cognition.  Such an interpretation finds support in Kant‟s next claim that the  
imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it 
can give to the concepts (read logical judgments) of understanding a 
corresponding intuition belongs to sensibility.  But inasmuch as its 
synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and 
not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to 
determine sense a priori in respect of its form (read categories) in 
accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent 
a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of 
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intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination.
393
 
 
This dense passage isolates imagination in many of its roles as well as develops the 
fundamentality in all aspects of cognition.  In its ability to present intuitions, the 
imagination must synthesize the deliverances of the senses; in its ability to present the 
logical forms of judgment by means of intellectual synthesis (only suggested by Kant, 
but shown by my own deduction) the imagination must synthesize the possible forms 
of thinking; in its ability to produce the categories, the imagination synthesizes the 
judgments with the forms of intuition; and in its role of joining intuitions and 
categories, the imagination produces schemata
394
 by which intuition can be brought 
into homogeneity with the categories.  As the faculty responsible for synthesis in 
general, the imagination proves to be a vital function in cognition.  Thus, while Kant 
explicitly drops the three-fold synthesis and much of the imagination in favor of 
figurative and intellectual synthesis and emphasizes the transcendental unity of 
apperception in the B-edition, he does not emend his work in a way that removes the 
imagination from any part of his analysis.  What Kant presents is a less developed but 
more reader friendly version of the deduction, one that can clarify the grounds 
argument of the transcendental deduction, but this version must necessarily involve 
the imagination.   
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Critics and Defenders 
 
After such work, Kant is now in position to answer some of his harshest 
critics. The success of his deduction, we may even conjecture the project of the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements seems to be plausible, and is based upon an 
exegesis of the imagination as a discrete faculty, but one functionally connected with 
both sensibility and understanding.  At this point in time we may defend Kant from 
his accusers and note interesting parallels between my interpretation and others 
sympathetic to defending Kant.  
Of authors that attend to the Transcendental Deduction, Peter Strawson is 
rather harsh in his evaluation of the success and importance of Kant‟s arguments in 
either edition.  Strawson concludes that Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction is a failure 
in determining the objective validity of the categories.  This evaluation is precipitate 
upon two important interpretations Strawson attributes to the 1
st
 Critique.  In The 
Bounds of Sense, Strawson in careful to provide a guide of his interpretation of Kant, 
arguing for “two faces” of the Critique, only one of which he wishes to promote and 
defend.  Strawson wishes to separate Kant‟s doctrine of transcendental idealism—
which amounts to attributing, according to Strawson, to our own cognitive 
constitution the limiting or necessary features of experience
395—from a metaphysics 
of science that is available in Kant so long as one adheres to an austerer 
interpretation.  This latter task, the one proper to Kant studies according to Strawson, 
permits the reader to embrace the Copernican revolution without slipping into what 
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Strawson believes is the speculative realm of transcendental idealism.  An austere 
reading of Kant argues that “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, 
employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or 
experiential conditions of their application.”396  Upon such a reading, the notion of 
forms of intuition, having no empirical referent, becomes meaningless and thus 
should be abandoned in favor of concepts to which we can make direct reference.  In 
addition, the second important consideration when discussing Strawson‟s 
interpretation of Kant‟s philosophy lies in the advancement of the function and use of 
logic to which Strawson has access by the time of his writing.   Strawson will 
elaborate not Kant‟s understanding, but his own, which he believes finds application 
in the logic advanced and employed by the middle of the 20
th
 Century.  Strawson 
identifies two principles of logic that will govern his evaluation of the transcendental 
table of logical judgments and arguments based upon its establishment.  The two, 
basic ideas of logic Strawson cites are 1) truth-functionality and 2) quantification.  
While these notions were available to Kant, at least the second of these two, they are 
not the principles Kant cites directly and, consequently, will color the evaluation and 
interpretation of Kant‟s doctrines.  The overall evaluation Strawson attributes to the 
success of Kant‟s philosophy will take us too far afield at this point, and yet his 
evaluation of Kant‟s deductions will prove helpful in uncovering difficulties and 
ambiguities found in the text. 
 To quote the Oxford professor in full: 
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Such analytical argument as we can find is conducted at dizzying 
heights of abstractness and generality; it is intertwined with the 
elaboration of the subjectivity thesis, the transcendental psychology of 
faculties; for anything detailed of specific by way of conclusion, it 
depends entirely on the derivation of a list of categories from the forms 
of judgment... the Deduction leaves us favorably entertaining rather 
than wholly possessed or persuaded of [the argument for the objective 
validity of the categories].
397
 
 
What Strawson indicates in these concluding remarks is Kant‟s reliance on the 
categories on judgment and the nebulous connection between the table of judgments 
and the table of categories.  That a derivation of the categories depends on the table of 
judgments has been noted above.  Also as noted above, should such a derivation of 
the categories from the table of judgments prove tenable, the a priori nature of 
categories as well as the necessity of them for cognition will be established.  Thus 
Strawson‟s critique is really one not concerning the Transcendental Deduction, but, 
rather, a critique of the Metaphysical Deduction, wherein Kant putatively indicates 
the reliance of the categories on the table of judgments.  And having provided such a 
deduction, the sting of Strawson‟s critique will be ameliorated.  Strawson himself 
notes that if the Metaphysical Deduction is successful, the objective validity of the 
categories is established.  He continues to suggest that should such a derivation 
obtain, the Transcendental Deduction becomes redundant, unless the argument arrives 
at the same conclusion, but from a different set of premises.
398
  Such a second 
argument is proper and necessary, according to Strawson, because “the appeal to 
formal logic produced virtually no result… the attempt to derive categories from the 
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notion of objective judgment was a failure.”399  That is, a Transcendental Deduction 
is necessary because of Kant‟s failure in the Metaphysical Deduction. 
 And yet, for Strawson, the Transcendental Deduction fares little better than 
Kant‟s Metaphysical Deduction.  In part this critique stems from Strawson‟s 
interpretation regarding the aims and sufficiency of a demonstration of objective 
validity.  According to Strawson, objective validity is “the necessary applicability of 
categories to appearances, to the objects of experience.”400 This definition of 
objective validity will come to be challenged by figures like Henry Allison, who 
argue that demonstration of the applicability of categories is the second half of a two 
part argument in the Transcendental Deduction.  The first half is to demonstrate the 
necessity of the categories “with respect to objects of sensible intuition in general.”401  
The second half, Allison argues, is the task cited by Strawson, to demonstrate the “the 
necessity of the categories with respect to human sensibility and its data.”402  This 
second task is what Allison describes as the objective reality of the categories, one 
with which Kant is concerned, but a different argument than that of objective reality.  
Much of the contention relies upon interpretations of Kant‟s stated task; to “prove 
that by their [the categories] means alone an object can be thought.”403  Allison‟s 
argument amounts to dividing the Transcendental Deduction into two parts, the first 
of which is to demonstrate the a priori necessity, and hence validity, of the categories 
in order to think any object in general, the second to demonstrate the application of 
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the categories to human intuitions and the objects found therein.  By limiting himself 
to the second of these two tasks, Strawson concedes Kant‟s argument for the 
transcendental unity of apperception,
404
 but overlooks the importance of this unity in 
grounding and demonstrating the necessity of the categories.   
 One might go even further and suggest that Strawson‟s demands for objective 
validity of categories is actually a misplaced demonstration, one which Kant will 
provide in part in the Schematism and then fully in the Analytic of Principles.  
Strawson‟s definition of objective validity draws from Cohen‟s reverse reading of the 
Transcendental Analytic and presupposes applicability before demonstrating the a 
priori nature of the categories and the objective validity that obtains at the most 
general and abstract levels, that is, prior to application.  What Kant is demanding in 
the Transcendental Deduction is not concrete examples of the application of the 
categories, but the necessity of the categories, demonstrated priori to any empirical 
experience.  Strawson, it would seem, has placed the cart before the horse. 
 This tacit strategic approach, along with Strawson‟s stipulations of formal 
logic, also informs his evaluation of the metaphysical deduction.  According to 
Strawson‟s austere reading of Kant‟s doctrines, a metaphysical deduction must be one 
that is devoid of spatio-temporal considerations.
405
  To argue for this seemingly 
implausible analysis of the metaphysical deduction, Strawson cites the relevant 
passage at A76/B102 between general and transcendental logic.  At this point 
Strawson stresses the doctrine that transcendental logic contains the notion of “the 
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synthetic unity of the manifold in an intuition in general.”406  Strawson continues by 
pointing out that the categories as presented in the metaphysical deduction are not 
schematized categories and thus have no temporal conditions.  
 But what Strawson fails to note, thereby preventing him from seeing the 
original presentation of deduction of the categories and table of judgments, is the 
differentiation between the unity of the manifold in general, as presented in the 
metaphysical deduction, and the narrowing of categories in the schematism to attend 
to the temporal structures necessary to provide rules for application to particular 
objects.  In the metaphysical deduction, the role of time and space is the general and a 
priori presentation of any possible manifold, in the schematism the role of time is the 
structural rules of temporality that provide the possibility for the generalized (read 
universal) categories of the understanding to be applied to particular objects.  
Moreover, Strawson‟s emphasis on the unity of the manifold quoted above appears to 
disregard, or at least fails to fully comprehend, Kant‟s own discussion of 
transcendental logic when Kant states transcendental logic “has lying before it a 
manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by the transcendental aesthetic… Space 
and time contain a manifold of pure, a priori intuition.”407 To exclude time and space 
from consideration in the metaphysical deduction overlooks the role of formal 
intuitions as presented by the imagination in the derivation and elaboration of both 
the table of logic and categories.  Thus by providing the complete list of possible 
“objects” according to the parameters of space and time by the productive 
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imagination, we can provide a metaphysical deduction to which Strawson will 
disagree, but on specious interpretive grounds.  By employing the logical principles 
available to Kant, and eliding the logical notions Strawson wishes to replace them 
with in his reconstruction and evaluation of failure, Strawson‟s evaluation of the 
metaphysical deduction can be refuted. 
 Even with such a refutation, the charge of redundancy must be addressed.  
Strawson has charged that if the metaphysical deduction was a success, in terms of 
proving the necessity of the categories in cognition, the transcendental deduction 
would have been redundant.  This charge is dependent upon Strawson‟s peculiar, 
austere, interpretation of the task set out by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction.   If 
the task demanded by the deductions is to prove the application of the categories to 
objects of experience, it would appear Strawson is still correct in denying the success 
of the deduction.  When the task is divided into the two part system provided by 
Allison, Strawson himself provides a way out of his own charge of redundancy.  By 
affirming the necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception, and by forcing 
him to concede the original metaphysical deduction provided here, Strawson‟s own 
evaluation of starting at new premises to arrive at the necessity of the categories is 
imminent.  The starting point of the metaphysical deduction is the forms of space and 
time, the imagination and the logical table of judgments.  What Kant‟s transcendental 
deduction provides is a missing premise regarding the individual in which the 
cognitive processes inhere.  The Transcendental Deduction, therefore, provides not a 
new deduction of the categories, but, rather, argues for the missing premise that 
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permits the universality of the deduction of the categories for all rational beings that 
are subject to the conditions of sensibility with which we find ourselves equipped.  
Such an approach strengthens the necessity of the Transcendental Deduction and 
illustrates that, rather than a redundancy, it is integral to Kant‟s transcendental 
argumentation to delimit the conditions of cognition.    
 One further point that does not permit Strawson to understand the importance 
and mechanism behind both the Transcendental and Metaphysical Deductions is his 
relegation of the imagination to a second-class faculty rather than one in its own 
right.
408
  This interpretation appears to be the natural consequence of Strawson‟s 
reliance upon the B-edition deduction.  Because of the emphasis Kant places on the 
transcendental unity of apperception and its subsequent revision in the B-edition, 
which downplays the role of the imagination, Strawson interprets the imagination to 
be a function of the understanding.  Because Kant deletes the exposition of the three 
temporal ec-stasies with their emphasis on synthesis of manifold, memories and 
recognition, the second edition of the 1
st
 Critique lends itself to such an interpretation.  
But careful attention to the heart of the B-edition deduction, §24, does not warrant the 
demotion of the imagination to an auxiliary of understanding.  It is in this section, 
entitled The Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General, that 
Strawson‟s chief concern lay, and his treatment of the imagination overlooks the 
fundamentality of imagination in the process(es) of synthesis.  It is to be noted that 
the imagination is responsible for the synthesis of categories and the deliverances of 
the senses—the very formulation Strawson describes as the goal of the deduction, 
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objective validity.  If we recall, Kant indicates that it is the function of the 
imagination to effect the figurative synthesis necessary to combine categories with 
the object presented in the sensibility in order for cognition to obtain, first by 
synthesizing the deliverances of the senses into a unity, then by presenting such a 
unity for subsumption under the categories as an image and finally as the act of 
synthesis connecting the appropriate schemata to the image.  If Strawson‟s concern is 
with the application of the categories, such an oversight appears to undermine any 
sympathy to the text.   
 But perhaps Strawson is concerned in his austere interpretation to connect the 
categories, albeit dubious in his mind, with the givenness of the objects in 
appearance.  In point of fact, the bulk of Strawson‟s analysis appears to be a defense 
of this very Kantian precept in the face of sense-data theorists and their claim that all 
concepts are the product of abstraction from empirical data.  He argues that the 
deliverances of the senses are “discrete, single, separate, without complexity.”409  
Any complexity is the product of synthesis, performed by the understanding with the 
help of its “lieutenant, imagination.”  And yet, it is at this point that Strawson‟s 
strategy exposes its interpretive weakness again.  Rather than focusing on the 
production of the categories, and the role of imagination in doing so, Strawson 
overlooks the process of pure synthesis in favor of the syntheses involved in 
empirical judgment.  He is willing to concede Kant‟s doctrine that “‟pure‟ synthesis is 
involved also in the generation of the unity of the „pure manifold‟ of space and time,” 
but fails to appreciate this doctrine in terms of a derivation of the categories.  This is, 
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in part, because of Strawson‟s rejection of transcendental idealism in favor of his 
austere interpretation that attempts to confine Kant to an emender of sense-data 
theories of concepts and author of bloated faculty psychologies.  In doing so, 
Strawson will reject any discussion of pure, a priori syntheses and subsequently any 
employment of the imagination in its pure form.  By relegating the imagination to a 
sub-faculty of the understanding, employed only in the figurative syntheses of 
empirical judgments, Strawson overlooks the most critical insight of the Copernican 
revolution and the point behind Kant‟s treatment of intellectual syntheses in 
illustration of the deduction of categories from the form of intuitions in general from 
the Metaphysical Deduction. 
 With Henry Allison‟s interpretation and defense of Kant‟s transcendental 
idealism, we find a more sympathetic read of Kant‟s Metaphysical and 
Transcendental Deductions, but one which suffers from problems similar to 
Strawson‟s.  By distinguishing the two different steps in the argument of Kant‟s 
Transcendental Deduction, Allison is able to differentiate himself from Strawson‟s 
position and errors, but by emphasizing the B-deduction, Allison himself overlooks 
the role of imagination in  intellectual synthesis, and hence does not perceive the 
fundamentality of the imagination in a deduction of the categories.  
 Allison interprets Kant‟s stated goal of the Transcendental Deduction in a 
much more sympathetic light, granting to Kant the claim that the goal of the 
deduction is to demonstrate the conditions for the possibility for cognition, and by 
what right we have to claim them as necessary.  But to do so, Allison makes the 
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distinction between the a priori right to claim the transcendental unity of apperception 
as a condition for cognition and the a priori right to claim the application of the 
categories to the deliverances of the senses in human cognition.  Allison affirms the 
success of the former, the objective validity of the categories in conjunction with 
apperception, but not the latter, the objective reality of the categories.  In doing so, 
Allison makes an important and interesting observation about objective validity and 
objective reality, which in turn has consequences regarding the objects to which the 
categories apply.  In an attempt to make clear this difficult distinction I will quote the 
rather lengthy passage from Allison.   
Using the legalistic metaphor suggested by the notion of validity 
(Gultigkeit), we can also say that a judgment is objectively valid if the 
synthesis of representations which it contains is “grounded” or 
“legitimate.”  The objective validity of the categories is to be 
explained in terms of their role in judgment.  Thus to say that the 
categories are objectively valid is to claim that they make possible, 
“ground,” or “legitimate” an objectively valid synthesis of 
representations.
410
  But since it is only in and through judgments that 
we represent objects, the objective validity of the categories can also 
be said to consist in the fact that they are necessary conditions for the 
representation of objects.   
     By contrast, the notion of objective reality has an ontological sense.   
To claim a concept has objective reality is to claim that it refers or is 
applicable to an object.  Thus a fictional concept, such as a „unicorn,‟ 
would not have objective reality, although it could very well function 
as a predicate in an objectively valid judgment, such as „unicorns do 
not exist.‟  In the case of the categories, which alone concern us here, 
the claim of objective reality is equivalent to the claim that they have a 
reference or applicability to whatever objects are given to us in 
intuition (objects of possible experience).
 411
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One important point to note here is the connection Allison draws between the 
objective validity of the categories with their employment in valid judgments 
(arguments).  In order to draw this connection, Allison relies upon the judgments 
found in the table of logical judgments, much as we have for the original deduction 
presented above.  Important to notice here is Allison‟s contention that the categories 
must be legitimated or grounded in order to be objectively valid in judgment, but 
Allison fails to provide any grounding other than the necessary, unified consciousness 
in which such judgments may obtain.  Allison argues the categories are employed 
in/by such a consciousness, but whence the categories is still left in question.  
Furthermore, because the objective reality of the categories, the actual use of the 
categories in empirical experience, depends upon the objective validity and the 
legitimacy of the categories, by failing to provide a transcendental deduction 
determining whence the categories, the second half of Allison‟s distinction will 
obviously fail.  Without demonstrating the source(s) and necessity of the categories in 
connection with the possibility of receptivity, Kant‟s conceptual and sensible stems of 
knowledge will fail to be aligned.  Allison‟s proof strategy falls short of providing 
this connection, while the one I have provided attempts to bridge this connection. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
objective reality and objective  validity, and then, in his conclusion, deems that the categories are 
objectively valid in a “judgmental or logical sense” but “fails to demonstrate that the categories make 
experience possible.”  This shift in goals obscures Allison‟s analysis; objective reality cannot be 
equated with the reportedly failed second task of Kant‟s deduction.  The legitimacy or grounding of 
categories in apperception Allison argues for convincingly.  What Allison‟s strategy lacks however is 
the proper understanding of the connection of apperception and the forms of intuition.  The arguments 
for apperception are similar to those for the forms of intuition; both are transcendental arguments, but 
neither of which we directly experience.  We never experience the transcendental unity of 
apperception, although we may experience the synthetic unity of apperception as a representation in 
cognition through the unification of ec-stasies of time.  Likewise, we never experience the form of 
intuition, although Kant does seem to make allowances for a formal intuition.  Cf. §24 B160-161.  
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 The true difficulty in Allison‟s interpretation and judgment concerning Kant‟s 
Transcendental Deduction is the shortcoming that we find in Kant.  Allison‟s 
faithfulness to the transcendental deduction precludes him from discovering the 
logical forms of formal intuition.  And without doing so, Allison is beholden to a 
doctrine that the categories govern apperception, apprehension and empirical 
intuition.  He is correct to specify that judgments concerning these facets of cognition 
are governed by the conceptual apparatus necessary to make synthetic, empirical 
judgments, but mistaken in his assessment that all synthesis is governed by the 
categories.  In one respect, prior to explicitation of the categories Kant provides, we 
find the forms of intuition synthesized in formal intuitions that may obtain prior to the 
categories Kant provides.  Recognizing these formal intuitions conceptually appears 
to be the difficult task at hand if there are no categories to govern such recognition.  
Thus Allison argues that any recognition of formal intuition must be category 
governed.  And yet, in the table of judgments, Kant is not employing the categories 
per se, but, rather, determining the concepts available to human cognition by 
providing an exhaustive account of the ways in which formal intuitions may be 
manifest.  If the difference between the table of judgments and table of categories is 
correct as I have presented it, the categories do not govern the table of judgments, but 
are, rather, the temporalization and spatialization of the judgments found in formal 
intuition.   Certainly, the categories appear to be co-occurrent with the forms of 
logical judgment, or, at least they follow immediately upon the re-spatialization and 
re-temporalization of the judgments to bring them closer to objects of empirical 
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experience.  With this re-re-spatialization and re-temporalization, we are no longer 
dealing with formal intuitions, but with the abstract concepts that necessarily follow 
from the logical judgments.  No longer are the judgments mere forms of logical 
judgment, that is of objects in general; by introducing the forms of intuition again, 
they move beyond logical form to conceptual generalities, categories.   
 The approach I have taken is the inverse of Allison‟s.  Rather than 
generatively describing the categories, Allison takes them as primitives connected 
with the forms of judgment (and he is correct to emphasize the connection with the 
categories).  In doing so, Allison argues all syntheses are products of productive 
imagination and are category-governed.
412
  This peculiarity forces Allison to describe 
the synthesis required by the transcendental unity of apperception to be category 
governed, and thereby displaces the grounding legitimacy of the categories in 
transcendental apperception.  Likewise, apprehension, even the unity of apprehension 
in immediate object presentation, is category governed.  This forces Allison to 
overlook the synthesis that takes place at the level of sensibility in presenting a 
unified manifold to the understanding, a synthesis operating in formal intuitions and 
the logical judgments that are precipitate.  In short, Allison‟s commitment to 
conceptual primitives without explanation forces him into a position that suggests 
conceptual organization at all levels of cognition.  It would seem to be, for Allison, 
concepts all the way down.  My approach, on the other hand, permits synthesis of 
varying sorts, at varying levels.  The imaginative synthesis operating in formal 
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intuition is not concept governed in my approach.  Rather, it is the synthesis that 
provides unity of a manifold considering the formal presentation of an “object” in 
space and time, not any empirical object, but the formal intuition that elicit logical 
judgments concerning identity and non-contradiction that can in turn be elaborated 
into the list of twelve Kant provides.  Formal intuitions, intellectual though they may 
be, require a synthesis that is not the understanding joining concepts with the 
deliverances of the senses.  This intellectual synthesis is generative of the table of 
judgments and, subsequently, the table of categories.   If the productive imagination, 
and the reproductive imagination for that matter, are operative, at times extra-
conceptually, at others conceptually, we can support Kant‟s many claims about 
varying syntheses, but also unify the two stems of knowledge under one root.  
Allison, it would seem, would have that root be the understanding.
413
  In doing so he 
subsumes all syntheses under a single, conceptually-governed activity, that betrays 
Kant‟s own descriptions (primarily from the A-edition).  Rather than apperception 
being the condition that accounts for the unity of time, Allison interprets the unity of 
time as the sufficient condition of the unity of apperception.  Furthermore, the unity 
of time is the basis for the categories and Allison would also have the categories 
providing the ground of apperception, a direct contradiction of Kant‟s stated purpose 
in the transcendental deduction.   
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 At the same time, Allison is willing to concede the “doctrine that the 
unification or determination of time is produced by the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination.”414  But this concession does little to explain Allison‟s position that all 
synthesis is category governed.  In point of fact, it presents a trenchant difficulty in 
trying to reconcile these two aspects of Allison‟s interpretation.  If the imagination is 
a sub-faculty of understanding, and the imagination is responsible for the synthesis 
required for the unity of time that enables the unity of apperception, it would seem 
that all syntheses are category governed.  By arguing for an extra-conceptual 
synthesis that provides the unity of time in an infinite given magnitude, while at the 
same time maintaining synthesis is category governed, Allison appears to provide an 
inconsistent position on the proper role and constraints governing synthesis in 
general.  By distinguishing between types of syntheses, both extra-conceptual as well 
as category governed, and the distinction between imagination in its productive 
capacity from that of its reproductive capacity, my interpretation can ameliorate this 
difficulty in Kant‟s text and Allison‟s interpretation.    
 The only place Allison will rely upon the imagination  is to attempt to prove 
the objective reality of the categories, and he will inevitably deem this argument a 
failure.  And yet, in doing so, he overlooks the imagination in its original and 
fundamental function, its functions both in the transcendental unity of apperception 
and in the determination of judgment and categories.  In short, he makes the same 
interpretive error that Strawson commits by relegating the imagination to a sub-
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function of the understanding, allocating its employment in figurative synthesis alone 
and failing to account for it in intellectual synthesis. 
 In a more recent study of the deduction and logical table of judgments, 
Beatrice Longuenesse (1998) follows Allison‟s guide and interprets the pivotal 
section of the 1
st
 Critique in light of syllogistic logic, but approaches the subject in a 
novel way.  Longuenesse proposes that “neither the argument of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories… nor the System of Principles of the Pure 
Understanding, can be understood unless they are related, down to the minutest 
details of their proofs, to the role that Kant assigns the logical forms of our 
judgments, and to the manner in which he establishes the table of categories or pure 
concepts of the understanding according to the „guiding thread‟ of these logical 
forms.”415  In opposition to Cohen and his intellectual heir Strawson, Longuenesse 
defends Kant from their backwards reading, whereby they start with empirical 
concepts and their application in the principles and subsequently work backward to 
prove the validity of the categories.  Rather, Longuenesse begins with the 
Metaphysical Deduction and attempts to find the logical forms that inform the 
production of the categories.   
 Longuenesse begins this process by pointing out that logic, for Kant, means 
the “universal rules of discursive thought.”  She asserts that, despite Kant‟s 
suggestion in both the 1
st
 Critique and the Prolegomena, the logical table of 
judgments is not merely the collocation and emendation of logical forms of syllogistic 
logic, although they do inform the production of the forms of discursive thought.  For 
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Longuenesse, the logical forms Kant indicates are the product of a process similar to 
that of the construction of mathematical concepts.  But unlike mathematical concepts 
logical judgments are entirely discursive and not intuitive.  This interpretation grants 
Kant success, albeit too concisely/briefly stated in the metaphysical deduction, and 
consequently success in the Transcendental Deduction because the legitimacy of the 
categories has been demonstrated priori.  This interpretation follows Allison‟s lead in 
reevaluating the purpose of the Transcendental Deduction by sympathizing with 
Kant‟s stated purpose.  Unlike Allison, however, the argument for the universality of 
the logical forms and the argument for their functional identity with the categories 
permits Longuenesse to affirm the objective reality of the categories and not only 
their objective validity.  Because the logical forms of judgment are the means by 
which all thought is organized in discursive thought, by the addition of the forms of 
pure intuition, the categories become the means by which intuitions are thought in the 
understanding, hence their necessary application is ensured. 
 One difficulty with Longuenesse‟s argument centers around the content of 
discursive thought.  One facile objection questions what the content of these concepts 
employed in discursive might be.  Certainly, so the objection runs, in the employment 
of discursive thinking, we are employing concepts; but concepts of what?  As the 
“form of thinking in general” these concepts cannot have empirical content, lest they 
be concepts of particulars and lose the very aspect Longuenesse relies upon to 
determine the universal validity of the judgments and categories.    To address this 
difficulty, Longuenesse characterizes the contents of discursive thought as “concepts 
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in a judgment to something represented by „x‟ or „x, y, z‟.”416  By presenting 
variables as the objects available to discursive thought, Longuenesse follows Kant‟s 
prescription for the contents of intellectual synthesis, thus removing any empirical 
content of particular objects.  In so doing, Longuenesse can affirm the a priori nature 
of discursive thought and the forms of transcendental logic while still retaining the 
ability to provide different objects under such cognition.  However, this description 
highlights the difficulty in providing concepts, reportedly devoid of content, while 
still stipulating the possibility of making distinctions.  In order to represent “x” or “x, 
y, or z”, Longuenesse must still be employing, at minimum, the concept of a 
singularity and plurality, two of the very concepts she is attempting to justify.  Even 
in the pure realm of discursive thinking, these concepts appear to be in employment 
and a deduction of them appears to be in order.  Thus by relying on the logical forms 
of judgment with variables designating distinctions between “objects” of 
consideration, even in discursive thinking alone, neither Longuenesse nor Kant can 
make the claims she tries to make of him.  Rather, some content must be employed in 
order to determine the forms of discursive thought.  By adding the formal 
requirements of space and time, as in the deduction I have provided above, we can 
emend the tremendously valuable work Longuenesse researched in order to determine 
how such concepts of singularity and plurality are able to be employed even in 
discursive thought alone.  This addition explains how one can discursively provide 
distinctions between variables „x, y, z‟ in order to distinguish between “objects” 
available to discursive cognition.   In doing so, one can highlight the role of the 
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imagination in its transcendental determination of logical judgments and thereby 
categories.   
 This brings us to one further point concerning Longuenesse‟s interpretation of 
Kant‟s doctrines.  Despite an even-handed approach to both versions of the 1st 
Critique, and thus avoiding the common critique of her predecessors, Longuenesse 
still interprets the transcendental imagination along similar lines as Allison and 
Strawson.  Both for them and for Longuenesse, the transcendental imagination of the 
A-edition becomes the synthesis speciosa, figurative synthesis, of the B-edition.  And 
while my interpretation above does concede the employment of imagination in 
synthesis speciosa, in both its reproductive and productive uses, it does not merely 
relegate imagination to this empirical employment.  The transcendental imagination 
also has its place in intellectual synthesis, the grounds for synthesis speciosa in the 
first place, by providing the forms of discursive thinking to begin with.  And while it 
may seem like the imagination is an inapt word for the a process whereby no images 
are actually in play (for that would still fall under the figures of figurative synthesis) 
it presents an opportunity to see Kant‟s use of imagination beyond the mere image 
making employment of his philosophical forebears.  In fact, it highlights the radical 
transformation of Kant‟s use of imagination- one by which it is in part responsible for 
the ways in which we both see and think our world. 
  
 
 
 257 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight: Is the Imagination a faculty, one or two? 
 
 In exploring the role of the imagination in the 1
st
 Critique, I have thus far 
treated the imagination as an independent faculty.  In fact, I have been treating the 
imagination as the faculty that mediates between Kant‟s well-established dualism, 
even suggesting that the imagination might be the mysterious root out of which the 
sensibility and understanding emerge.  However, that the imagination is independent 
is far from obvious when one investigates both Kant‟s works and commentary on 
such; that the imagination is the root faculty is nearly universally denied.  Several 
issues surround the imagination, and several reasons obscure the doctrine I have 
attempted to illustrate.  It is now to this presupposition I now wish to turn.   
 The chief reason for obscurity concerning the imagination as an independent 
faculty remains Kant‟s inconsistent and confusing references to this faculty in 
question.  The revisions to the Critique of Pure Reason—notably the revision to the 
Transcendental Deduction, wherein Kant employs the imagination—leave his reader 
wondering what work if any, it performs in the A-deduction and how this use is 
modified or supplemented in the B-edition.  In the preceding chapters, I have 
attempted to show a reconciliation and harmony between the editions, thereby 
attempting to alleviate this problem.  But, in addition to the revisions of the 1
st
 
Critique, Kant employs the imagination in his two subsequent Critiques.  By the time 
Kant writes the 3
rd
 Critique, he has nearly abandoned the language of sensibility and 
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passivity when describing the deliverances of the senses, favoring imagination as the 
faculty that presents the deliverances of the senses.  This shift in locution compounds 
the difficulty of discussing the imagination as a faculty in its own right, for in this 
later work it appears to be allied with sensibility.  The discrepancies between the A 
and B editions compounded by the seeming discrepancies with the terminology of the 
3
rd
 Critique present significant challenges to a unified theory of imagination in Kant‟s 
works.  There is, however, a possible resolution to these difficulties, and it is only by 
turning to these issues themselves that one can provide a coherent account that 
demonstrates the necessity of the imagination both as an independent faculty and as 
the root of the other faculties while satisfying the architectonic of Kant‟s dualism.  It 
is thus to the difficulties and reformulations Kant provides that I now wish to turn. 
 One of the most glaring changes Kant makes in his reformulation of the 
Transcendental Deduction is his departure from the three-fold synthesis with which 
he begins the A-edition.  The speculation about Kant‟s desire to present the ground of 
the categories i.e. the transcendental unity of apperception, in addition to a simpler 
version of synthesis at work in such an argument presents plausible reasons why Kant 
might abandon the three-fold synthesis of the A-edition in favor of two syntheses in 
the B-edition.  Yet another reason is the implications and perhaps confusion that 
arises from such syntheses.  Kant originally declares quite simply that “synthesis in 
general… is the result of the power of imagination.”417  But if one examines the three-
fold synthesis, one finds synthesis operating at all three levels, thus presenting an 
opaque doctrine that requires synthesis of the power of imagination at all three levels, 
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but only one to which Kant explicitly attributes synthesis by the imagination.  
Beginning with the first of the three-fold, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, 
the synthesis that obtains is an immediate, unified whole.
418
  Such a synthesis Kant 
appears to attribute to the sensibility, for it is by the deliverances of the senses that 
one is presented with a unified manifold of intuition(s), for it is not a synthesis 
enacted by the understanding‟s ability to bring particulars to judgment.  At first blush, 
such a synthesis effected by apprehension is a synthesis that obtains at the level of 
sensibility, hence the imagination might be associated with the faculty of sensibility.  
This need for a collocation of sensations is found in the epistemic strategies of 
empirical philosophies, and by declaring the synthesis required in apprehension, Kant 
echoes Aristotle and Aquinas without explicitly mentioning a sensus communis.  But 
this is precisely the idea Kant is promoting by arguing for a unified manifold given in 
apprehension that we understand to be comprised of data delivered by our discrete 
sense receptors. 
 When turning to the second of Kant‟s three-fold synthesis, the synthesis of 
reproduction in imagination, one finds explicit treatment of the imagination at work 
in providing presentation of objects no longer present.  One might call these 
occurrences memories, for that is spirit in which Kant employs reproductive 
imagination; unfortunately, Kant rarely makes use of the term.  Regardless of terms, 
however, we find Kant appealing to the classic definition of the imagination as the 
faculty responsible for the presentation of objects not present, or if present, attendant 
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parts no longer under the direct gaze of apprehension.
419
  Furthermore, Kant employs 
this reproductive imagination as a mediating faculty whose role is to mediate between 
immediately given sensation, former sensations, and their recognition as same, 
different or in reciprocity.  Such a use of the imagination reminds his audience of the 
pivotal role the imagination has played in nearly all the historical accounts, despite 
certain authors attempt to subordinate this vital function. 
 When turning to recognition, the third in his three-fold, one finds Kant‟s own 
development of synthesis in judgment.  Judgment belongs to the faculty of 
understanding properly, and, as such, synthesis appears to be allied with the 
understanding.  In bringing the deliverances of the senses together with the 
architecture of categories—that is, by subsuming the particular presentation of 
apprehension under concepts—judgments are formed e.g. in identification of an 
object, parts and wholes, or reciprocity.
420
  That such a synthesis is required for any 
identification and recognition is apparent, otherwise no object of experience 
obtains—literally, we would not recognize the object of experience delivered by 
sensation.  And yet, this proves a difficult doctrine to maintain.  If synthesis in 
general is the product of imagination, the imagination appears to be a function or 
species of the understanding.  The overriding concern in the three-fold synthesis is to 
provide an account for the presentation, recognition and possible reproduction of 
objects of experience for epistemic purposes, but Kant appears to have the 
imagination operating differently at various points in such an explanation.   
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 That the vagueness of such a doctrine vexes Kant remains a plausible 
suggestion for his reformulation of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition.  
No longer will Kant recount these syntheses, but will instead argue more 
straightforwardly for the transcendental unity of apperception as the main doctrine 
that grounds the objective validity of the categories.  And yet, in such an argument 
the imagination appears again, this time in the form of another ambiguity.  According 
to Kant the transcendental unity of apperception must be properly delineated, but to 
do so he makes recourse to the transcendental power of the imagination.  Such a 
function is the only a priori means by which he can argue for the unity of the “I think” 
that accompanies all experience.
421
  Since the transcendental power of imagination 
remains the function by which Kant explains the possibility of the transcendental 
unity of apperception, and this latter doctrine requires a pure, a priori explanation of 
any possible manifold (in this case the pure representation of the self as unified), Kant 
has recourse to a power of the imagination that is only intellectual.  Such a purely 
intellectual synthesis, and the judgment that the argument for the transcendental unity 
of apperception is successful by means of it, appears to be allied, once again with the 
understanding, thereby undermining the imagination‟s claim to independence.422  In 
contrast to such pure synthesis, Kant will find himself in need of an explanation of the 
deliverances of the senses, or intuitions of such deliverances, and does so by 
contraposing the intellectual synthesis with a figurative one.  The figurative synthesis 
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affords the presentation of a unified manifold in intuition.
423
  Accordingly, “since all 
our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under 
which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, 
belongs to sensibility.”424  Kant would thus seem to align imagination of the 
figurative variety with sensibility again.  However, “in as much as its synthesis is an 
expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable 
merely… the imagination… is an action of the understanding.”425  Because the 
presentation of senses to the understanding in the act of judging is a synthesis of 
spontaneity, the imagination cannot belong merely to sensibility, but appears to 
belong as a function of understanding.  Kant, it would appear, maintains that the 
imagination belongs to both sensibility and understanding.  Such a doctrine, however, 
will violate the strict dualism established earlier in Kant‟s analytic of principles. 
 By shifting locution in the 3
rd
 Critique, from an analysis of the passivity of 
sensibility and spontaneity of understanding, to an analysis of the products of 
imagination and concept formation found in the understanding, Kant will attempt to 
alleviate the confusion of the 1
st
 Critique.  However, he will, once again, muddy the 
waters when discussing the imagination.  Such a dualism between imagination and 
understanding might be construed as Kant‟s considered view, firmly placing the 
imagination in the service of sensibility.  But the nature of judgments discussed in the 
3
rd
 Critique suggests caution against such a strong interpretation.  Because Kant 
occupies himself with reflective judgments, judgments wherein the object is no longer 
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present or in reflection of an object of experience whereby one moves away from 
direct apprehension of the object to contemplation of it, what the dualism of 
imagination and understanding amounts to is only an attenuated dualism.  What the 
imagination presents in reflective judgment is the presentation of an object no longer 
present, which is tantamount to the presentation of reproduction, memory, found in 
the three-fold synthesis.  The shift in locution is only precipitated by a shift in 
judgments, not by any radical revision of Kant‟s terminology from the 1st Critique. 
 After the exercises of two deductions and a third critique, there appears to be 
three possible options available for Kant.  Kant can ally the imagination with 
sensation, thereby explaining much of the figurative synthesis and synthesis of 
apprehension; ally the imagination with understanding, thereby explaining intellectual 
synthesis and the spontaneity/activity found in judgments and the synthesis of 
recognition in concepts; or he may posit the imagination as a third faculty in its own 
right.  Each interpretation presents itself with a unique set of problems, but, I would 
like to contend, while the problems of two options are insurmountable difficulties to 
Kant‟s project, one option may be mitigated in such a way as to affirm Kant‟s 
doctrines. 
 If the imagination is to be allied with sensibility or explained as a sub-process 
of sensation, startling implications become apparent.  Should one interpret 
imagination as part of sensibility, Kant can easily explain the synthesis that obtains in 
apprehension.  The unified manifold that is immediate in apprehension is now easily 
explained by a form of synthesis exclusive to sensibility itself.  Such a manifold is 
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unified because sensations themselves are unified in the passive receptivity of the 
disparate sense receptors.   Furthermore, Kant gains a strong sense of the empirical 
reality to which he must appeal in order to establish the possibility of veritative 
judgments.  Judgments of objects of experience can be deemed true by referencing 
the unified object presented by the senses. To find the truth of a judgment, one would 
merely need to appeal to sensation.  It may be the case that the various sensations of 
the object are discrete, but if this interpretation is pursued, any such syntheses of 
discrete sensation obtains in the passivity of sensibility itself.  As such, the objects of 
experience are responsible for the syntheses and judgments concerning objects will 
have recourse to the very objects themselves as given in sensation.  If this 
interpretation is pursued, one makes Kant into an empiricist of the Lockean-Humean 
sort.  All synthesis obtains in sensation itself and inspection and judgments of objects, 
while properly the domain of understanding, is ultimately beholden to the passivity of 
sensation for verification.  All concepts thus become some translation of the object of 
experience into a representation available for inspection by the mind. In doing so, 
Kant will lose the ability to claim pure concepts by which we organize the world, and 
hence will not be able to effect the Copernican turn.  By allying imagination with 
sensibility Kant gains a strong empirical reality, but loses the transcendental ideality 
he so vociferously argues for. 
 If one allies the imagination with the understanding, however, the inverse 
obtains.  By making the imagination a sub-process of the understanding, Kant will be 
able to account for the spontaneity of the pure categories, for pure concept formation 
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and articulation will be entirely the domain of the understanding.  By possessing the 
power of synthesis, the activity of joining forms of intuition, empirical intuitions and 
concepts will be exclusively the activity of understanding.  By determining the 
imagination as a function of the understanding much of the murkiness of synthesis 
found in the deductions can be overcome, notably the synthesis of recognition in 
concepts and intellectual synthesis.  All synthesis, but most importantly, synthesis 
found in judgment can be easily explained as the product of the spontaneity of 
understanding.  But such an approach has its costs as well.  If Kant gains a strong 
sense of transcendental ideality by this interpretation, he does so at the sacrifice of 
empirical reality.  If all synthesis is the product of understanding, there remains no 
tribunal against which one can weigh the judgments being made.  Judgments may 
turn out to be mere figments of the imagination.  Indeed, such a strategy tilts Kant in 
the direction of the rationalist philosophy of the Wolffian-Leibnizian 
schulphilosophen against which Kant is also struggling.  Indeed, there seems to be no 
justification for the objective validity of the categories. 
 The third option available is to account for the imagination as an independent 
faculty; such a strategy, however, is also not without its difficulties.  By arguing for 
the imagination as an independent faculty, Kant will be able to explain memory more 
easily, and can do so along the lines illustrated by Hume.  Memory is a reproduction 
of the deliverances of the sense, a presentation of objects no longer present.  As such, 
memories are susceptible to various influences e.g. resemblance, deterioration etc.  
The main strategic benefit Kant can find in such an argument is the ability to maintain 
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the dualism between sensibility and understanding, while finding a mediator between 
the two.  If the imagination is an independent faculty the passivity of sensibility can 
be maintained and the spontaneity/activity of understanding can be affirmed, with the 
imagination providing the liaison between two such seemingly incommensurate 
capacities.  The drawback of maintaining the independence of the imagination is the 
loss of a principled explanation of how such a “blind but indispensible function of the 
soul” works, thereby losing an account of pure reason.  Since Kant‟s project is a 
critique of pure reason, in all its capacities, such a loss of appears unacceptable, lest 
we have at the most pivotal moment a faculty with no explanation or reason.  
Furthermore, by making the imagination a third faculty, albeit a mediating faculty, 
such a strategy will present difficulties in explaining the connection between the 
independent faculty of imagination and the other independent faculties; 3
rd
 man 
arguments will present intractable problems for such an explanation.  In the final 
analysis, it would appear that no strategy can maintain Kant‟s position while 
providing satisfactory explanations according to the architectonic Kant has 
established. 
 Commentary on this issue also provides little assistance in finding a suitable 
choice.  Briefly, there are roughly two camps within Kant scholarship, those that 
argue for the imagination as a discrete faculty independent of the understanding and 
those that argue the imagination as a sub-process of the understanding.   Much of the 
debate centers around a historical fact.  In his own copy of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant crossed out the word „soul‟ in the passage that attributes the 
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imagination to “a blind but indispensible function of the soul,” and replaced it with 
„understanding‟.   
            Sarah Gibbons, Rudolph Makkreel, Martin Heidegger, and John Llewelyn all 
seem to agree that the imagination is a separate and discrete faculty.  These authors 
typically cite the A-deduction and its emphasis on processes required to have a single 
presentation of the deliverances of the senses, prior to synthesis with concepts of the 
understanding as proof that the imagination is operative outside the parameters of the 
understanding.  Integral to such a thesis is the typical strategy that points out a 
distinction between a narrow and broad understanding of “understanding”.  When 
Kant emends his own personal copy of the 1
st
 Critique, his ascription of imagination 
to the understanding, this faction contends, is not to the specific faculty of the 
understanding per se, but, rather, to „understanding‟ meant as something like the 
„mind.‟ 426  What this faction fails to provide is answers to the protracted problem of 
the imagination as an independent faculty. 
On the other side of the debate, proponents of the sub-process thesis, people 
like Henry Allison, P.F. Strawson and Paul Guyer, cite Kant‟s emendation of his own 
copy of the 1
st
 Critique as incontrovertible proof that the imagination is merely a 
function of the understanding and deny the understanding possesses multiple 
meanings. Kant did cross out the word „soul‟ in the quote above and replaced it with 
„understanding‟.  Thus some commentary is convinced that the imagination is a sub-
process to the understanding.  The sub-process theorists, insist that the B-deduction 
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demonstrates that the imagination is only comprehensible when applied to processes 
of understanding and that two distinct faculties “fails totally to explain how one could 
„deduce‟ the pure concepts of the understanding from the table of logical 
judgments.”427  What this faction fails to demonstrate is any resolution to the 
protracted problems facing the strategy of imagination as a sub-process.   
What both factions have in common is the strategic error of examining this 
issue as an exclusive disjunction.  The factious nature of the debate has led both 
parties to set up the issue as sub-process or independent, and then, owing to 
proclivities, demonstrating the difficulties with the opposing faction‟s position.  With 
such intractable problems enumerated above, either faction concludes the absurdity of 
the other‟s position and thus affirms their own.  What is conspicuously missing is any 
positive resolution to the difficulties surrounding any given position. 
I believe, however, that one of the three strategies listed above may find such 
a positive resolution.  Such an interpretation still relies on the absurd consequences of 
the other two, but, with proper provisos may overcome the inherent difficulties of its 
own.  Arguing for the independence of the imagination is just such a strategy.  As 
Allison has noted, such a position has the difficulty of providing an explanation for 
the categories as well as a third man argument to overcome.       
While Allison‟s point concerning the difficulties of a „deduction‟ of the 
categories poses problems for the standard thesis regarding the independence of the 
imagination, the new deduction provided in chapter 7 not only demonstrates that the 
categories can be deduced from the logical table of judgments, but also point to the 
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need for imagination at work in a deduction of the table of judgments itself.  It is only 
with a separate faculty, one that is at work in exploring the possible combinations of 
the a priori forms of intuition that such a deduction of either tables is possible. The 
imagination in this capacity does operate within parameters, but the parameters are 
not of the understanding.  They are, rather, parameters established by reason and the 
forms of intuition.  Thus I believe the first obstacle can be overcome. 
The second obstacle, the one regarding the relationships between the 
understanding, sensibility and imagination can be mitigated if one adopts the position 
that the imagination is not merely the liaison between the two faculties, but the 
unknown and common root of them both.  Kant makes just such a suggestion in the 
introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason when he declares “that there are two 
stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps 
spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.”428   
Understanding the imagination as performing necessary functions in both 
sensibility and understanding allows us to comprehend Kant‟s claim.  When 
determining judgments, that is, by joining the deliverances of the senses with the 
concepts of understanding, there are two different and discrete faculties at work.  But 
in discovering the means through which both intuitions and pure concepts are 
accounted, the imagination takes center stage.  The imagination in its role in the 
presentation of a unified intuition; the imagination in its role of determining the 
categories of the understanding; and the role of the imagination as the faculty of 
synthesis in general, now permits us to understand what the common root of these 
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two stems of knowledge may be.  Kant has demonstrated the need for a synthesis in 
sensibility as well as a need to account for the synthesis found in acts of judgment.  
By taking the imagination as the root of both faculties, the syntheses found in the 
respective faculties becomes plausible.  No longer must one argue exclusively for 
synthesis in any of the faculties.  If the imagination is the root from which both 
sensibility and understanding spring, synthesis can plausibly be found in both.  In 
doing so, the obscurities found in the A-edition can be ameliorated.  The syntheses 
found in apprehension and the synthesis found in recognition can be viewed as the 
outgrowth of the synthesis found in imagination.  Thus Kant can maintain his claim 
that synthesis in general is the product of the imagination, while the specific 
syntheses, whether they be the immediacy of apprehension, category generation of 
the understanding, figurative synthesis or intellectual synthesis; all such syntheses are 
grounded upon and derivative from the transcendental power of imagination.   Such 
an interpretation promotes the hypothesis that the imagination finds employment in 
both sensibility and understanding.  Rather than describing the imagination at work in 
both stems of knowledge, one can assert that synthesis occurs in both stems because 
of a common root.  When examined from the stem of sensibility, the imagination 
finds itself at work in presenting a unified manifold, when examined from the 
understanding, the imagination also performs the necessary task of providing 
categories.  The common root between the two, the one that actually explains the 
common connection between two seemingly independent and incommensurate 
faculties is the imagination itself.  From a transcendental standpoint, the imagination 
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is a discrete faculty, but one which finds itself employed in both stems of human 
knowledge.  Because it is a common source for both stems of knowledge, the role of 
imagination as an independent faculty does not suffer greatly from any third man 
argument. 
Such a strategy does, however, bear one further relevant consideration.  Since 
Kant describes the imagination with such variety, the question remains whether it is a 
single, unified faculty or perhaps more than one.  Kant repeatedly cites the 
reproductive use of the imagination, most notably in the synthesis of imagination in 
reproduction.  When describing the imagination at work in the Transcendental 
Deduction, Kant prefers to describe the imagination as productive and even 
transcendental.  Such concerns, however, should trouble the reader very little.  The 
productive use of the imagination is the very transcendental power described in the 
unity of apperception, but, furthermore, is the transcendental power at work in the 
original deduction of the categories in chapter 7 section A.  By means of the 
transcendental use of imagination, one literally determines both the unity of the self 
as well as the conceptual architecture at work in cognition.  This productive and 
creative power establishes the grounds from which cognition is possible. By 
considering the historical use the imagination has traditionally been given, one can 
see Kant „s employment of the imagination in its reproductive role as complementary 
to the productive use found in Kant‟s (and my own) transcendental arguments.  The 
reproductive imagination represents objects no longer present.  Such representation is 
a presentation, hence reproduction is a production.  Much as Richard of St. Victor has 
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Bilhah as the handmaiden of reason, so too does the productive imagination have the 
reproductive imagination as a function of its employ.  The presentation of 
reproduction of previous delivered senses is simultaneously a production for a new 
presentation.  Thus we can see the imagination is an independent faculty, one which 
accounts for synthesis in varying capacities, and which unifies all syntheses under 
one faculty that is the root of Kant‟s dualism. 
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Chapter Nine: Imagination and Error Production 
 
Principled Error Production 
 
Even though Kant‟s critical reformulation finds a radical fundamentality and 
priority for imagination in the processes of cognition, in roles that are necessary for 
human knowledge to obtain, Kant is cognizant of the history of the imagination and 
the deceptive practices often attributed to it.  In uncovering and clarifying the 
elements necessary for human knowledge, the imagination has its proper place.  But, 
Kant will also observe that the imagination is prone to “daydream” and extend itself 
beyond experience.
429
  Despite its essential role in cognition, without proper 
parameters the imagination can also lead human knowledge astray.  After Kant has 
performed his critical analysis is the Transcendental Analytic, he turns his attention to 
mistaken judgments of cognition, and it is here also that we find the imagination at 
work, at work in a way not countenanced by Kant, but, rather, as a source for illusion. 
The Transcendental Dialectic is Kant‟s explanation and analysis of trenchant 
errors concerning metaphysical topics.  Such an exploration is a fitting discussion in 
Kant‟s philosophy, for Kant is attempting to perform a critique that “must set forth 
the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori through a deduction of these concepts” 
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and to “set forth the principles of their use, and finally the boundaries of that use.”430  
In other words, Kant attempts to ground metaphysics by determining the nature of 
human knowledge both in its construction as well as its limitations.  Delimiting 
metaphysics as a science will combat the illusions of the established 
schulphilosophen, and will determine the objects and topics about which humans may 
make knowledge claims.  
Metaphysics, as Kant conceives it, is “a natural predisposition of reason, but is 
also of itself dialectical and deceitful.”431  Such inquiries are “indispensable” to the 
vocation of reason, and human understanding gravitates towards speculation about 
“the totality of all possible experience.”432  As Kant understands the history, the 
discipline of metaphysics, both rationalist and empiricist, has consisted of speculation 
beyond the realm of human experience or a blatant appeal to probability and common 
sense.  Neither approach determines what topics are fitting for knowledge claims.  
The former extend too far; the latter fails to provide the necessity metaphysical 
knowledge seeks.  Kant sets about establishing metaphysics as a science that can 
dispense with the “ill-directed and fruitless cultivation” of ideas of pure reason in 
order to turn reason to a metaphysics “that will not deceive.”433  The common mistake 
in all inquiries concerning metaphysics up to Kant‟s critical philosophy was to make 
knowledge claims that regarded concepts and ideas concerning objects that are never 
experienced.  Speculation concerning notions such as God, freedom and the soul, as 
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well as the principle of sufficient reason, had long been in practice, but, Kant notes, 
had not made any progress since Aristotle.
434
  It is to just such ideas that Kant turns in 
his Transcendental Dialectic.  
In turning to such notions in the Dialectic, Kant does not wish to 
incontrovertibly refute the contents of such claims.  Rather, Kant wishes to determine 
whether any such metaphysical doctrines can be asserted as propositions of human 
knowledge.  His answer to such an inquiry is a resounding NO.  This is not to imply 
that such ideas do not prove useful.  Instead of asserting God, freedom and the soul as 
objects of human knowledge Kant will restrict their use in human thought.  He will 
promote them as regulative ideas, ideas which are useful to thinking, but which can 
never be the objects of determinate judgments.  These ideas are the “natural” product 
of reason projecting determinate ideas to their logical conclusion, community, 
causality and substance respectively.  Kant explains reason‟s desire to think these 
knowable, determinate concepts to their logical conclusion because human reason 
naturally attempts to encompass all possible topics of inquiry in its search for 
completeness.
435
  For reason to think community (totality) causality (antecedent 
conditions and consequents) and substance (that which endures through time and 
predication) to their logical conclusion—to think beyond the objects of finite 
cognition to their infinite conclusion—is reason‟s attempt to expand human cognition 
beyond the bounds of objects known by finite human cognition.  But, as Kant will 
point out on each occasion, the limits of human knowledge do not permit determinate 
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claims to be made of such.  To make a claim concerning the knowability of these 
topics, is one thing, to employ the ideas or to have faith in them is another.  Faith in 
the ideas of God, freedom and the soul are useful for several reasons.  The first of 
which is that reason (human understanding) is satisfied at having postulated what 
such ideas might contain, if expanded beyond objects it can know.  Human curiosity 
is satisfied to a certain extent, insofar as we can projectively imagine what such ideas 
are/might be.  In this regard, Kant suggests, human reason can and will inevitably 
tend, and, in thinking according to such ideas, the vocation of reason is satisfied.   
A second benefit from thinking through to these unknowable ideas is the 
possibility of regulating human behavior and thinking.  Immediately apparent is 
Kant‟s proposal to delimit human knowledge to allow room for faith.  By declaring 
God, freedom and the soul as unknowable, Kant creates space for religious 
perspectives and toleration, perhaps even reclaiming the essence of religious 
sentiment in terms of faith.  By allowing room for faith in delimiting the objects of 
human knowledge, Kant also permits such ideas to regulate human behavior.  If we 
determine our behavior “as if” God exists, we have freedom and hence responsibility 
for our actions, and for these actions we must answer according to an eternal time 
frame, and Kant believes this will encourage morality.   
The third, and perhaps most important, use Kant finds in designating such 
ideas as regulative is to humble the scientific claims of rationalist metaphysics.  By 
designating certain topics off-limits, the topics about which humans can claim 
knowledge is thereby limited; by placing boundaries around human cognition, Kant 
 277 
 
serves to further delineate those topics that can be known.  Such epistemic humility 
bespeaks Kant‟s commitment to the limitations of human knowledge writ large, and 
by demonstrating what lies beyond the boundaries of knowable objects, Kant believes 
that it serves to put in relief what and how humans can come to know objects. 
When turning to the Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant observes 
such ideas as God, freedom and the soul are indeed concepts we have in our mental 
repertoire, but they are not concepts that have any real connection to experience.
436
  
We do not, Kant claims, experience any of these concepts; that is, we never intuit an 
object that corresponds with these ideas.  Rather, these concepts are the product of 
reason thinking itself to completion.  To make a distinction between concepts of 
experience and these experientially ungrounded concepts, Kant renames these 
unexperienced and unexperiencable concepts as ideas of reason.  It is reason‟s desire 
to think infinitely about concepts that it does not experience and cannot know that 
leads reason to posit such constructions e.g. when experiencing substance, human 
understanding recognizes substance as that which endures through time and change; 
in thinking that which endures infinitely, reason constructs the concept of soul—that 
which is immortal. 
To distinguish this form of error in knowledge claims from that of an 
empirical sort, Kant‟s analysis in the Transcendental Dialectic is focused on 
transcendental illusion not with empirical illusion.  Transcendental illusion, unlike 
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that of the empirical species, is concerned with ideas or principles that “are in no wise 
concerned with objects of experience.”437  One simple explanation for the illusion of 
the ideas of reason is an overextension of their use.  One may meaningfully discuss 
the enormity contained in the ideas of God, freedom and the soul, but it is an 
overextension to posit them as actual objects of possible experience.  Kant‟s analysis 
decries speculative metaphysicians who have taken reason‟s ability to expand 
concepts of experience to the domain of infinity, and do so by the daydreams of the 
imagination.  Without experience of these ideas, one imagines what such concepts 
contain and do so by pursuing a reasoned or logical conclusion of the extension of 
concepts of experience.  Kant will even concede the necessity to think to such limits, 
citing again the need for reason to think totality and completeness, but invariably 
Kant judges these imaginative fantasies as illusory and mistakes when posited as the 
claims of knowledge.  And while this simplistic and mundane explanation about the 
mechanism that drives the transcendental illusions of the ideas of reason presents a 
viable limitation to the ideas of reason, this line of argument does not deviate too 
greatly from his philosophical forebears—on several occasions, we have been 
countenanced against placing too much trust in the imagination.  In addition, it is not 
able to explain illusions of the empirical sort.  If one does not rely upon this overly 
simplistic explanation, there is, I believe, a complementary explanation that covers 
illusions of both sort.  A principled explanation will allow Kant to describe error 
production both transcendentally and empirically.  Rather than pursuing these 
illusions separately, I would like argue for a single principle that can explain both 
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sorts of error in judgment, and then demonstrate its application in illusions both 
transcendental and empirical.   
In the Prolegomena, we find a formulation for a single principle that can 
explain error production.  Kant states that “all illusion consists in taking the 
subjective basis for a judgment to be objective”438  To understand the viability of this 
single criterion for error production, it is essential to remind ourselves of a few the 
already established Kantian doctrines.  By the time Kant arrives at the Transcendental 
Dialectic in the 1
st
 Critique, he has elucidated the subjective conditions of experience.  
From the Transcendental Aesthetic, we have come to understand that space and time 
are transcendentally idea, subjective, aesthetic conditions necessary for the intuition 
of the deliverances of the senses.  From the Transcendental Analytic, Kant has 
determined the necessary but subjective conditions necessary for organizing 
(spontaneously) the deliverances of the senses from human-rational standpoint, the 
categories.  In order for intuitions to appear, they must be organized by the categories, 
and, as such, Kant has established the objective validity of these basic constituents of 
human perception and cognition.  The single most important consequence of these 
essential elements is to effect the Copernican turn and Kant‟s argument that human 
knowledge amounts to a collection or system of rules that govern appearances and the 
objects that appear in human cognition.  We cannot, by this claim, know what an 
object is in itself, we cannot know thing(s) in themselves because objects of 
appearance are always intuited through the forms of intuition and organized 
according to the spontaneity of the understanding.  The realm of human knowledge is 
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limited to “objects” defined as what can appear in human experience.  What the ideals 
of reason and speculative metaphysics presuppose is that the concepts necessary for 
human knowledge are actually determinate of things in themselves.  When reason 
imaginatively extends (even in its natural use) its domain from the finite sphere of 
human knowledge and attempts to determine what substance is as a thing in itself, 
reason attempts to determine not what substance is as a subjective condition for 
knowledge, but what substance entails beyond human experience.  The concept of 
soul— immortality of enduring being—arises.  But this is the very mistake Kant has 
just cautioned against.  Substance, a subjective condition for experience and 
knowledge thereof, is never experienced in itself.  To claim that we ever experience 
substance, the condition of experience, is the first mistake.  One can never experience 
what endures through time and change, even though one organizes their experience 
according to such a concept.  In fact, empirically, we are hard-pressed to find any 
enduring substance in all the objects of experience.  Yet we still employ the category 
when organizing the deliverances of the senses.   For example, when painting a wall, 
the color and even texture may change, yet in order to describe the experience of 
painting an enduring referent i.e. a wall is necessary in order for the activity to be 
intelligible.  Yet given a larger time reference, one will most likely experience the 
decay of the wall.  Psychologically, we therefore expand the concept of substance not 
to walls themselves, but to smaller particles out of which the wall was comprised.  
And yet these too will eventually decay ad infinitum.  This process ad infinitum 
thwarts reason, and hence reason posits the absolute reference from which an infinite 
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substance, soul, cannot decay.  Yet souls are never the object of human experience.  
For the sake of completeness on an infinite scale, reason can think the enduring 
substance, but such a substance is not an object of possible experience.  And when 
metaphysicians mistake this logical and natural conclusion of reason and posit it as a 
necessarily existing object, Kant reminds them 1) that such an object can never be 
experienced, hence it cannot be included in the corpus of knowledge and 2) that in 
doing so, speculative metaphysicians have mistaken a subjective condition for an 
objective one e.g. the category substance, pursued it to its logical end, soul, but since 
it is not an object of experience, must posit it as the thing in itself.  In doing so, 
speculative metaphysicians have violated the strict prohibition concerning predication 
of the thing in itself, and would be forced to deny the Copernican revolution in Kant‟s 
philosophy.  But by having shown the necessary conditions for the possibility of 
experience, Kant believes metaphysicians cannot deny that these predications are 
merely subjective conditions, and hence knowledge of soul(s) is relegated to the 
realm of the thinkable, by the vocation of reason, but cannot be included in 
knowledge claims.  In short, it truly is a flight of fancy, or the imaginative extension 
of reason to attempt such folly. 
Likewise, Kant is able to argue for empirical judgments.  In the already 
established language, illusion in empirical judgments is nothing more than mistaking 
judgments of perception, subjective judgments, for judgments of experience, 
objective judgments.
439
  According to Kant‟s examples, the statement „When 
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supporting a body, I feel weight.‟ is merely a judgment of perception, while the 
statement „Bodies are heavy.‟ („Bodies have mass.‟)  is a judgment of experience.  
The chief distinction between the two propositions remains that the former only refers 
to the experience of the perceiver, a reference to the perceiver‟s state, and the latter 
predicates the object of experience.  In the process of judging the former, reference is 
to oneself and the reported affect of supporting bodies.  The subsumption of a 
particular object under a category, the requirement for the objective validity of the 
judgment, is entirely missing.  When judging the second of these two propositions, on 
the other hand, one must subsume „body‟ under the concepts, unity, reality, substance 
and existence.  Because the categories have the objective validity illustrated from the 
deductions, in making a judgment of this sort, we are not describing the states of the 
perceiving subject, but are predicating the object of our experience.  Anytime one 
mistakes a judgment of perception, the report of subjective experience, with a 
judgment of experience, the predication of an object, error results.
440
  This principle 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Prolegomena Kant puts the subjective and objective conditions of experience in terms of judgments of 
perception and judgments of experience.  By extending the conditions to their employment in 
judgment itself, it is easier to illustrate empirical judgments and the possibility of error.  
440
 One difficulty with this suggestion is that even in making judgments of perception, in order for the 
object of perception to appear, Kant argues that the categories are operative.  E.g. In order for me to 
experience body and weight, I need to organize the manifold of experience to come up with concept 
like body and weight that one may pronounce when supporting a body I feel weight.  Body, weight, 
support, feel and I are all concepts employed to make this statement.  However, we can save the 
argument by exposing the referent.   While it may be the case that every documented report of 
supporting bodies also leads to the assertion of feeling weight, this does not preclude the possibility 
that someone may support a body and not feel weight (not just in diminishing register but actually not 
feel weight).  Hence the attribution of feeling is to myself and my states, not to the object itself.  This is 
precisely what Kant wishes to demonstrate in the distinction between judgments of perception in 
opposition to judgments of experience.  In the latter form, we are referencing ourselves, nor reporting 
feelings we experience, but are, rather, determining a predication ascribed to the object itself.  Indeed it 
may be the case that most if not all our judgments of experience are extensions of judgments of 
perception (thereby making knowledge constructed) but we do so by employing the a priori categories 
to determine what we understand by body, weight, etc.  And do so in a manner that is different from a 
judgment of perception.  We do so by projecting the predication onto the object of experience—by 
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applies equally to transcendental illusions as well as those empirical.  When one 
reports an idea one has as a knowledge claim, one has overstepped the parameters 
necessary for knowledge.  When one reports a subjective experience as objective, so, 
too, has one made an errant knowledge claim. 
While this distinction is important, it does not appear to explain the most 
common form of error production, mistakes of regarding the deliverances of the 
senses in terms of the object.  Yet, in fact it can.  Aristotle‟s classic example of wine, 
honey and vinegar can serve as a good example and demonstrate exactly how the 
mistaking of the two types of empirical judgments follows.  When drinking wine after 
having eaten honey, wine tastes bitter.  When drinking wine after having tasted 
vinegar, wine tastes sweet.  What can be said of wine? Is wine sweet? Is it bitter?  It 
is exactly this sort of relativistic tendency that demands Kant distinguish between 
judgments of perception and judgments of experience.  Both declarations regarding 
the wine are judgments of perception.   Failing to understand this, one might be 
tempted to transition from „The wine tastes bitter‟ to „Wine is bitter‟; thus confusing 
the report of a perception with predication of the object and creating the illusion that 
we have predicated the object of experience.
441
  But it is precisely illusion that has 
arisen.  Such a line of argument could lead one to ask whether one can describe 
objects of experience in any meaningful way.  Can we truly say anything of wine?  
                                                                                                                                                                     
referencing the object and determining (although inductive and thereby defeasible) the predicate as 
belonging to the object and not to ourselves. 
441
 This is in fact the result of the passive understanding of the standard empiricist picture.  If the only 
determination of the predication of an object is the passive receptivity from the deliverances of the 
senses, then judgments with caveats are the only type permissible.  By showing what elements human 
understanding brings to judgment, Kant is attempting to show demonstrate that all judgments are of the 
type that needs caveats.  But rather than physiological caveats, Kant wishes to show the spontaneous 
caveats, thereby humbling human knowledge even further. 
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Kant‟s initial response appears to defer the question.  Kant‟s concern does not seem 
to apply to particular instances of objects of experience in terms of their qualitative 
experiences.  Kant‟s concern lays in determining the appropriate domain of natural 
science (and pure natural science and metaphysics).  As such, Kant is not concerned 
with the taste of wine for reasons other than aesthetic, but, at this point in the 
analysis, he will concern himself about the predication of objects in reference to 
primary and not secondary qualities; that is to metaphysical principles and not merely 
accidental qualities.  Regarding the taste of wine a ceteribus paribus clause (normal-
optimal operating conditions clause) seems to be in place, and the determination of a 
taste of wine is made only in reference to „normal‟ operating conditions of the senses 
and a prolonged process of comparison with multiple instances of tasting, wine 
tasting in particular.  The science of oenology is possible, but Kant will not concern 
himself with the specifics of this branch.  Rather, he will concern himself with the 
conditions necessary for the possibility of experiencing the wine i.e. that as a body it 
must have weight, that the wine causes taste receptors to experience etc. 
Why we are tempted to mistake subjective conditions with objective 
conditions is a question about the psychology of error production—a question with 
which Kant does not overly concern himself.  One possible reason is ignorance of the 
distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.  But even 
after the discovery, one might lose the rigor demanded by Kant‟s distinction and 
contend that perceptions are reports of objects.  Kant suggests that this may be due to 
a kind of psychological darkness that precludes us from maintaining the distinction 
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described.  It may be the case that we find the demand for rigor and right judgment 
outweighed by other concerns, and this obscures the distinction.
442
  But does this 
imply that so long as we remain diligent and dutiful to epistemic concerns that we can 
and will avoid error?  Will the parallax and the mirage no longer deceive us?  In a 
certain sense, Kant‟s answer seems to be yes.  When we report the perception of the 
parallax or the mirage, we will report them as subjective states and thus avoid the 
error of predicating an object falsely.  Under Kant‟s conception, we will contend the 
oar appears bent, and can conduct further experiments to determine whether we can 
predicate the oar in any way in much the same way as was practiced prior to Kant, but 
now we have another argument for the necessity of doing so (other than the pragmatic 
one). 
One further consideration of error, one that displays the same concerns as the 
standard historical picture is that of error and illusion found in dreams and delusions.  
As part of his refutation of idealism, Kant contends that “the existence of outer things 
is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of the self.
443”  But this 
does not imply that “every intuitive representation of outer things involves the 
existence of these things, for their representation can very well be the product merely 
of the imagination (as in dreams and delusion).”444  Kant‟s chief concern here is to 
argue against Berkeley‟s idealism, but also Descartes‟ material idealism.445  
Following his explanation of the reciprocal nature of determining a transcendental 
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unity of apperception found in the B-deduction and the objects of intuition, in 
addition to his concern to separate his own critical or transcendental idealism from 
the “fanatical idealism of Berkeley,” Kant argues that the affective nature of intuition 
implies an „object‟, unknowable though it may be, that is “responsible” for the 
impressions of the senses.  And because intuitions are the product of affectation, one 
implication might be that every intuition has a corresponding transcendental object.  
And while Kant will maintain that most appearances probably do have such a 
corresponding object, it is not necessary that all of them do.  It is possible that certain 
presentations of intuition might merely be “the reproduction of previous outer 
perceptions.”446  
This conciliatory move to the historical record fits nicely with Kant‟s 
elaboration of the reproductive function of imagination as well as the stigma so often 
attached with the faculty and accompanying memories.  Kant has explained how 
illusion arises, but has not yet provided any resolution to the problem.  One such 
solution is to return to the essential formulation of error production.  If, in dreaming, 
one ascribes the experience of the dreamer and the representations found in dream (or 
delusion) to objects, one has mistaken subjective experience for objective.  One easy 
correction is to withhold judgment concerning the objects of dreams, and only to 
describe the experience the dreamer undergoes.  And while this restriction may 
indeed avoid error production based upon dreaming or delusion, one further question 
arises; how do we know when we are dreaming from when we are not?  If the 
overriding epistemic concern demands that we never predicate objects of experience, 
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either as existent or as having properties, based upon dream states, Kant must provide 
some criterion to allow for safe predication.   
Such dream considerations are the resonant response of Kant to Descartes‟ concern, 
and it is in this context that we find Kant‟s response to the question concerning 
dreaming and waking.  He writes: 
Cartesian idealism therefore distinguishes only outer experience from 
dream, and lawfulness as a criterion of the truth of the former, from 
the disorder and false illusion of the latter.  In both cases it 
presupposes space and time as conditions for the existence of objects 
and merely asks whether the objects of the outer senses are actually to 
be found in the space in which we put them while awake, in the way 
that the object of inner sense, the soul, actually is in time, i.e., whether 
experience carries with itself sure criteria to distinguish it from 
imagination.  Here the doubt can be easily removed, and we always 
remove it in ordinary life by investigating the connection of 
appearances in both space and time according to universal laws of 
experience, and if the representation of outer things consistently agrees 
therewith, we cannot doubt that those things should not constitute 
truthful experience.
447
  
 
The answer to the question concerning how one distinguishes dream and illusion from 
waking experience and the truth one can predicate of objects in waking life appears to 
be an appeal to the regularity and consistency that we find in waking life, in 
opposition to those we find in dreaming.  In short, Kant seems to answer the question 
of dream illusion by declaring that truthful experience follows universal laws of 
experience i.e. those logical judgments found in the original deduction above.
 448
  If 
we find two objects existing in the same place at the same time, we may vouchsafe 
that we are dreaming.  
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One difficulty with this explanation is that if these logical impossibilities fail 
to obtain, we still do not know whether we are dreaming or awake.  In fanciful 
dreams, it is not too difficult to differentiate between dreaming and waking 
experience.  In the absence of absurdities, it proves more difficult.  For example, if 
we should find pink elephants as the objects of representation that follow the logical 
possibilities according to space and time, can we vouchsafe we are awake and having 
truthful experience?  Can we truthfully claim pink elephants exist?  In a sense, Kant 
does not concern himself with such questions concerning the content of empirical 
investigation.  Once again, his concern lays with the possibility of predicating objects 
of experience according to scientific principles.  Kant‟s concern is not with whether 
elephants are pink or not, but with questions about whether bodies have mass or every 
effect has a cause.  The specifics of the domain of pachydermology or even of 
particular events and their specific causes is beyond Kant‟s immediate concerns.  For 
the content of these specific areas of inquiry, Kant will leave these to the experts in 
the fields of research that determine the laws that govern these disciplines.  Kant‟s 
suggestion is that these disciplines, as all waking experience, must follow universal 
laws of experience, and failing to do so means we are either dreaming or delusional. 
When Kant elaborates error production, his overriding concern is to provide a 
principled criterion that can establish cases of misrepresentation.  The specifics of any 
particular empirical discipline, he can contend, must follow the parameters delineated 
in the 1
st 
Critique when affirming knowledge claims.  Kant offers such principles in 
the final section of the transcendental analytic, in which he continues the work found 
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in the Schematism, but provides more specific elaboration of the categories according 
to the received physics (Newtonian) of his day.  These principles, by and large, offer 
an opportunity for more elaborate extension of the general rules found in the 
Schematism and a deeper exegesis on the categories in application.  When Kant turns 
to error production, these principles are operative as secure means by which we can 
describe the world of experience.  In the case of error production, Kant finds it 
imperative to offer the same principled approach to explain the mechanism(s) by 
which we overstep the secure principles an produce mistaken judgments.  This is 
inherently an overextension of the products of the imagination itself.  This principle 
has application in several different cases of error production, namely the 
transcendental dialectic, the relativity of sense experience and cases of dreams and 
delusions.  And yet, there remains one principle that governs all error production.  
Whether one is claiming knowledge of transcendental ideas, qualitative experiences 
or dreams, the mistake is the same.  In all these cases, one mistakes subjective 
conditions or qualities for those objective.  When we report the metaphysical truth of 
God or souls; we have overextended our the ideas of reason and imagined them to be 
objective; when we report the feeling of heaviness we have imagined heaviness to be 
a quality of the object of experience; when we report the content of dreams or 
recombinant memories as objects of experience—in all these cases one has mistaken 
subjective conditions for objective truth.  The source for error production is precisely 
the mistake of imagining/declaring that which cannot be experienced as proper to the 
realm of knowledge.  Cognizance of the architecture of knowledge and diligence in 
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reporting appear to be the corrective measures necessary to humble the claims of 
human knowledge and the means by which we can reduce, if not entirely avoid, error.  
In Kant‟s own words, “pure reason‟s knowledge of itself in its transcendent 
(overreaching) use will be the only prevention against the errors into which reason 
falls if it misconstrues its vocation and, in a transcendent manner, refers to the object 
in itself that which concerns only its own subject.”449 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of 1
st
 Critique 
 
In Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason we find a nuanced and fundamental 
formulation of the power of the imagination.  The imagination, as we have seen, is 
important in the several aspects that comprise knowledge claims.  Due to Kant‟s own 
ambiguities and revisions discovering just what the imagination is and how it operates 
in theoretical, pure, reason requires an excavation and interpretation of Kant‟s 
primary text.  To overcome rational idealism(s), Kant wishes to retain empirical 
experience in the judgments concerning knowledge.  At the same time, Kant wishes 
to combat the trenchant skepticism that follows from the empirical tradition based in 
Locke and Hume.  Thus Kant‟s formulation of knowledge will affirm an empirical 
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realism as well as a transcendental idealism.  Such a philosophical shift elicits a 
problem for Kant; if empirical data is a necessary component of knowledge in 
addition to transcendental categories, how will two such disparate elements be 
brought to together in judgment?  In other words, how can Kant claim that pure 
concepts have objective validity, objective reality and be applied to the deliverances 
of the senses? 
To find the “common root” from which both sensibility and the understanding 
draw their radical natures and thus to bridge the gap between the two, I have appealed 
to the imagination, in an effort to gain insight into the basic question of connectivity 
of the two faculties, but also to shed light on this third obscure faculty.  To determine 
how sensibility may present a unified manifold of discrete parts, Kant presents 
overtures to an original yet sensible synthesis of the components found in the 
immediate deliverances of the senses.   The synthesis found in immediate 
apprehension amounts to the presentation of a unified field.  According to Kant, all 
synthesis is the product of the imagination, and hence immediate apprehension of a 
sensible field must have recourse to the imagination in the presentation of a unified 
manifold at a particular, instantaneous moment.  To determine the pure concepts 
themselves and to provide a deduction of the categories, I have argued for an 
employment of the imagination to which Kant only makes suggestive allusions.   
Kant‟s own deduction does not provide the legitimacy of his list of logical 
judgments nor the table of categories themselves.  Instead, Kant‟s deduction argues 
for a synthetic and transcendental unity of apperception necessary for all judgments to 
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obtain in a single consciousness.  While an essential component for Kant‟s 
foundational enterprise, this deduction falls short of explaining and justifying either 
table of judgments or categories.  To Kant‟s deduction, I have provided a derivation 
of the categories from the permutations of pure space and time as explored through 
imaginative variation.  Such syntheses of pure intuitions and the subsequent logical 
judgments afforded these exercises of the imagination provide an objective validity 
for the categories that supplements Kant‟s exploration of objective validity from his 
own deduction.  This second deduction, my own, has one advantage over Kant‟s own 
by demonstrating the origin of the table of logical judgments and categories while 
proving the exhaustiveness and exclusiveness of the judgments and concepts Kant 
provides.  The tables of categories does indeed present a complete list of pure 
categories, categories that all finite beings whose sensibility is governed by the forms 
of intuition space and time.  Once the legitimacy of the categories is demonstrated the 
only task that remains is to illustrate their application with the deliverances of the 
senses. 
This final task, that of objective reality, we find in Kant‟s exposition of the 
Schematism.  This section illustrates the fundamental role the imagination plays in 
connecting categories with sense data.  Because of the dualism he establishes between 
understanding and sensibility, Kant must find a liaison between the two very different 
faculties.  Kant already has such a faculty in place, and it is to the imagination that he 
turns explicitly in this section.  The imagination creates rules determined by each 
categories presentation of the form of time, schemata, by which the categories can be 
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connected with a corresponding presentation of sensibility in time e.g. substance is 
that which endures through time, and when we intuit something enduring through 
time we call it a substance.  Thus the actual employment of the categories with 
intuitions, the objective reality of the categories, is brought about by use of the 
imagination.  Since imagination is operative both in sensation and in understanding, 
the imagination provides the common root that enables judgments of knowledge—
both pure, in the case of logical judgments, and empirical, in the case of judgments of 
experience. 
This interpretation provides two important aspects concerning knowledge 
claims.  Judgments of experience and knowledge claims that are dependent upon 
empirical data, empirical knowledge claims, are indeed possible through this process, 
but, more importantly, so too are a priori knowledge claims. Empirical judgments, 
synthetic a posteriori claims, have long precedent in the empirical tradition.  Kant 
now has the means to explain the manner in which they are brought about.  Moreover, 
the deduction I have presented enables Kant to maintain and explain how a priori 
synthetic judgments are possible.  Provided the categories can be demonstrated and 
we can employ pure intuition in the production of the categories, Kant now has the 
means by which to explain how cause and effect is possible, even though empirical 
examples remain only probabilistic.  Importantly, Kant can refute Hume‟s argument 
that cause and effect is a mere fantastic product of habit by demonstrating that the 
connection between two events is necessary.  Furthermore, such a demonstration aids 
in explaining the conceptual conditions necessary in order to assert the inductive 
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claims of empirical causality.  Synthetic a priori knowledge is indeed possible, and as 
such, metaphysics as a science can be rigorously pursued. 
Because Kant can explain how both empirical knowledge and metaphysics 
can be pursued, the final obstacle Kant must explain is error production.  In this 
aspect Kant also has recourse to the imagination.  Any imaginative overextension of 
categories will result in mere metaphysical speculation.  Transcendental ideas like 
God, freedom and the soul are the result of just such overextension.  Such ideas are 
never encountered and hence we can never possess knowledge, neither empirical nor 
metaphysical of them.  We can however, argue for the rational consistency of such 
ideas, and hence may employ them in a regulative use, but never as determinative of 
knowledge.  Regarding empirical error and illusion, the same mechanism of 
overextension is operative.  When one imaginatively projects perspectival predication 
onto objects, we mistake judgments of perception for judgments of experience.  
Mistaking subjective conditions for objective conditions is readily available when one 
does not constrain the projective use of imagination.  By explaining all illusion, 
whether in the dialectic of reason or in empirical employ, as imaginative 
overextension, projection of ideas or personal states as real, Kant continues the 
tradition of countenancing caution when employing such a powerful, fundamental 
and ubiquitous power as the imagination.  
Even so, with all the accomplishments of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
himself finds it necessary to continue his critical enterprise, extending his analyses 
beyond theoretical reason to concerns practical and aesthetic.  By establishing the 
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fundamentality of the imagination in theoretical reason, I would like to continue 
along Kant‟s architectonic by tracing this fundamental faculty in both the Critique of 
Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment.  The final two chapters of this work 
begin such explorations.  Continuing the development of the theory of imagination 
from the 1
st
 Critique, I will now turn to preliminary implications and integrations 
found in the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 Critiques. 
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Chapter Ten: Implications and Integration 
Imagination in The Critique of Practical Reason 
 
 
 In the years between the first publication of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781) and the second (1787) Kant‟s attention to reason shifts from its theoretical use 
to concerns practical and moral.  Immediately following his revision, Kant continues 
his programmatic of delimiting reason and publishes the Critique of Practical 
Reason.  To find imagination in this work requires considerable effort.  Kant only 
mentions the imagination in a handful of explicit references, most often in a skeptical 
and critical light, and thus one might contend that the imagination finds little 
application in Kant‟s moral philosophy.  However, the omission of the imagination 
does not indicate its absence, but rather a need to demonstrate the connection between 
the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Critiques and the requirements of the imagination for both theoretical 
and practical philosophy. 
 Kant begins the Critique of Practical Reason by making reference to 
suggested possible titles.
 450
  He muses that he could have entitled the work “The 
Critique of Pure Practical Reason” thereby drawing closer connections to his first 
critique.  However, Kant opts for the shortened title, that he may demonstrate that 
such a pure practical reason is possible.  Rather than asserting pure practical reason, 
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Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.) 2002. 
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Kant prefers to title his second critical work “practical reason”, something he believes 
all rational agents demonstrate in their everyday deliberative actions, in an effort to 
clarify how one ought to pursue moral deliberations, that is, through pure practical 
reason. 
 Also in distinction from the 1
st
 Critique, Kant does not begin this endeavor 
with an enumeration and analysis of the faculties of cognition, for either theoretical or 
practical philosophy.  Kant does retain the same architectonic, a doctrine of elements 
followed by a doctrine of method.  But because Kant wishes to establish a practical 
philosophy that is pure, he seeks to eliminate any candidates for a moral philosophy 
that make appeal to any empirical considerations.  To ensure a practical philosophy 
that is universal and necessary—that is, based on a priori reason and not any personal 
or cultural interests—Kant will begin his exploration of moral philosophy by purging 
it of any particulars, and hence he begins with principles followed by an enumeration 
of concepts.  It is only after he explores a priori, principled moral deliberation that he 
will turn to the illusory dialectic to complete his analysis of moral judgment and its 
possible illusions. 
 In such a principled approach, as is well-known, Kant determines that only a 
good will can be predicated as good without qualification.
451
  In a quite superficial 
sense, a good will is a will that makes rules, maxims, to effect some consequence or 
action.  Many other capacities as well as objects are considered good e.g. happiness, 
wit, intelligence, but only the will can be considered good without seeking another 
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 Ak. 393, p. 7.  All references to the Groundwork/Grounding are from Immanuel Kant‟s Grounding 
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object to which it applies.  Kant equates a good will to a will governed by pure 
reason.  In contrast to intelligence that may be guided by reason to effect some end, a 
good will performs its function of maxim making according to the dictates of reason 
rather than the interests of other ends.  Such a distinction between end-oriented rule-
making and universal rule-making is the celebrated difference between hypothetical 
and categorical maxims.  The will‟s function is to formulate maxims for action, and to 
claim a good will, a faculty not influenced by other ends than rule-making itself, Kant 
claims that reason must determine “the will by means of a priori grounds.”452  These a 
priori, unconditioned, grounds are the very determination of universal and necessary 
means by which to formulate rules for action.  A categorical rule, or imperative, will 
be the only means by which the will can ensure no ulterior motivation or ends in 
formulating rules. Thus Kant believes that only a principled approach to moral action 
and moral deliberation is possible to provide a pure will that can ensure universality 
and necessity, and provide a moral law for all to follow. Such a formal principle is the 
only approach that will not rely upon any empirical conditions, and as such provide 
the unconditioned ground for moral action.    
 The formulation of the categorical imperative itself and such a discussion of a 
priori principles by which the will can provide rules for action is, I contend, the 
culmination of a rather imaginative process itself.  By appealing to common sense, 
Kant recognizes the multitude and variety of motives that influence action.  To 
remove all goal-oriented thinking, the most entrenched of which are personal or 
community happiness, to find a principled manner by which to conduct all actions in 
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a moral fashion, itself requires a deleterious thought process, often deemed 
“abstraction,” that can only be executed under an imaginative framework.  The 
exercise amounts to asking oneself to remove all biographical information, both 
personal and cultural, in order to determine what capacities are at work in finding a 
truly universal morality.  To escape a cultural relativism that often leads to one 
ethical, Kant removes such considerations as personal interest or happiness from any 
such deliberation and to posit a purely formal articulation of the moral law.  This 
deleterious imagination leads Kant to consider action from a common standpoint 
among all so-called human beings, their possession of reason alone.
453
  Reason itself 
has no goal or object, but can by means of imaginative restraint reign in irrelevant, 
particular and goal-oriented considerations for maxim making in moral deliberations.  
The principle that avoids these errors and whose form can be applied in such 
deliberations is the oft quoted categorical imperative: 
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law.
454
 
 
or, alternatively, 
 
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time 
as a principle of universal legislation.
455
 
 
This purely formal formulation by which a good will determines the maxims a 
rational agent is to enact is the single principle that will govern a good will and hence 
all moral deliberations.  By determining this as the single principle by which maxims 
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should be formed Kant argues for the objective validity of such a formulation.  The 
objectivity validity obtains from the universality Kant requires in searching for a 
principle that can apply to a purely good will, one devoid of empirical ends.  The 
necessity of this formulation comes from the demands of reason and the demands of a 
universal morality itself.  There is no other way, Kant argues, by which the good will 
can govern its activities and obey the dictates of reason than by following this 
imaginatively deleterious, purely formal principle to govern all actions. 
 And yet it is this very formal articulation that provides some difficulty for the 
second, major concern of Kant, the objective reality and application of such a formal 
principle to particular instances in the world of empirical experience.  It is here that 
the imagination finds another employment, one specifically understood as a liaison 
between the purely formal principle and situations as they are experienced.  This 
imaginative willing or willful imagination, is one that can illustrate a deep 
imaginative theme in Kant‟s practical philosophy.  
 There is one concern however.  In the 1
st
 Critique, Kant employs the 
imagination through schemata to apply pure concepts to objects of empirical 
experience.  Recourse to such an explanation is strictly prohibited by Kant when he 
says: 
the moral law has no other cognitive power to mediate its application 
to objects of nature than the understanding (not the power of 
imagination).  What the understanding can lay at the basis—as a law 
for the sake of the power of judgment—of the idea of reason is not a 
schema of sensibility but a law, but yet a law that can be exhibited in 
concreto in objects of the senses, and hence a law of nature, though 
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only in terms of its form; therefore we call this type of law the type of 
the moral law.
456
 
 
It would seem that by shifting from theoretical reason to the practical, Kant has 
replaced the schemata with what he terms “the typic,” to the exclusion of the 
imagination in its former mediating function.
457
  Such a reading does apply if one 
considers the imagination in its role only as the faculty for schemata and not the law-
likeness of concepts themselves.  Assisting in the exclusion of the imagination is the 
aforementioned reading of the understanding in the narrow sense.
458
  Perhaps the 
inverse is in order here, that Kant can be interpreted as regarding the understanding in 
its broadest sense, and the imagination in its narrowest.  By inverting these 
conceptualizations, a place for the imagination can be found, not only in the creation 
of a categorical imperative, but also in its application.  To affirm the application of 
the moral law, Kant must describe and explain what a “typic” of practical reason must 
be and how it applies to concrete situations; to do so will require not only the 
imagination but imaginative thinking. 
 To understand the typic of the moral law, Kant suggests one ask a specific 
question in order to grasp how the application of the categorical imperative to 
concrete situations obtains.  One must ask whether “you could indeed regard it [the 
action proposed] as possible through your will” and whether the action you propose 
were to “occur according to a law of the nature of which you yourself are a part.”459  
This is the means by which one can apply the moral law through a typic to a situation 
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in order to demonstrate the objective reality of the moral law.  Satisfying the first of 
these requirements is not difficult to accommodate.  One must merely ask whether it 
is possible to enact the maxim under deliberation e.g. can I do X.  The second 
requirement, however, proves much more difficult to achieve.  This second 
requirement amounts to asking “what if…” everyone permitted themselves to act 
according to such a maxim and what the world would amount to under such 
conditions.
460
  By speculating under such universalization, one must imagine what 
such a world would look like and whether such a world is logically possible.  In cases 
that fail universalization, we cannot imagine a world (nature) where such maxims are 
employed.  In other words, the type of world imagined in not one that is logically 
possible.  Kant provides telling examples e.g. case of false promises and/or suicide 
that fail such a test.  Imagining what a world looks like in which people are permitted 
to make false promises would be a world in which promise making becomes 
impossible.  To imagine such a world is a logical impossibility.
461
  But, importantly, 
in order to execute this typic of the moral law, one must imagine what such 
speculation entails.  It is only by imaginatively exploring the possibility or 
impossibility of such worlds that the typic can bridge the gap between the purely 
formal moral law and the concrete situation in which one is tempted to enact the 
maxim e.g. when one is tempted to make a false promise when she believes it to be in 
her advantage.    
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Instrumental in applying the moral law and establishing the possibility of such 
a typic are: 1) the formal principle deduced from a pure will, 2) recognizing the 
concrete situation in which one is called to act, 3) forming a maxim (a rule governing 
the action under consideration) and 4) determining whether such a maxim when 
tested against the formal principle can indeed produce a world that is logically 
possible.
462
  In the case of lying, the application of the moral law is quite simple.  The 
formal, moral law has already been determined by Kant‟s consideration of a single 
principle based upon the good will‟s guidance by reason—that is, the categorical 
imperative.  Examining the empirical situation within which one finds oneself 
remains an estimation covered by the 1
st
 Critique and determining objects/situations 
of empirical experience.  We can and do experience situations in which we find 
ourselves in interaction, either causal or reciprocal, with objects of experience, and 
the estimation of the objects (ourselves included) involved in a situation that elicits 
action is one which the epistemic and ontological considerations pure reason have 
made explicit.  The third criterion amounts to introspectively understanding the action 
desired in the situation and the maxim by which the object can be obtained.  This 
presents an opportunity for Kant to demonstrate the desire afforded by inclination and 
the calculative thinking we undergo in order to bring about desired effect.  However, 
Kant insists that the desired effect must be brought about by moral means, not merely 
any means that presents a resolution of gratification.  Should the desired effect only 
be achievable by immoral action, practical reason must lead the way and sublimate 
inclination.  In the case of lying, one wants to acquire some advantage and the means 
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of attaining it can only be brought about by bearing false witness.  Kant remains 
adamant and cautious at this point, reminding his readers that the desired object or 
advantage is not the proper motivation for morality.
463
  In this case the motive is some 
form of self-interest.  But lest these deliberations become unclear and one be tempted 
to place the object of desire or advantage before moral considerations, Kant provides 
the fourth criterion.  By examining what must be in place in order to bring about the 
desired effect, lying in this case, one can test the means by which such advantage 
obtains.  By removing any personal or empirical considerations and examining the act 
of lying itself and the maxim needed in order to effect such an action, we remove any 
extraneous considerations or irrelevant data from the application process.
464
  By 
examining the maxim for the act itself and determining whether such a type of law 
produces a world that is possible, Kant can effectively test, a priori, whether such a 
maxim is falls under the a priori auspices of the moral law.  This imaginative, a priori 
application of the moral is the type, or typic, of the moral law and only those that pass 
the test are typics that are imaginable and thus morally permissible.   
Unlike schemata as we have found it in the 1
st
 Critique, the typic does not rely 
on pure intuition, but, rather, is a conceptual abstraction that permits of a priori 
analysis, and then moral judgment in the application of the determination found in the 
universalization test.  Bridging the gap between pure practical reason and its 
formulation of the moral law is the typic that permits one to withdraw from empirical 
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considerations and examine the maxim one is deliberating (for empirical action) to 
ensure that the means by which we are acting in the world conform to moral 
demands.  According to Kant‟s analysis, this process is executed by means of the 
understanding because it is the faculty responsible for conceptual articulation.  This 
being the case, the understanding is certainly the faculty in which this applicative 
process takes place, but it cannot do so without the deleterious and projective use of 
imagination.  Moral judgments themselves may be the product of the understanding, 
but the understanding could not execute its task without aid from the imagination in 
the process of abstraction from the empirical world and projective testing required by 
the universalization test.   
Having determined the objective validity of the moral law and the possibility 
and actuality of its application, its objective reality, Kant estimates that the 
categorical imperative is the only a priori formulation for a moral law, one that holds 
for all rational agents so long as actions are governed by practical reason and no other 
concerns.  Concluding the Analytic of practical reason, Kant can then turn his 
attention to the dialectic and the possible illusions that arise from considerations of 
pure practical reason.  The dialectic centers around two important discussions, the 
idea of freedom and its relation to other regulative ideas, and, the notion of a highest 
good.  During this transition, Kant has the opportunity to reconsider his philosophical 
position and his epistemic humility from the 1
st
 Critique and offers emendations to his 
analysis of the regulative ideas—God, freedom, and the soul—seen from the 
perspective of practical reason.   
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A reminder concerning his determination of God, freedom and soul is in order 
to understand Kant‟s further development of these ideas in the 2nd Critique.  In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant concluded that such ideas are never (and can never be) 
experienced, and as such cannot perform any function in determining the world of 
possible experience.  For a concept to be determinative of the world of possible 
experience, they must actually be found in experience.  We find examples of 
determinative concepts in, pure concepts, categories, which are the building blocks 
from which we erect a considerable repertoire of empirical concepts.  These basic 
concepts are actually experienced as demonstrated in the above deductions.  If we are 
to have determinative concepts of God, freedom and soul, one would need to employ 
the categories in conjunction with data from sensation in order to produce them as 
empirical concepts.  However, God, freedom and the soul are not empirical concepts 
that are the product of the application of categories to the deliverances of the senses.  
They are, rather, the product of pure reason thinking imaginatively and exhaustively, 
to completion, about such concepts as substance, causality and community-totality.  
As we experience these categories in completion, Kant relegates these products of 
reason to a merely regulative role that provides guidance for reason and even action, 
but not ideas we can claim to have corresponding objective reality.  Kant claims the 
ontological status of these concepts must be left undetermined, citing their possibility 
in a noumenal world, but their impossibility of being experienced phenomenally. 
In the 2
nd
 Critique, Kant wishes to return to a discussion of these regulative 
ideas, to support his claims from the 1
st
, but also to illustrate how practical reason 
 307 
 
emends the pronouncements of his earlier work.   Kant introduces the idea of freedom 
in relation to the will and the latter‟s ability to form and act upon unconditioned 
maxims.  He writes: 
Since the mere form of a law can be presented solely by reason and 
hence is not an object of the senses and thus also does not belong 
among appearances, the presentation of this form as determining basis 
of the will is distinct from all determining cases of events [occurring] 
in nature according to the law of causality, because in the case of these 
events the determining bases must themselves be appearances.  But if, 
moreover, no determining basis of the will other than that universal 
legislative form can serve as a law for this will, then such a will must 
be thought as entirely independent of the natural law governing 
appearances in reference to one another, viz., the law of causality. 
 
Here Kant is reminding us that all appearances are governed by the category of cause 
and effect.  But insofar as the moral law is presented by reason alone, it is not an 
appearance but a principle of reason.  Since no empirical conditions will be permitted 
into an a priori principle, the universal moral law is not under the auspices of 
concepts that govern appearances.  As the will is the faculty to effect the moral law in 
application, the will may be conceived as operating outside the laws of appearances, 
that is, outside the law of causality.  Understanding the will as free permits Kant to 
continue affirming the possibility of a legitimate, universal ethics, one that has 
freedom to act according to maxims not governed by causal determinations.  
Responsibility and moral worth are consequent upon denying the determinist 
accusation that all actions have antecedent, determining causes.  Kant can thus affirm 
the truth of the determinism, of cause and effect, but in contemplating the moral law 
and deciding whether the maxim under deliberation conforms to the universality of 
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the moral law, the will (and the understanding) operate outside of appearances.  
Causality is at work in appearances, but, as the will is outside of empirical 
phenomena in its deliberation, the will need not be conceived as an absolutely 
determined faculty.  In short, the will is free.  This doctrine, permits Kant to continue 
his argument from the 1
st
 Critique, the one that denies empirical experience of 
freedom, but also permits him to argue for its actuality, an actuality that applies only 
at the deliberative and intelligible level.  Kant continues to affirm that freedom 
regulates our behavior, because, while we cannot ever experience freedom and affirm 
it from an epistemic standpoint, the transcendental argument affirms its necessity in 
employment of the categorical imperative.  As Kant has illustrated the application of 
the moral law, he can affirm that it is both possible and actual, he can affirm freedom 
is both possible and actual, while it is never experienced as an appearance.  Of 
importance here is theoretical reason‟s inability to affirm the actuality of freedom, as 
it only resolves the antinomy of causality and freedom by determining freedom is 
possible according to a noumenal/phenomenal division.  It is only practical reason 
that affirm its actuality, and yet still affirm that it is only understood as intelligibly 
actual and never a phenomenal manifestation. 
 And while Kant‟s consistency with the 1st  Critique is admirable, perhaps, 
Kant is too modest in claiming that knowledge of freedom is impossible.  As Kant has 
argued, the intelligibility of freedom and its possibility are required for practical 
reason, but its actuality, he insists, is not an object to which we have access.  Because 
one never possesses an experience of the actuality of freedom, which would provide a 
 309 
 
corresponding object, we can never make knowledge claims about freedom.
465
  And 
yet, according to Kant‟s description of the application of the moral law, we may have 
a single instance that not only demonstrates the necessity of freedom, but also 
provides an instance according to which we may find an object of experience that is 
freedom itself.  Hence, I would like to push Kant‟s determinations in the 2nd Critique 
further than Kant himself did, in order to demonstrate the actuality of freedom and 
not just its possibility and intelligibility.  To do so, we will have recourse to the 
imagination and its function of image production and representation. 
 According to Kant‟s analysis, pure practical reason begins by determining an 
a priori principle by means of which one may weigh deliberations concerning action.  
Pure practical reason provides the moral law, to which one must adhere in order to 
have moral worth for one‟s actions.  We have even seen the possibility of applying 
such an a priori principle to concrete situations and the role the imagination plays as a 
liaison and facilitator between the pure, a priori principle guiding maxim formation 
and concrete situations in which one acts.  And while Kant‟s understanding admits no 
medium of the imagination proper—rather, the typic is formulated by the 
understanding—in order to exact the correlation between a concrete situation and the 
a priori principle by deleterious abstraction and projective image formation in 
considering the logical viability of universalizing any given maxim evidence for the 
imagination at work is manifest.  Furthermore, one can represent this very process to 
oneself.  In fact, one does experience the abstraction, deliberation, universalization, 
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and logical judgment by which this process is enacted.  In so far as one undergoes this 
process, one also possesses the ability to represent such activities to oneself by means 
of self-reflective imaging.  Not only do we undergo this process, but, moreover, we 
do have knowledge of the process undergone.  To present such an internal process, 
Kant has no recourse to sensibility as providing the receptive half of his formulation 
for knowledge.  And yet if knowledge is to obtain concerning our ethical 
deliberations, one must have not only the conceptual half of knowledge, but also the 
intuitive half.  The imagination, I contend, might provide just such an image of the 
internal process.  Kant himself admits that the moral law furnishes “as a sensible 
nature” the form of a world of understanding.466  The world of the understanding to 
which the moral law, the image of it and the universalization process, provides the 
conceptual requirements of the good will and pure reason‟s generation of an a priori 
principle by which one can determine moral worth.  Because the understanding 
through reason provides the moral law, Kant‟s assertion about the understanding‟s 
role in the objective reality, application, of the moral law remains true.  But one now 
has further recourse to illustrate the experience of the objective reality and application 
of the moral law through deliberation and maxim formation.  It is to this end that 
Kant suggests one “can cognize freedom” even though one can “never become 
conscious of freedom directly.”467   
 One can never become conscious of freedom directly like we are conscious of 
other objects of experience because of the missing element of receptivity from the 
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senses.  And yet, in imaginative representation, we do find the presentation of an 
image of the process by which we are applying the moral law.  In this reproductive 
use of the imagination, one literally presents an image of themselves enacting the 
deliberative process and determining whether particular maxim‟s conform to the 
moral law.  Furthermore, in this depiction, the subsequent judgment and finally acting 
or not on the maxim itself demonstrates the will in process.  Because one decides, 
either in conformity with the moral law or not, and acts according to such a decision, 
representation of the process through internal, reflective images illustrates freedom 
itself.  Such a depiction, provides an image of the moral law, as a sensible nature, that 
satisfies the epistemic requirement for knowledge claims according to Kant.  We 
become aware of ourselves as agents that determine permissibility and 
impermissibility of maxims that are then enacted.  Literally, but also figuratively, we 
have an image of ourselves as free agents, and hence have an object of experience 
that is freedom which allows one to claim knowledge of oneself as a free agent.  Thus 
Kant can claim to know in addition to the possibility, the actualization of freedom.  
According to Kant, these claims may be justified by pointing out that the moral law 
determines that which speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined.  The 
transcendental argument for freedom is now replaced with immanent use.
468
  
 This imaginative process has interesting parallels with the role of imagination 
in the genesis of judgments and categories from the 1
st
 Critique; in fact, the 
qualifications of the knowledge claim of freedom in the 2
nd
 Critique parallels the 
knowledge claims found in the earlier work.  Much as we found in the deduction of 
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judgments and categories above, the role of the imagination in this practical 
application is qualified as productive and a priori.  Just like the “objects” found in the 
original deduction earlier in this work, the “object” produced by the imagination in 
practical reason is also pure a priori.  Due to the process of deleterious abstraction 
from concrete situations to discover the maxim under consideration for practical 
judgment, such judgments are removed from any empirical determinations.  One is 
merely asking whether any particular maxim conforms to the logical prerequisite(s) 
of the moral law.  Certainly, it holds true that the motivation to determine whether 
maxims do conform finds its impulse in empirical experience.  But, nevertheless, any 
empirical motivation and considerations are rendered obsolete in the application of 
the moral law to maxims.  Hence the process by which moral deliberation obtains is 
an exercise of pure, practical reason and the judgments rendered are a priori.  
Likewise, the representation of the process of deliberation and moral judgment 
remains a priori and sensible (by means of the image/representation of the process).  
Such a pure intuition of the conditions by which moral judgments are made and 
application of categories to this process renders an a priori knowledge of the 
actualization of freedom itself.  Hence Kant‟s claim concerning knowledge of 
freedom might be overly modest.  We can and do experience freedom in moral 
deliberation, and as such can have a priori knowledge of freedom, but only by means 
of the imagination and its various functions in cognition.  
 This line of argumentation is, I believe, Kant‟s doctrine of the suprasensible 
substrate.  Kant continually affirms a knowledge of the suprasensible substrate, 
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freedom, required for moral deliberations, and consistently affirms this knowledge as 
intelligible.
469
  This intelligible knowledge is precisely the a priori knowledge of 
freedom afforded by the imagination and thereby allows Kant to maintain the 
distinction between a priori, synthetic, that is metaphysical knowledge, and 
knowledge that pertains to the world of experience and the world as we experience.  
Kant‟s purpose behind this distinction was to reform metaphysics and delimit what 
may be safely vouchsafed as knowledge from the finite human condition.  
Accordingly, Kant desires to relegate all metaphysical claims produced by mere 
axiomatic rationalism to the transcendental dialectic of pure reason.   This knowledge 
of a suprasensible substrate differs, however, from such illusions because it is the 
very experience of freedom as actualized.  Freedom, understood from the standpoint 
of theoretical reason is only a possibility, a possibility that may only be understood 
noumenally.  Practical reason avoids the requirement demanded of pure reason by 
demonstrating the use freedom and the a priori knowledge we may have of it.  In 
short, practical reason proves freedom not merely as a possibility, but as an actuality, 
and has “expanded our knowledge beyond the boundaries” provided by a critique of 
pure reason.
470
  Thus the regulative idea of reason as found in the 1
st
 Critique is 
transformed by pure practical reason into an object of which we can have a priori, 
metaphysical knowledge.     
   Such a determination of freedom permits Kant to comment on further 
regulative ideas, God and the soul from the 1
st
 Critique, but also a new regulative idea 
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found in the dialectic of practical reason, the highest good.   Unlike determinate 
freedom, however, these ideas continue to remain merely regulative and not 
determinative, but in so doing have a strong connection with imagination and its 
ability to serve the vocation of reason in thinking the totality and completion of a 
system.  Even from a practical standpoint, reason‟s vocation remains dedicated to 
considering the infinite in a regulative employment, but still must remain skeptical 
regarding the actuality of these ideas.  And yet, these ideas are still productive in 
assisting practical reason in guiding action.  Each regulative idea in turn will 
contribute to both reason‟s vocation and the regulation of behavior.471 
 To open the section entitled the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, Kant 
reminds his audience that “pure reason, whether considered in its speculative or in its 
practical use…. demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given 
conditioned…”472  And yet, this demand leads reason to “an unavoidable illusion 
[which] arises from the application of this rational idea of the totality of conditions to 
appearances as if they were things in themselves.”473  One such unconditioned 
condition is the idea of freedom that has proven the “most beneficial straying into 
which human reason could ever have fallen, because it ultimately impels us to seek 
the key to get out of this labyrinth” as the imagination aided in doing above.  In its 
pursuit of totality of unconditioned conditions, pure practical reason is not so much 
concerned with God, freedom or the soul, as was pure theoretical reason, but with  
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the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural 
need) likewise the unconditioned; moreover, it does not seek this 
unconditioned as a determining basis of the will, but even when this 
determining basis has been given (in the moral law), it seeks the 
unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the 
name of the highest good.
474
 
 
The notion of a highest good is the object for pure practical reason, but it is not an 
object that obtains in human experience.
475
  And hence, any epistemic claims 
concerning the possibility or actuality of such a concept in the world of possible 
experience, appearances, must only be employed with a such a disclaimer.  And yet, 
such an idea is “most beneficial” because it delimits pure practical reason‟s scope 
while providing distinctions by which one can reconcile “needless controversies,” 
namely the apparent discrepancy between the worthiness to be happy and actually 
being happy.  
 The issue centers around Kant‟s formulation of moral worth and its 
compensation in the world.  To be morally worthy, virtuous, the maxim‟s of one‟s 
actions and the actions themselves, must be in conformity with the moral law. And 
yet, we find that even when one acts morally, one may suffer misfortunes in life.  On 
the other hand, we often find immoral persons enjoying every luxury and happiness.  
It would seem that virtue and happiness rarely find themselves in proportion.  
According to Kant, two traditions have arisen to settle this difficulty.  The 
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“Epicurean” school of thought places happiness as the highest good, and argues that 
one should work to ease the misfortunes of life by wanting less (or at least finding 
efficient means for satisfying gratification) by means of prudence.  The “Stoic” 
school considers moral worth, virtue, the highest good, and encourages a self-
satisfaction of moral worth even in inhospitable circumstances.
476
 In order to regulate 
behavior in a world where discrepancies between virtue and happiness exist, the 
former position affirms happiness as the goal of morality, the latter virtue.  Kant, on 
the other hand, wishes to affirm both. 
 In order to affirm a state wherein “virtue and happiness together amount to 
possession of the highest good, and thereby happiness distributed [to persons] quite 
exactly in proportion to [their] morality (as a person‟s worth and his worthiness to be 
happy) amounts also to the highest good of a possible world,” Kant illustrates this 
very antinomy and wishes to expose the presupposition employed by both.  Both 
Stoic and Epicurean schools argue for the irreconcilability of the two because of the 
discrepancies found in empirical experience.  Kant‟s simple resolution to this problem 
hearkens to the resolution of the dynamic antinomies of the 1
st
 Critique.  To affirm 
that both are possible, Kant will argue that in the world of appearances such 
discrepancies are found, but such disparity need not obtain in the noumenal world.  
The presupposition both schools of thought rely upon is the idea that the world of 
appearances, in Kant‟s terms, is the only way of conceiving these relationships.  This 
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presupposition amounts to a belief that this worldly existence of appearances is the 
only existence.  However, if one imagines a world in which empirical appearances do 
not exhaust the metaphysical possibilities a resolution to the antinomy beings to 
appear.  We can, according to Kant, imagine a world in which one‟s virtue and one‟s 
happiness are commensurate even though we may not find such states of affairs in our 
empirical experience.  And yet, in order to imagine such a world, Kant will need to 
rely upon other regulative ideas. 
 One possible strategy to envision the highest possible good is to think as if 
one‟s life does not end with the secession of this physical existence.  Kant argues for 
the immortality of the soul as a postulate of pure practical reason that permits one to 
think of the highest good as “progression proceeding ad infinitum toward that 
complete adequacy” of virtue and happiness.477  If one considers this infinite 
progression, which presupposes the “existence and personality of the same rational 
being,” an indefinite amount of time remains during which virtue and happiness can 
be reconciled.  Such a postulate is a “theoretical proposition, though not proveable as 
such,” but yet one that permits a resolution to the antinomy.  By imagining the 
immortality of the soul, reason finds one explanation that can affirm the possibility of 
the highest good and thus render it regulatory of both thought and action. 
 A second strategy that admits the possibility of the highest good is the 
postulate of God‟s existence.478  If, as empirical experience informs us, there are 
discrepancies between person‟s of moral worth and those who obtain happiness, and 
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we are resolve this difficulty by thinking an eternity, “it must lead to the 
presupposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect i.e. it must postulate 
the existence of God.”479  In several ways, envisioning the existence of God resolves 
the difficulties of postulating immortality of the soul and imagining the process of 
progression from the perspective of eternity.  God as the cause of immortal souls 
resolves the causal difficulties (as found in Descartes), but furthermore, Kant can 
employ the infinite perspective to address the established epistemological problem of 
evil.  Humans interpret their moral worth and happiness, but only from a finite 
perspective.  If one envisions an infinite perspective, the disparity can, once again, be 
reconciled.  Indeed, Kant ultimately wishes to employ both postulates as mutually 
reinforcing, albeit unknowable, propositions that can allow finite humans to think the 
highest good as possible, thereby providing a psychological mechanism by which he 
can affirm the thinkability of a highest good, but remain epistemologically cautious in 
affirming any of these ideas.  These ideas, of the highest good, God, and immortal 
souls, are the means by which reason regulates its own thinking in determining the 
scope of pure practical reason.  By thinking these ideas, by imagining them as 
possible postulates, practical reason can seek for the unconditioned condition that is 
the totality of moral considerations, without compromising the previous knowledge 
claims of the moral law and its applicability through freedom to concrete situations.  
These regulative ideas are purely rational exercises that permit reason to pursue its 
vocation, but by exposing and illustrating their interconnectivity, Kant can counsel 
his audience to remain skeptical regarding their existence. In this manner, regulative 
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ideas in the 2
nd
 Critique regulate thinking and perhaps actions, much as they have in 
the 1
st
 Critique.          
  Thus we find the imagination at the heart of pure practical reason and the 
products of moral deliberation.  By determining an a priori moral law, Kant requires a 
liaison between the principle of pure, practical reason with concrete situations.  
Moreover, in the process of applying the moral law to these situations we find a need 
for abstraction from irrelevant elements in deliberations concerning maxim formation.  
Much like we found in  
Aristotle‟s deliberative imagination, we find Kant appealing to a deleterious and 
projective employment of imagination in applying the moral law to action through the 
typic of practical reason.  Furthermore, when returning to the idea of freedom we find 
the imagination, in its ability to represent as pure a priori intuition the process by 
which we apply the moral law to concrete situations, providing a pivotal 
demonstration of the actuality of freedom.  This basic function of the imagination 
provides a Kantian argument to affirm both the possibility and actuality of freedom 
beyond its merely regulative use as found in the 1
st
 Critique.  One can now begin to 
offer an argument for a determinative use and a priori knowledge of freedom.  One 
final parallel obtains to demonstrate the importance of the imagination in the 2
nd
 
Critique.  As with other regulative ideas, the imagination provides the means by 
which reason can project an idea that remains epistemologically dialectical, but quite 
instructive in its use.  The ideas of the highest good as well as God and an immortal 
soul, assist reason in its vocation, while remaining merely regulative ideas.   
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Chapter Eleven: Implications and Integration II 
Imagination in the Critique of Judgment 
 
  
Because both theoretical and practical reason produce judgments, scientific 
knowledge and moral knowledge respectively, Kant‟s attention is drawn to the nature 
of judgment itself.  That Kant is aware of a need to explore the capacity to judge itself 
becomes apparent in the rapidly successive publication of the Critique of Judgment in 
1790 (only one and a half years after the 2
nd
 Critique and 3 years after his revision of 
the 1
st
).  To complete his programmatic of exploring various ways of judging and of 
connecting the first two Critiques together, Kant will explore one further manner by 
which humans do make judgments, the aesthetic, to put into relief species of 
judgments made in both theoretical and practical employments of reason.  This 
strategy allows Kant to explore one further facet of human judging while illustrating 
important aspects of judging itself. 
In his Critique of Judgment, the imagination to which Kant makes reference 
bears distinct differences from that cited in the 1
st
 Critique.  This discrepancy has left 
many commentators puzzling over the use of the imagination as Kant would have it in 
the 3
rd
 Critique and its commensurability with that of the Critique of Pure Reason.  
Following this puzzlement, and perhaps a consequence of it, is the tendency noted by 
Rebecca Kukla: 
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For most of the twentieth century, Kant‟s aesthetic theory was 
marginalized by analytic philosophers, who systematically privileged 
epistemology and (to a lesser extent) ethics as the core philosophical 
subdisciplines and who did not see aesthetics as substantially relevant 
to these subdisciplines.  Kant‟s third Critique received vastly less 
scholarly attention than the first two, and the little commentary that it 
did receive was insulated from the rest of the corpus of Kant 
scholarship.
480
   
 
The focus on Kant‟s earlier critiques defines the imagination in light of epistemic-
moral projects to the neglect and confusion of the imagination in the third.  Kukla 
notes that as this was the case, it has, however, been ameliorated in last couple 
decades, and the 3
rd
 Critique has enjoyed a renaissance.
481
  And while treatment of 
the Critique of Judgment has flourished in the last 15 years, the imagination has still 
been relegated to the margins and is often still cast in light of the epistemic-moral 
understanding.  It is not that commentary is not available on the imagination and its 
role particularly in judgments of beauty and, somewhat less exemplary, in those of 
the sublime.  But what is lacking is a comprehensive treatment of the imagination in 
the entirety of the 3
rd
 Critique.  Lacking also is an integration of the imagination and 
its prominent place in the Critique of Judgment with that of the first two.
482
  It is to 
these two issues I now wish to take up in this final chapter.   
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It is my contention that not only is the imagination an essential component for 
all reflective judgments, of the beautiful, of the sublime and of teleology, but also that 
by looking to the specific uses of each, illumination on Kant‟s proposed thesis in the 
preface of the Critique of Judgment: 
to determine whether “judgment give[s] the rule a priori to the feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure, the mediating link between the cognitive 
power [in general] and the power of desire (just as the understanding 
prescribes laws a priori to the cognitive power and reason to the power 
of desire)
483
 
 
can be provided.  Conceived and understood according to a principle of 
purposiveness, Kant‟s thesis, I intend to show, will become clear.  In other words, 
Kant establishes in his introduction the architectonic that he believes will complete 
his critical enterprise.  By looking to the concept of purposiveness, purported by 
humans in various aspects of cognizing, theoretical, practical and aesthetic, all three 
Critiques become bound together into a systematic whole.  By looking to judgment 
itself, Kant believes he can provide the a priori principle, purposiveness, found in all 
manner of judgments.  Thus the 3
rd
 Critique is often hailed as the mediator between 
theoretical, concepts of nature, and practical, concepts of freedom, to form a whole.  
“There must after all,” Kant says, “be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies 
nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically, even 
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though the concept of this basis does not reach cognition of it either theoretically or 
practically.”484 
 Kant determines it is the idea of purposiveness that is the single a priori 
principle that presides over judgments.  But this principle differs from those found in 
either of the first two Critiques.  In the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes 
between determinate and reflective judgments.  “If the universal (the rule, principle, 
law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is 
determinative.”  These determinate judgments are those found in Kant‟s exegesis of 
theoretical cognition in the 1st Critique.  In the 3
rd
, however, Kant wishes to discuss 
judgments of reflection.  “If only the particular is given and judgment has to find the 
universal for it, then this power is merely reflective.”485  Popularly understood, 
determinate judgments are described as cognition from concepts under which 
particulars are subsumed, and reflective judgments are particulars from which 
humans cognize universals.  The signal difference between these two forms of 
judgments is the idea that determinate judgments are the variety employed in 
epistemic claims found in theoretical philosophy and its determinations about nature 
and moral claims found in practical philosophy and those judgments determining 
action guided by reason, while reflective judgments do not determine objects or 
actions.  Reflective judgment “gives only a law to itself [human reflection on 
judging].”486  Thus the conclusions obtained in reflective judgment are not 
designations of objects nor actions, but comment on the tendencies found in the 
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function of these judgments.  The suggestion that purposiveness is the a priori 
principle that guides all judging does not determine that all things, neither objects nor 
actions, do indeed have a purpose, rather it suggests that all human cognition orients 
itself around a thinking terminus ad quem.   
Kant presages this demarcation of determinate and reflective judgments, 
when, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he distinguishes between the determinative and 
regulative judgments.  Determinate judgments, as cited above, determine the 
particulars that are subsumed under universals for the sake of veritative knowledge 
claims.  Regulative judgments, on the other hand, cannot be determined true or false, 
but, rather, are thought “as if” in order to regulate thinking.  Epistemic judgments 
concerning God, freedom and the soul cannot be proven or demonstrated by human 
cognition, but can modify the ways in which thinking occurs, that is, they regulate 
human thinking.  Kant neither differentiates nor conflates reflective and regulative 
judgments in the 3
rd
 Critique, but one finds similarities in the function of such 
judgments.
 487
  Both modify human thinking.  Regulative judgments, often called 
regulative ideas, Kant believes delimit the bounds beyond which human cognition 
cannot trespass while still making objective claims according to his scheme of 
metaphysics as a science.  One cannot metaphysically speculate on god, freedom, or 
the soul and do so within a sound critical philosophy.  In similar, but different, 
fashion, reflective judgments present an end to which human thinking can aspire.  
While clearly not judgments warranting veritative epistemic claims, human cognition 
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can think an end and purpose to its varied enterprises.  In fact, Kant claims, we find 
this very thinking pleasurable.
488
 
It is within this context of species and functions of judgments that one finds 
Kant‟s thesis regarding the single a priori principle of judging itself.  One finds that 
discovering “order is an occupation of the understanding with regard to a necessary 
purpose of its own.”489  Kant reemphasizes here the tendency so often cited in the 1st 
Critique— for human reason to think of ends, often beyond its own ability, and to use 
these ends both to aspire to and delimit its thinking.  Purposiveness found in nature 
cannot be verified as true, nor, as is hotly contested, is purposiveness to be found in 
acting morally.  But humans find a pleasure in thinking a unified order of nature, all 
empirical laws subsumed under one guiding aegis, and positing a kingdom of ends as 
that to which all actions should aspire.  What Kant seems to suggest is that humans do 
indeed find pleasure in organizing the concepts of nature and concepts of freedom 
into a systematic unity.  These internal subjective states seem undeniable, even if the 
value placed on these objects does not obtain in nature or freedom itself.  The fact is, 
humans find pleasure in this activity, and Kant wishes to evaluate these subjective 
conditions of experience. 
And yet, the pleasure found in these varied forms of thinking purposiveness in 
any aspect of human cognition, itself, falls under scrutiny of its own principle.  It may 
very well be the case, Kant accedes, that in thinking all human cognition has an end, a 
purpose, and unifying principle is not the state of affairs, but rather, that which must 
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be thought because “only through such laws do we first get a concept of what a 
cognition of things is.”490   This very enterprise, I would like to suggest, is quite 
imaginative, and as such the imagination plays a prominent role in reflective 
judgment.  It is now to the actual examples of reflective judgment, of beauty, 
sublimity and teleology, that I wish to examine.  We find in so doing to what extent 
these feelings are imaginative and what role, if any, the imagination plays in these 
judgments. 
To begin, we must return to a peculiarity in Kant‟s corpus alluded to earlier, 
but not characterized.  In the Critique of Judgment we find a shift in the vocabulary of 
Kant‟s faculty psychology from that presented in the Critique of Pure Reason.  Little 
to almost no mention is made of receptivity and intuition in the 3
rd
 Critique.  Rather, 
Kant seems to have replaced imagination for sensibility.  This shift in imagination 
elicits some comment.   
In the 1
st
 Critique Kant introduces a dualistic model to represent human 
cognition.  The faculty of sensibility is the receptive capacity responsible for the 
deliverances of the sensuous encounter humans have with the world.  Sensible 
intuitions are the sense data received from objects in the world that are then ordered 
and organized according to the faculty of understanding.  The understanding, on the 
other hand, is the spontaneous capacity that does not collect information from the 
world, but, rather, operates with the deliverances of the senses to organize intuitions 
according to pure categories.  The synthesis of the deliverances of the senses with the 
categories of understanding affords are, Kant reports, judgments—determinative 
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judgments that warrant epistemic claims of objective validity, that is, knowledge.  In 
order to enact such syntheses Kant summons a third faculty, the imagination, but 
presents it rather ambiguously.  “Synthesis in general,” Kant reports “is the mere 
result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, 
without which we should have no knowledge, but of which we are scarcely ever 
conscious.”491  At this point, Kant allies the imagination with the understanding. No 
combination, no synthesis can be given through the senses.
492
  The power of synthesis 
and the subsumptive act of determinate judgments are allocated to the understanding.  
Thus the canonical interpretation of the 1
st
 Critique firmly places the imagination as a 
sub-function of the understanding.
493
   
More recently, this standard interpretation has come under scrutiny by authors 
such as John McDowell and, to some extent, Henry Allison.  McDowell argues 
against the integration of imagination into the understanding.
494
  He suggests that, 
prior to synthesis with categories, a synthesis of the deliverances of intuition must 
obtain in order for the intuition to appear as a unity.  To appear as a manifold, 
McDowell contends a synthesis must take place at the level of sensation, much as we 
have seen in the treatments of the Transcendental Deductions in the foregoing 
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chapters.  Discussion of McDowell‟s (Sellars‟) arguments on this topic extends 
beyond the scope of the concerns here.  But let it be said, for now, that Kant does 
make concessions toward this very point, indicating a “figurative synthesis” by 
stating “we need the imagination to combine the manifold of intuition.”  A unified 
presentation of the deliverances of the senses is necessary for us to intuit any object.  
What is at issue here is the role of imagination in appearing, either figuratively, that is 
through the senses, or intellectually, as objects of cognition.  The shift in the 3
rd
 
Critique is Kant‟s tendency to incorporate the imagination in sensibility for the 
purposes of presentation.  Since the imagination, whether allied with sensation or 
understanding, is the mediating faculty that enables judgment, if Kant is to determine 
the a priori principle governing judgment, imagination must be included. 
This is precisely the shift we see from the 1
st
 to the 3
rd
 Critique.  No longer 
does Kant make numerous and overt references to sensation and receptivity.  Rather, 
his vocabulary shifts to incorporate the figurative synthesis of the 1
st
 Critique as a 
description of sensibility that delivers material upon which we can reflect.  The 
aesthetic half of Kant‟s dualism remains intact, but he moves away from calling the 
deliverances of the senses sensibility, instead preferring the term „imagination.‟  
Under the rubric of reflective judgment, it is not the object one experiences, but the 
presentation of the object, often in its absence.  Understanding this caveat, Kant can 
still claim the imagination as an independent faculty, but one that is responsible for 
the presentation of the manifold of sensibility that is the intuition under scrutiny in 
judgments.  This leaves the reader in a peculiar situation.  The imagination presents 
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the deliverances of the formerly called sensibility to understanding; its role is that of 
delivering, but also of enabling synthesis.  Thus we find what I shall call the 
imagination in a receptive (albeit pre-conceptually synthetic) mode, coincident with 
sensation as it is found in the 1
st
 Critique,
495
 and as mediator between this receptivity 
and the understanding.  Recognizing the faculty of imagination as it is called in the 3
rd
 
Critique and the continuation of its transcendental function from the 1
st
 is vital in 
delineating the role of imagination as well as the nature of aesthetic judgments. 
When it comes to analyzing the beautiful, maintaining this distinction proves 
beneficial.  Not only will it provide a useful conceptualization to illustrate what Kant 
means by “free play of the cognitive powers”, between the imagination and 
understanding, but it also emphasizes Kant‟s overarching connection between all 
aesthetic judgments and the human propensity to think in terms of purposiveness and 
his final conclusion concerning the subjective conditions elaborated in reflective 
judgment.  Important to remember is Kant‟s characterization of aesthetic judgments 
as reflective.  In reflective judgment we are not dealing directly with the deliverances 
of sensation, but with a presentation to ourselves of such.  This may explain Kant‟s 
conspicuous shift to imagination as the presentation of the deliverances of receptivity.  
Kant merely does not present the imagination in this capacity in the clearest light, and 
the ambiguity allows him to draw a comprehensive connections with other types of 
judgments. 
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To begin his analytic of the beautiful, Kant turns to feelings “connect[ed] with 
the presentation of an object‟s existence.”  In determinate cognition, pleasure or 
displeasure is connected with the bearing such an object has on our own existence, 
most often in terms of utility or gratification.
496
  In the case of a judgment of beauty, a 
reflective cognizing, Kant argues that it is not the interest we take in the object 
regarding ourselves that elicits the feeling of pleasure.  Rather, this feeling is elicited 
by the very object itself.  In presenting an object aesthetically, we take no interest in 
mercenary considerations, we take no interest in the object, but find the feeling of 
pleasure, interest, in ourselves while contemplating the object.  This disinterested 
interest indicates that the feelings one has regarding the object is indifferent to the 
existence of the object, but recognizes the feelings that the presentation elicits all the 
same.  Kant continues by pointing out that “this contemplation, as such” is not 
“directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether 
theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them 
as purposes.”497  In viewing an object according to taste, aesthetically, a feeling of 
pleasure arises, but not from any concept or purpose— we do not wish to use, but, 
rather, to contemplate the object and our own presentation of the object to ourselves.  
By dissociating pleasure from personal interest and basing it in the presentation of an 
object, Kant can put forward an argument concerning universality and necessity.
498
 
                                                          
496
 CJ, 47/206. 
497
 CJ, 51/209. 
498
 Two attributes most commonly associated with judgments of beauty.  All judgments of beauty 
inherently demand others agree with our assessment.  Kant takes up this normative tone and attempts 
to provide a critical basis rather than merely remaining dogmatic.  
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The universality deemed appropriate to judgments of beauty is not that of 
universal assent.  Kant concedes that differences in era, culture and personal 
temperament will provide wide contestation when judging whether an object elicits a 
feeling of pleasure.  Kant‟s claim of universality stipulates the possibility of universal 
assent, once personal interests are put aside.  Furthermore, Kant insists in the 
necessity of universal assent in the fourth modality.  But this necessity is not, once 
again, one that is based upon the interest of the observer.  It is based upon the 
subjective condition that obtains in the “free play” of the faculties.  Kant argues for 
this universality and necessity based on sensus communis and the common cognitive 
capacities all humans share.  We even posit, he suggests, the objective necessity of 
agreement upon judgments of beauty based on the sensus communis.   
Morevoer, it is truly the “free play” of the faculties upon which Kant builds 
his case for the modalities of judgments of beauty and it is in the third modality that 
we find his exegesis most promising, but also most confusing.  The third moment is 
pithily characterized as purposeless purposiveness.  And it is in this modality that we 
see Kant‟s overarching theme of purposiveness incorporated into the particular 
judgment of beauty.  
In the presentation of an object, a two-fold process is underway.  The 
perception of an object is presented, but not in a unified way.  The imagination 
synthesizes the manifold into a singular appearance, affording a remove from 
immediate perception and allowing for reflective contemplation.  It may be the case 
that this imaginative organization strays from the determinate understanding normally 
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afforded in epistemically oriented cognition of the object presented.  Yet this is 
precisely the freedom necessary for “free play that is afforded by the imagination in 
reflective presentation.  In contemplation of the object one becomes aware of the 
pleasure or displeasure sponsored by the presentation.  If pleasure arises, the process 
continues and the subject projects a purpose to the object presented.  This purpose, as 
Kant calls it, remains ambiguous.  It is neither the case that the purpose allotted to the 
presentation is a determinate cognition, nor is it entirely arbitrarily ascribed by the 
observer.  For example, when one sees a rose, one does not think according the 
empirical laws of biology, nor according to the pure concepts of the understanding.  It 
may go without saying that in affording a unity to the presentation categories may be 
operative, say the category of unity, but the presentation is not guided by the 
categories for the determination of any particular empirical law, say of causality or 
community of interrelated parts.  The purpose that seems to arise is the purpose of 
pleasing the individual. But this thinking would put the cart before the horse.  It is the 
feeling of pleasure that gives rise to the projection of purposiveness.   
This purposiveness, of giving pleasure, that is projected onto the object of 
reflection is generated by the spontaneity of the imagination.  One can project many 
possible purposes onto a rose upon its presentation, many of which may be beyond 
determinate applicability.  But the signal purpose projected upon the presentation of 
an object of beauty is that it serves the purpose of pleasing.  This free play of the 
imagination corresponds to Kant‟s demand of the spontaneity of the imagination.  
Furthermore, in organizing the material of sensation into a coherent unity, one 
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becomes aware that the particular instance experienced, in exemplary cases deemed 
beautiful, tend to present the understanding with a refined notion of the object 
perceived.  Aesthetic presentation creates the rule by which other instances of the 
particular case may be judged.  This movement from particular to general, and 
subsequently rule generation, affirms Kant‟s suggestion that aesthetic experience 
tends to the lawfulness of the imagination.  By setting the bar for other possible 
experience, discursive thought is served in a refinement of its concepts.  Moreover, 
discursive thought is placed in check by reflective judgment‟s demonstration of a 
different possible way of viewing a presentation.  Aesthetic judgments of beauty tend 
to both provide the rule for subsequent concept employment, informing the 
understanding while setting limits to it. 
One further example may prove useful.  In the presentation of an architectural 
work, there appear to be at least two ways that humans can view the object.  If taken 
as the presentation of a structure that houses humans, providing protection and a 
space to pursue actions, the judgment remains determinate.  The building can 
subsequently be deemed either suitable or not for the purposes guided by the concept 
of dwelling.  If viewed merely as a presentation of the deliverances of the senses 
organized by the imagination into a unity, several options remain.  By reflecting on 
one‟s inner states, one must consider whether pleasure or displeasure obtains 
regardless of the so-called determinate purposes of theoretical cognition.  If no 
pleasure obtains, aesthetic judgment does not deem the building beautiful and 
recourse is typically to utilitarian considerations for further judgment.  If pleasure 
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does obtain, however, one sees the object not as a useful item for dwelling, but as an 
object that “quickens the cognitive faculties.”  In this quickening, Kant suggests, the 
particular is seen in terms of its purpose, not in regard to utility, but in regard to its 
expansion of human cognition.  The building redefines the guiding empirical concept 
of places of dwelling. In beauty, the particular provides the rule, rather than being 
subsumed under it.   But the purpose of buildings, commonly understood, is not for 
the expansion of human cognition.  The purpose reflective contemplation provides 
obtains not in the object but in cognition itself.  Hence the purpose is really no 
purpose at all, but a projection by the imagination for the expansion of our cognition.  
The organization of imagination provides the unity, at a sensorial level, the 
quickening of the understanding is afforded by the work of the imagination as a 
harmonizer of the presentation and the lawfulness of the understanding in its 
delineation of the world.
499
  Purposeless purposiveness is thus a harmony of 
presentation with lawfulness, and is afforded in the free play of the imagination in its 
organizing and synthesizing processes.  The purpose and lawfulness found in a 
judgment of beauty resides not in the object, but in the subject and hence is not the 
purpose of the object, but remains a projection of subjectivity itself. 
A similar interplay between the faculties is found in a judgment of the 
sublime.  Whereas a judgment of beauty affirms pleasure and harmony of the 
imagination and understanding, the sublime involves a feeling of “agitation connected 
with our judgment of the object,” one which concerns our faculties of reason and 
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imagination.
 500
  In other words, when we experience the sublime, we find a feeling of 
discomfort at the presentation of an object, one that thwarts our capacity to 
comprehend.  For our purposes, I wish to treat the differences in judgments of the 
sublime, Kant‟s distinction of mathematical and dynamic, as one— not to dismiss the 
differences, but, rather, to see the experience of the sublime in terms of imagination 
and Kant‟s theme of reflective judgment in its role of providing a unity to human 
cognition.  Paradigmatically, I will focus on the dynamic sublime, for it affords a 
poignant illustration of the reconciliation of imagination and reason. 
According to Kant, the sublime is that which “arouses in us, merely in 
apprehension and without any reasoning on our part” a feeling “countrapurposive for 
our power of judgment, incommensurate with our power of exhibition, and as it were 
violent to our imagination.”501  In other words, we judge sublime a feeling aroused in 
us— a feeling aroused by the apprehension of something with such great magnitude 
(mathematically) or with such great force (might, dynamically) that we cannot present 
to ourselves a unified field.  The sublime defies reason‟s ability to comprehend, 
reason cannot fathom the immensity presented, even though it is a single presentation.  
The sublime encounter is one that denies what is perceived can be made 
commensurate with our reason. 
Furthermore, when with the sublime “we judge an object aesthetically,” “this 
judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion (mathematically) or 
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of its might over the mind (dynamically).”502  This straining arouses in us a certain 
feeling—a feeling of our faculties at work—a feeling of the inability of the 
imagination in its presentation of an object and reason to make sense of the 
experience— a feeling “bordering on terror.”503 
But simultaneous with this unpleasant sensation, one acquires a new sense of 
the power of one‟s faculties.  Because the phenomenon presented exceeds the power 
of imagination, and reason recognizes this situation, a new horizon, a new limitation 
is consequently implied.  In an experience of the sublime the imagination cannot 
represent in a unity that which is delivered by the senses, in a manner commensurate 
with reason.  For example, when one witnesses the Grand Canyon or a hurricane, the 
imagination finds difficulty in presenting the entirety of the experience as a single 
manifold of intuition.  It is as if these experiences are too much for us.  The inability 
to represent to ourselves what is presented in intuition stresses and strains the power 
of the imagination and pushes it beyond its presently denoted domain. Yet in the 
awareness of the limitation, one can provide a projected purpose to the experience—
the expansion of our cognitive capacities, concept and rule generation.  
The initial limitation of the deliverances of the senses as presented by the 
imagination is experienced as a negative feeling.  Certainly, this thwarting of 
imagination to make a unity of the experience, of our faculties in general, is 
unpleasant.  But, Kant insists, one does “feel the very power‟s [the imagination‟s] 
might” to surpass itself.  This feeling of “horror” thus becomes a pleasure, a “sacred 
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thrill—one derived from acquiring “an expansion or might that surpasses the one it 
sacrifices.”504  In other words, because the imagination cannot reconcile what it 
perceives with reason, negative feelings are aroused, but because it sees a new limit to 
which it can expand, it transforms this negative feeling into a delight in feeling its 
own expansion, a delight in cognition itself.  Recognizing its own growth, and the 
projected growth of reason itself, the imagination transforms an “amazement 
bordering on terror” into a pleasurable experience, one which serves the projected 
purpose of expanding cognition.  
By feeling the might of our own imagination we are moved by the sublime 
and our once unpleasant feelings of awe are transformed into admiration of our own 
powers.  Hence it is only by reflection on our own faculties, not the object, that we 
can experience the sublime.  This reported purpose of expanding cognitive abilities, 
in the representation of unity and the expansion of reason‟s laws, by particular 
examples, are the purpose one finds in sublime experience.  The purpose of expansion 
and the feeling of pleasure that accompanies is an awareness that, despite the initial 
failure of coordinating presentation and reason, experiences of the sublime may serve 
a purpose in the reconciliation of experience and cognition.  
    One suggestion, for which I will not argue here, but that seems to follow, is 
that once this expansion takes place, one cannot experience the object/event and feel 
and judge it sublime.  If the concept of Grand Canyon, roughly, big hole in the 
ground, is expanded in such a way that it can then encompass the entirety of the 
presentation, the initial moment of presentation‟s inability is no longer operative, 
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hence no terror and no sublimity.  The experience is thus seen to further the purpose 
of expanding human cognition, and yet this purpose is merely the report of reflective 
introspection, not the purpose of the Grand Canyon found in nature.  On this topic 
Kant writes: “The judging strains the imagination because it is based on a feeling that 
the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral 
feeling) and it is with regard to this feeling that we judge the presentation of the 
object subjectively purposive.”505  The purposiveness one finds in the experience of 
the sublime is, again, merely subjective purposiveness. 
 The final form of judgment found in the 3
rd
 Critique, the teleological, is one 
that attempts to coordinate determinate judgments with purposes imaginatively 
suggested, but yet ones of which no determinate judgment be made.  Returning to this 
comprehensive outlook on the idea of purposiveness as the ground for all judgments, 
one returns to Kant‟s suggestion that the 3rd Critique is the conclusion that can unify 
his critical enterprise.  And it is in reference to teleological judgments that Kant can 
unify the numerous empirical laws determined by theoretical reasoning. 
Among the many types of teleological purposes we allocate to concepts of 
nature, Kant distinguishes between formal and material.  Formal objective purposes, 
mathematical concepts, seem “as if [they] for our use had been intentionally been so 
arranged, while yet it also seems to belong to the original nature of things, without 
concern as to how we might use [them].”506  The a priori nature of these concepts 
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differentiates them from material objective purposes.  Material purposes, on the other 
hand, are “cases where I find order and regularity in an aggregate, enclosed within 
certain boundaries, of things outside me.”507  The contingency of such empirical 
presentations permit purposiveness, but they cannot claim a priori status, and as such 
are merely empirical determinations.  Additionally, Kant distinguishes between 
intrinsic and relative ends.  Kant states, “we may regard the effect [of objects of 
nature] either as a purpose, or as a means that other causes employ purposively.”508  
The former, as in the case of a river depositing silt, is intrinsic to the function of the 
river for the benefit of nature itself.  In the latter case, the activity is seen with other 
goals in mind e.g. when humans develop arable land for the purpose of agrarian 
cultivation.  Kant questions whether the former cannot also be seen as a case of 
relative purpose, suggesting that nature itself might deposit silt in order for land 
propagation and human use, but doing so relegates this to human artifice rather than 
nature‟s intrinsic purpose.  Kant‟s final distinction pertains to human activity, and he 
considers the multiplicity of human behavior and its ability to be intrinsic, as in the 
case of pursuing happiness, or relative, the means by which we attempt to attain 
happiness.  The central theme of Kant‟s evaluation of teleology concerns cause and 
effect, and how one should conceive the application of this pure concept in terms of 
empirical examples whether for nature or for human happiness. 
Kant‟s treatment of cause and effect from the 1st to the 3rd Critique proves 
grounds for some confusion, but he can and does maintain a consistent position.  In 
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the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant affirms the knowability of cause and effect.  And 
yet he retains a skepticism that, although cause and effect can be known a priori, 
when dealing with empirical examples caution should be employed.  We employ 
cause and effect in the top-down 1
st
 Critique model in order to affirm determinate 
concepts of nature, which make epistemic claims.  The concept of cause and effect 
conditions human comprehension of empirical examples.  And yet, this does not 
provide grounds to determine actual causes to effects and to subsequently determine 
the purpose of specific causes.  He regards the examination of pure reason as found in 
the 1
st
 Critique “a propaedeutic to the system of pure reason” which will further need 
supplementation in a metaphysics of natural science.
 509
  This skepticism 
acknowledges and embraces the Humean skepticism that propelled Kant‟s critical 
enterprise while providing grounds to overcome Hume‟s radical position.  It is in the 
3
rd
 Critique that we find the final articulation of such skepticism.  Kant writes, “We 
have to judge a relation of cause to effect which is such that we can see it as law-
governed only if we regard the cause‟s action as based on the idea of the effect, with 
this idea as the underlying condition under which the cause itself can produce the 
effect.”510  In other words, the only way one can see cause and effect is to see 
purposiveness, the cause bringing about the effect with a goal in view (either intrinsic 
or relative).  In order to empirically employ the concept of cause and effect, Kant 
argues we must have a projected purpose that unifies why and how the cause is 
efficacious in bringing about the effect.   
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Kant‟s treatment of empirical laws of nature in terms of cause and effect 
unites the properly called aesthetic portion of the 3
rd
 Critique with the section on 
teleology.  When evaluating the possibility of judgment in general, purposiveness is 
the essential component.  In order to make human experience intelligible, humans 
posit purpose onto the action.  But after evaluation of judging itself, we realize that 
we can lay no epistemic claim to these purposes.  In regards to teleological judgments 
Kant discusses the harmony that arises when disparate empirical laws are united in 
the comprehensive plan of nature.  The awe of the majesty of nature, once mitigated 
by imaginative purpose transforms from amazement to admiration.  This admiration 
itself is “an entirely natural effect of that purposiveness observed in the nature of 
things,” suggesting that this admiration also falls under the rubric of reflective 
judgment and the purposiveness created by humans to express unity.  In this case it is 
the harmonization afforded by imaginative projection that transforms awe to 
admiration.  The admiration we find is a product of reflection on our faculties at work 
in the process of unifying the concepts of nature. Purposes found in nature are not in 
the objects themselves, they are, rather, imaginative positings we place on experience 
in order to obtain meaning from experience.  Kant declares that  
this harmony, despite all that purposiveness, is cognized a priori rather 
than empirically, and that fact alone should make us realize that the 
space to which I had to give a determination (by means of imagination 
in conformity with a concept) so as to make the object possible is not a 
characteristic of things outside of me but a mere way of presenting 
[them] within me; I should realize, therefore, that when I draw a figure 
in accordance with a concept, I introduce the purposiveness into the 
figure, i.e. into my own way of presenting something that is given to 
me from outside, whatever it may be in itself rather than this 
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something‟s instructing me empirically about that purposiveness, and 
hence should realize that I need no special purpose outside of me in 
the object to account for that purposive harmony.
511
 
 
The harmony we find in a unified system of empirical concepts, in singular instances 
of cause and effect, are not in the objects, but within the individual cognizer‟s 
projection of purpose.  Owing to the subjective character of this form, and all forms, 
of reflective judgment, and the synthesis necessary in order to collate all empirical 
laws of nature into, at times singular purposes, but inevitably a single purpose, Kant 
has recourse only to the imagination, as the power of synthesis.  It is in fact, the 
imagination that enables cognitive harmony in projecting a telos onto nature. 
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Conclusion 
 
The provocation employed to summarize Kant‟s philosophy states: “Two 
things fill the heart with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the starry skies 
above, the moral within.”  To his epitaph, I would like to submit one further 
candidate, the imagination.  For it is in the imagination that one finds a vital function 
that enables both theoretical and practical philosophy. 
From the work presented in this essay, one finds a coherent, historical 
development of the imagination, one that begins with general philosophical questions 
pertaining to the connectivity of the deliverances of the senses and the judgments 
made by the powers of cognition.  Beginning with ancient philosophy, continuing 
through the Medieval period and into modernity, the question concerning the 
accuracy with which we “get the world right” has long occupied philosophical 
investigation.  Such a questioning has led various philosophical figures to both 
denounce and employ the imagination as a liaison between the passivity of sensation 
and activity of thought, often eliciting a subordination or superordination of the 
faculty.  Such ambivalence to the imagination has led to a rather incomplete and 
imbalanced treatment of such a ponderous faculty.   What I hope to have shown are 
common themes resonating throughout the history of philosophy and a possible 
resolution to the protracted debates.  One such resolution is to affirm the activity of 
the imagination as a liaison, while demonstrating such a role despite changes in 
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metaphysical presuppositions.  By providing duplex interpretations of archetypal 
thinkers in conjunction with projective interpretations to uncover the origins of our 
use of the imagination, I believe one finds the increasing importance and continuing 
development of the imagination.  One can, I believe, affirm with Eva Brann a 
definitive role of imagination while accounting for the epochal shifts found in 
Richard Kearney‟s exposition.  In other words, the imagination does find a 
fundamental role in the human cognitive processes, regardless of whether one 
assumes a theo-centric or anthropocentric metaphysical model.  Although, depending 
one‟s metaphysical presuppositions, how one conceives this fundamental role will 
shift in place of emphasis, but not the role itself.   
Furthermore, by Kant‟s time the importance of imagination becomes manifest.  
I have argued that Kant himself feels the need for such a faculty, even if he fails to 
fully develop his own insights.  By providing a duplex and inversive interpretation of 
Kant‟s major works, I have demonstrated not only a consistent account of Kant, but 
also developed his theory of the imagination in such a way as to illustrate the 
fundamental employment Kant‟s make of this faculty, but also have illustrated its 
fundamentality and necessity in all aspects of cognition.  When developing his own 
theory of human cognition, I believe Kant upholds the concerns of connecting various 
aspects of cognition, but also transforms the often marginalized faculty of 
imagination in so doing.  What enables Kant‟s formulation is his employment of the 
imagination as a liaison faculty, much like it was found in philosopher‟s works prior 
to the Critique of Pure Reason.  Yet Kant also transforms and radicalizes this faculty 
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to justify and explain the self, pure concepts and the deliverances of the senses, thus 
providing the objective validity required in “getting the world right”, but also the 
means by which we gain contact with the world.  Such a projective and visionary use 
of the imagination and its products inform and guide our thoughts and actions.  By 
inspecting the critical corpus, one begins to gain a sense of the fundamentality and 
necessity of a power that can enframe, can build, can create and can project purposive 
meaning in our lives, an Einbildungskraft.   
By providing such a solution to his project, Kant expresses and fulfills the 
Enlightenment ideals of his own time.  Not only does such a projective and visionary 
use of imagination enable various aspects of cognition, but the transformation and 
radicalization of such a faculty highlights the need for such a faculty for the sake of 
progress.  It is only by envisioning the goals to which humans aspire, and then acting 
upon the teleological projection, that progress is possible.  As the capstone of modern 
philosophy, Kant upholds the Enlightenment ideals of progress, provides the means 
by which it is possible, and does so by illustrating the faculty by which we ground our 
theoretical and moral pursuits and by which we find a purpose in our lives.  The 
imagination is truly an awesome power, one that enables the various modes of human 
activities, theoretical, practical and projective. 
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